A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Friday, June 23, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, V

 

This blog, over a great number of past postings, has been presenting a dialectic argument that traces the history of political biases in this nation.  More specifically, it has traced the common view of governance and politics among the population from an original parochial/traditional view to a natural rights view.  Added to that narrative, the blog has described a current challenge to the natural rights view, that being critical theory.  In each case, the blog has presented these views from the perspective of an advocate for each view respectively.

And now, this blogger presents a proposed synthesis, the liberated federalism view, which he promotes.  In this endeavor, it’s time to present this last construct – to describe and explain it.  But before the actual model is described, some of its elements need to be identified.  In doing so, this blog will dedicate several postings to this task, starting with this entry and the ones to follow.

The first element is the covenant or compact.  This element, for the purposes of this model, retains its meaning found in the parochial/traditional perspective,[1]  but because of the current social and political environment, which is encouraged by the natural rights perspective, certain attributes need to be emphasized.

          Unfortunately, the term, covenant, as it is currently used, has become synonymous with the word contract.  But within this model there is a significant difference between the idea of contract, and that of covenant or compact.  Contracts are agreements between or among individuals or groups over limited issues or binding clauses.  Covenant or compacts refer to obligations that:

 

… ought to be seen as more comprehensive and more binding … [It] suggests an indefeasible commitment and a continuing relationship.  The bond is relatively unconditional, relatively indissoluble …

            Covenant is more ambiguous [than contract] … The ensuing obligations are not fully specified in advance; instead, they derive from the nature and history of the relationship.  Respect for parents, nurture of children, civic virtue:  these duties and ideals are neither founded in consent nor created through negotiation [as in the case of contracts].[2]

 

And with this quote, this account will begin to describe what Philip Selznick shares with his readers concerning the various elements that this blogger relates to liberated federalism, the construct under review.[3]

The function of a covenant or compact includes making clear what the fundamental moral attributes and standards are in the union formed by those involved in agreeing to the provisions of such a document.  That is, there is an explicit or implied deference to moral determination beyond individual will, a positive view of the self that can make and keep such commitments, a genuine interest in the welfare of fellow members in the union, and a clear listing of principles for a distinguished and identifiable way of life. 

These notions of a covenant or compact run parallel to those espoused by Daniel Elazar in his writings concerning federalism.[4]  And in this, readers should take note that this rendition of what federalism is does recognize its structural elements – especially in terms of government structure – but the emphasis is more on what Elazar calls its processes – those ways of conducting business which honor the notion of being federated or of being partners with others.

Along with covenant or compact is the next element of this model, which is equality.  Equality, as identified in this nation’s basic national covenant – the Declaration of Independence – which is a foundational document.  It has a strong moral component utilizing both religious and secular thinking.  If nothing else, experience has shown the evil that follows when the moral principles of this hallowed document are disregarded, particularly in relation to ensuing travesties to human dignity and to the conceptions of personhood.

More ambitiously, equality acts to encourage, from a collective or communal state of mind, the formulation of a reflected and felt constitution – a true expression of a people since this principle assures that all need to be on equal standing within the arrangement.  And beyond equality’s role in the formulation of a constitution, the same sense and value motivate the creation and maintenance of a healthy commonwealth that is derived from that constitution.  “Moral equality is the postulate that all persons have the same intrinsic worth.”[5]

Selznick describes this element from two levels:  baseline equality and equal treatment – more on this below.  At either level, equality refers to the belief that despite inequality in talent, wealth, health or other assets, the entailed value calls for equal consideration of all persons’ well-being, that all have an equal right to maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons.  This ascribed status is given, by this researcher, the title of constitutional integrity.

Constitutional integrity has a normative quality since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects of that condition.  Selznick quotes Bernard Williams on this point:

 

That all men are human is, if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc. are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be forgotten.  These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations represented in perception and thought; and the capacity to feel affection for others and the consequences of this, connected with frustration of this affection, loss of its objects.[6]

 

Factually, the judgment is made from the behavior of humans, that homo sapiens are equal in their ability to make moral choices.  There exist no elite standing in this regard; each is humbled by the leveling attribute; each is subject to moral discretions; each can realize fully his or her own capacities as a person.  These attributes are what lead to meaningful self-respect and a sense of empathy that allows one to reach out to others according to Selznick and, upon reflection, one’s own common sense.

Equality has certain aspects that Selznick uses to further analyze this element.  The first, as indicated above, is what he calls baseline equality.  This aspect refers to the minimal level of equality to which each person is entitled.  It is constitutionally or formally defined.  In the history of the United States, this in turn, has to do with jurisprudential development of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to its provision of equal protection[7] and, to some degree, the due process provisions.[8]

Of particular concern are the legal entanglements of the fundamental interests of the states, the rights of individuals as they are identified in the Bill of Rights, and the corollary issue of suspect classification (when a group or class is judged to have been subject to discrimination).  That concern suggests two questions:

 

·       Do the actions of the state represent fundamental interests of that government as defined by its police powers, such as public safety, and justify any adverse treatment of individuals?

