Currently, this blog is describing
and explaining its favored view of governance and politics – a view this blog
suggests should guide the nation’s efforts in civics education. It is a mental construct this blogger calls
liberated federalism. To date, the blog
has reviewed a couple of its elements, that being covenant or compact[1]
and equality. Readers are invited to
visit previous postings to see what has been described.
The next element is
communal democracy. As with the other
related postings, those dedicated to this construct, this account of communal
democracy will rely heavily on the ideas of Philip Selznick.[2] It includes the idea of the “consent of the governed”
which is derived from the principle of rule by the governed. This association was made early by the
nation’s republican leaning founders.
What the liberated
federalist perspective stresses is that the rule and consent must be viewed as
that emanating from a functioning community, instead of from an aggregate of
individuals (as assumed in the natural rights perspective described earlier in
this blog). This other view – this shift
– to a communal democracy entails four principles: “the protection and integration of minorities,
the moral primacy of the community over the state, the responsibility of
government for communal well-being, and the social basis of political
participation.”[3]
And in that vein, in
terms of the protection and integration of minorities, the decision-making
process in a communal democracy respects the foundational notion that the
process is a reflection of “the people as a whole.” This notion stands in counter distinction to unrestrained
majority rule, in which the majority has the right to do whatever it desires.[4]
The more communal
position identifies that there are individual rights, and that the system must
guarantee the integrity of each person’s fundamental needs and interests. Therefore, the majority is limited in its
ability to legally acquire what it wants.
Hence, the idea that rights protecting individuals that is found in the Bill
of Rights has its origins with this view of limited democracy or a communal
democracy.
In addition, the communal position is one of inclusion in
terms of fundamental law, the formulating of constitutional provisions, and in the
United States, overriding a presidential veto, for which a consensus must be
expressed through representative bodies.
Those incidences of consensus demand the agreement of diverse groups by
insisting on 60 percent, two-thirds or three-quarter majorities.
In addition, there is no
permanent majority. Minorities in one
issue can become part of a new majority in another issue. And upon losing on some issue, minorities can
exercise their rights to associate and rights of speech to convince others to
join them to form a new majority. Of
course, such an environment invigorates a polity and promotes engagement and
activity – hopefully for the better.
The covenantal or
compact-al, federalist view is that majority rule is a form of representation,
while sovereignty is best held by a people-in-community. That is, the community, through the
institution of majority rule as expressed in representative forms and limited
as indicated above, will follow in the direction of the will of the people. A majority, no matter how large, that is
cohesive enough to bar the minority from meaningfully participating, acts to serve
as a threat to communal democracy and as such, represents an impoverished form
of the democratic ideal.
The second aspect of a
communal democracy is the position of the moral primacy of the community over
the state. This tends to be downplayed
by civics instruction under the reign of natural rights thinking. Even though many descriptions of the social
contract concept are often misrepresented in current secondary school materials,
federalists prefer the term social compact, and a more communal view should be emphasized. That would portray the continual character of
such agreements beyond immediate conditions and render any transactional
character as being case-specific, i.e., being attributes of a specific
political contest.
For example, in using a popular
textbook – as a teacher is apt to do – it is likely to employ Thomas Hobbes’ description
of the state of nature to represent all the views of that concept, including
that of John Locke. The state, according
to Lockean theory, originates from preexisting communities, not from autonomous
and endangered individuals. By adopting Hobbesian
language, it minimizes the essential role communities play in the formulation
of societal origins.
“Whatever may be said of
other aspects of his thoughts, this Lockean premise [the protection of
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property] does not entail a radical
individualism”[5] as
Hobbes’ account tends to do. Instead, it
is based on a view of a person entangled or enmeshed in a social context with relationships
of family, friends, and commitments.
The creation of law in generating
a regime helps to perfect (and protect) the community; it does not create it. The community already has its foundation to
be moral through its kinships and resulting traditions that bolster its cohesion. Morality is allowed to transcend the public
and the private spheres of the community.
It also provides the way for the community to be “civilized.”
What results is a give
and take between the rights and the moral claims of the community. There are times when the moral claims preempt
private rights, as in the time of war in which involuntary conscription is
necessary and permitted. In more
ordinary times, compulsory education falls under this condition.
On the other hand, there
are rights that can be protected only with narrowly constructed laws; for
example, laws that regulate the search and seizure of private property in the
search for criminal evidence. This
balancing between rights and the prerogatives of government demands
interpretation:
… the
identification of fundamental rights is an aspect of constitution-making; and
constitutions, whether tacitly accepted or explicitly adopted, must be
interpreted. Interpretation brings to
bear prudential judgment, which requires appreciation for the diverse interests
and values at stake in the life of a community.
Constitutional or common-law rights to life, liberty, and justice are authoritative
premises for decision; they demand vindication; but their reach is not predetermined. There is room for enlargement of rights as
well as for their limitations.[6]
A communal democracy is
also concerned with the responsibility of government in maintaining the
democracy’s well-being. All but anarchists
believe government has the responsibility for providing services for the
betterment of society, even if that expectation is limited to concerns dealing
with the maintenance of the society in question. The argument is not whether the government
should provide services, but to what extent.
Historically, there is a
tendency for empowered democracy to create a social democracy in which the
expectation for governmental services rises significantly. A social democracy is not synonymous with a
communal democracy. Experience has
offered or demonstrated a number of cases where social democracies pursue
policies that are extremely individualistic, as even some welfare programs have
been, and, in turn, undermine the health of the community.
For example, Selznick
points out that in the United States, a centralized welfare state has
diminished the viability of local welfare resources and has debased a sense of
moral obligation in meeting the challenges of the impoverished. Instead of vibrant efforts to deal with these
problems, bureaucratic responses have deadened any spirit of liberation among
the general populace.
This theme will be continued
in the next posting by addressing how communal responses can address these
challenges and maintain a vibrant sense for a communal democracy.
[1] Covenants and compacts are sacred agreements. Compact is the broader classification of
which covenant is a subtype. While compacts
are sacred in the minds of those participating, covenants, in addition, call on
God to witness the agreement. The
Declaration of Independence is a covenant while the US Constitution is a
compact. Of interest, the term, federal,
is derived from the Latin word for covenant, that being foedus.
[2] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992).
[3] Ibid., 503.
[4] For a cautionary argument lodged against unincumbered
majority rule for the founding generation, see John Adams, “The Revolutionary as
Conservative,” in Great American Thinkers Volume I: Creating America from Settlement to Mass
Democracy, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1983), 156-207.
[5] Selznick, The Moral
Commonwealth., 507, emphasis in the
original.
[6] Ibid., 510.