·       And how do those interests compare to the rights of individuals affected by those actions? 

 

These questions suggest that when situations are targeted against some group or person, what are the countervailing values:  usually the value of equality vs. the value of some legitimate state interest.  In addition, Selznick asks whether individuals who are adversely affected by the actions of the state are members of a group with a history of constitutional abuse being directed against them.

          That writer highlights the effects of history and the relation of individuals to their commonwealth:

 

The constitutional doctrine of equal protection does not ignore or erase differences of talent, achievement, contribution, or good fortune.  It is not a device for leveling gradations or for making society more homogeneous.  It is, however, a path to community.  Equal protection speaks above all to membership, and membership presumes that all who belong share a core identity.  This identity is wholly compatible with rich diversity so long as that diversity does not undermine equality of membership.  The most serious threat to such equality is division based on moral stigma.  Whatever its source, whether it be a certain racial or ethnic origin or level of native intelligence, the effect of moral stigma is to rank some people as intrinsically less worthy than others.  Vindication of moral equality, in the face of strong impulses toward moral hierarchy, is the primary mission of equal protection of the law.[9]

           

Within a community there is the expectation that all members can fully participate or else there can be no meaningful commonwealth.  There is not just an expectation of being protected against abuses of power, but a whole range of duties and rights attached to membership and to the protection of being members. 

While these rights and duties might be bound by limited resources and options, they are what make membership meaningful.  And this line of thought will be further pursued in the following posting as it addresses equal treatment, the other form of equality identified by Selznick.  But before leaving this notion of baseline equality, the term should be held with serious consideration and commitment among the populace of a federated union.



[1] In a few words, covenants or compacts are sacred agreements that usually set up arrangements among people.  Actually, the overall classification is compacts, of which covenants is one type.  Covenants call on God to witness the agreement and compacts, unless they are covenants, do not.  In everyday life, marriage vows are either covenants or regular compacts.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant; the US Constitution is a compact.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992), 479-480.

[3] Ibid.

[4] For example, Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,” Journal of Church and State, 33, 2 (March 1, 1991), 231-254 AND Elazar, D. J. (1994). How federal is the Constitution? Thoroughly. In a booklet of readings, Readings for Classes Taught by Professor Elazar (1994), prepared for a National Endowment for the Humanities Institute. Conducted in Steamboat Springs, Colorado, 1-30.

[5] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 483.

[6] Ibid., 483-484.

[7] Mark V. Tushnet, “Equal Protection,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 257-259.

[8] Thomas O. Sargentich, “Due Process, Procedural,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 236-237 AND Peter C. Hoffer, “Due Process, Substantive,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 237-239.

[9] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 489, emphasis in the original.

Tuesday, June 20, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, IV

 

Inquiry suitable for secondary students in the field of political behavior needs to be concerned with the ideal domain of decision making. That would be behaviors at all levels from individuals to national groups.  That is, it needs to account for those elements of one’s thinking concerned with what should be.  The inquiry should include looking at and analyzing what the ideals are, their appropriateness, and the vibrancy in which they are held by political players.

          That study can include asking what the ideals are, why are they held, what moral messages they assume or communicate, and how powerful or transcendent are those ideals.  As such, a model of politics can and should be proposed by the political science community that incorporates ideal concerns when delving into how this domain influences the actions of political actors.

          Is political science completely disengaged from such a concern?  Here is how the discipline is introduced to prospective and new students at Northwestern University:

 

Political science is the study of politics and power from domestic, international, and comparative perspectives. It entails understanding political ideas, ideologies, institutions, policies, processes, and behavior, as well as groups, classes, government, diplomacy, law, strategy, and war. A background in political science is valuable for citizenship and political action, as well as for future careers in government, law, business, media, or public service.[1]

         

While one can detect some peripheral interest in ideals, the topic seems not to be addressed directly – perhaps political philosophy would be more disposed to addressing it.

Obviously, if political action involves the manipulation of power arrangements for the purposes of securing goals and attaining value satisfaction, then everyone is a political actor from time to time.  Such an encompassing model, one that directly and extensively addresses this concern over the ideal domain, was not found by this researcher in political science literature. 

The parochial/traditional federalist model, while concerning itself with political ideals, especially those identified as republican ideals, has been limited in its analytic efforts to describe and explain some idealistic view of what could or should be.[2]  The political systems approach, associated with the natural rights view of governance and politics – and highlighted earlier in this blog – falls short of sufficiently addressing the concerns of the ideal domain. 

Philip Selznick comes close to providing such a model (and many of his insights will be incorporated below), but the description of what he calls communitarian liberalism lacks comprehensive and isomorphic qualities in relation to what is called for here.  Again, the emphasis seems to be on what is and why that reality exists, and little attention is directed to the question revolving around the concern about what should be.

          What is offered in upcoming postings is a model of political activity not necessarily suitable for professional analysis, but viable for the study of government in the nation’s secondary classrooms.  That is, what is being sought here is not to guide the efforts of political scientists, per se, but to guide the efforts of civics educators and the claim here is that their demands significantly part ways from those of political scientists. 

Be that as it may, what this account is offering is a model this blogger calls liberated federalism and the demand here is that it should address sufficiently, if not directly, the ideal domain as well as the real and physiological domains.  Does that mean that this proposed construct can totally ignore the demands of political science study?  Of course, not; it needs to be sufficiently attuned to what that discipline holds as essential in its pursuit of political knowledge, but the ultimate aim or aims of civics educators do differ from that other professional field.

Before providing a description of the elements of a liberated federalism model and the model itself (being the topics of various postings to come), a word should be given to determining the viability of such a model.  This blog will address what conditions this model must address to be a legitimate and a viable foundation for the study of government in the nation’s schools.  Addressing this concern takes on several dimensions.  Eugene J. Meehan[3] provides criteria by which social scientists can judge constructs.

While a curriculum developer and/or implementer of curriculum have different concerns from social scientists, some of Meehan’s ideas can be incorporated into evaluating constructs for the purposes of classroom use.  The following questions suggest themselves from Meehan’s work:

 

·       Does this construct explain as many phenomena as possible as are classified under its concepts and generalizations?  (Does it have scope?)

·       Does this construct control the explanation it is presenting by being valid and complete in its component parts and in the relation between and among those parts?  (Does it have power?)

·       Does this construct specifically and precisely treat its concepts, making them clear in their use?  (Does it have precision?)

·       Does this construct have the same control over the class of situations it is explaining without changing the relations it has established?  That is, does it explain the same way time after time?  (Does it have reliability?)

·       Does the construct contain one-to-one correspondence with that portion of reality it is trying to explain?  (Does it have isomorphism?)

·       Does this construct predict conditions associated with the phenomena in question?  (Does it have predictability?)

·       Does this construct imply ways of controlling the phenomena in question?  (Does it have purpose?)

 

In other words, given the general goal of the liberated federalism model, how does its view of governance and politics match up with the realities of government and serve as a vehicle by which to present that reality, i.e., the structures, functions, and processes involved, including how it is contextualized among all relevant reality?

          But, as pointed out above, this construct is not aimed toward guiding political research by political scientists and other social scientists, but in guiding the efforts of civics teachers in secondary classrooms.  That means that in addition to the above concerns, there are exclusive pedagogic concerns as well.  That fact leads to two more questions.  They are:

 

·       Does this construct facilitate an educator to present its content at such abstraction levels amenable to students being able to comprehend the content?  (Does it have an appropriate abstraction level?)

·       Does this construct allow presentations of the material to students in such ways as to have motivating qualities in its presentation?  (Does it motivate students?)

 

A curriculum, to be viable, must sufficiently be powerful enough in relation to its subject matter[4] and be amenable enough to teenage students – students dealing with all the challenges of adolescence.  A tall order, indeed.

          What follows in the upcoming postings is a report on the way the liberated federalist construct addresses its subject matter.  Later, this blog will address pedagogic issues, but first it will “do” the subject matter.  It is argued in this synthesis that the liberated federalism approach, as will be presented, provides positive responses to the concerns posed by Meehan’s questions. 

What will follow in this blog illustrates that liberated federalism is a viable representation of governance and politics and a legitimate basis, from the demands of the subject matter, to generate the substance for an effective American government and civics curriculum.  The next posting will begin reviewing the elements of the liberated federalism model.



[1] “What Is Political Science,” Department of Political Science/Northwestern University (n.d.), accessed June 19, 2023, https://polisci.northwestern.edu/undergraduate/index.html#:~:text=It%20entails%20understanding%20political%20ideas,law%2C%20strategy%2C%20and%20war.

[2] For example see Andrew Roberts, “The State of Socialism:  A Note on Terminology,” Slavic Review, 63, 2 (Summer 2004), accessed June 18, 2023, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/abs/state-of-socialism-a-note-on-terminology/4C742B00BE0D00ED3F0BE855097DE5F7.

[3] Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought:  A Critical Study (Homewood, IL:  Dorsey Press, 1967).

[4] “Difference between Subject Matter and Content,” Difference Between.net (n.d.), accessed June 17, 2023, http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-subject-matter-and-content/#:~:text=Subject%20matter%20communicates%20ideas%20and,gaining%20from%20the%20knowledge%20imparted.  AND Ralph W. Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (Chicago, IL:  The University of Chicago Press, 1949).