An advocate of parochial federalism continues his/her presentation[1] …
This blog is currently reviewing the efficacy of the parochial
federalist construct. It is doing this
by presenting a set of conclusions inspired by Eugene Meehan’s[2] concerns
– comprehension, power, precision, reliability, isomorphism, compatibility,
predictability, control – plus two concerns added by this blogger – levels of
abstraction, and motivation (the last two aimed at the construct’s application
to curricular efforts). To this point,
the blog has reviewed the first four and will now turn to isomorphism.
This concern refers to
how well a construct matches, element by element, to that which it is
describing, explaining, and/or evaluating.
A fifth conclusion, therefore, one can make from the evidence is that parochial
federalism does have a one-to-one correspondence with the reality it is trying
to explain – that would be the governance and politics of the American polity. While volumes can be written about the
formation of this nation’s national/state governmental structure, processes,
and functions, they are derived from the application of federalist principles. By reviewing that process, one can get a
“case study” of how isomorphic parochial federalism is.
What has been described
in previous postings, though, still is at a certain level of generality that
the reader might judge as too broad. To
demonstrate, though, that the parochial federalist construct addresses more of
the one-to-one concerns involved with explaining the separate components of
American government, more evidence is needed.
While an exhaustive
account of how the construct addresses all the aspects of the nation’s
governmental arrangements is beyond the purposes of this account, what follows
is a selected summary of evidence presented by Donald Lutz[3]
that demonstrates that the federalist construct does address those varied
components and permits a more granular level of analysis. Lutz’s analyses are restricted to
foundational evidence predating the US Constitution, but he identifies various
far-reaching influences this exercise by the Puritans left for future
generations.
This is not to imply that
actual development in the Constitution could not be analyzed using
parochial federalism guidance, but extensive review of that sort would also be
beyond the purposes here. This blogger currently
wants to illustrate, using an ample sample of evidence, that a one-to-one
relationship between the construct and the area of study does exist.
Starting with the Puritans
who landed at Plymouth in 1620, certain federalist elements were
established. Lutz points out that the
Puritans (specifically, the group known as Pilgrims) were a religious group
that was interested in simplifying the religious practices of the English
churches and ensconcing them in congregational (as opposed to hierarchical) structures.
Being persecuted in England,
they decided to venture to the new world, via Holland, and “create a new city
of God – a society run according to the dictates of the Bible.”[4] And in that effort, they applied the lessons
they were exposed to in Holland where they acquired a Judeo set of ideas and
ideals.
Adopting the notion of a
covenant, originally from Hebraic tradition and law of the Old Testament, the
Puritans established a society and a politick on the following elements: a bonding among the members of the covenant, a
calling upon God to witness the bonding, and the consent of each member to join
the resulting communal union. This
latter element was a basic component; each member was free to bond and did so
of his/her own volition.
Of course, all of this
was accomplished by drawing up and signing the Mayflower Compact.
During
the 1600s over 100 other founding documents similar to the Mayflower Compact
would be written by American colonists.
Some of these agreements would create single settlements, while others
(such as the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut) would join several
existing covenanted communities into broader association. In each case the people created by the
agreement would be identified by those who signed the document. It is a peculiarly American trait that
founding documents like the Declaration of Independence and the United
States Constitution have signatures at the end. This expectation is part of the legacy of
early agreements like the Mayflower Compact, just as “We the People” is
derived from “We the undersigned.”[5]
The Mayflower Compact
accomplished several other important things basic to the nation’s political
perspective. First was establishing the
principle of adding or admitting new members to a covenant. Not all signees of the Mayflower Compact
were Puritans. A non-Puritan, though, was
not given subordinate status. A new addition
was instead awarded equal status to every other individual of the original
group.
Those organizing this
effort made this provision the beginning of a standard that led to the constitutional
provision that all new states, as they joined the national union, would be
granted equal status with the original thirteen states. Of course, such constitutional protections
such as equal protection under the law can be readily traced to this principle.
The second significant
aspect of the Mayflower Compact was its Lockean logic – foreshadowing
the influence of the Enlightenment.
Before John Locke ever wrote a word, Puritans in America were living out
his prescriptions by creating a society first and then creating a politick to
govern it. “On the Mayflower we find the
colonists doing essentially everything that Locke would later recommend.”[6]
One last contribution of
the Mayflower Compact was its clear statement of political values. These values included a commitment to
justice, equality, respect for law, and community. Individualism was not expressed in this
foundational document. Defined in
religious contexts, the Puritans brought with them strongly felt values and
principles that would evolve in the formative, colonial years and provide the
basis for a future bill of rights.
Lutz further points out
that the Mayflower Compact did not present a model for governmental
structure. As such, it was not the first
formal constitution in America. That
distinction goes to the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 1639. This instrument drew up the provisions
involved with the joining in federalist fashion of several Connecticut towns
into a political entity that would evolve into the colony.[7]
Again, Lutz identifies
various insights into how federalism covers the topic by sharing several
important features in the Fundamental Order document. First, all three parts of government –
legislative, executive, and judicial – were included in the General Court. Second, the constituent towns kept their own
governments.
Third, these local entities maintained a great
deal of freedom and, fourth, their citizen freemen were both citizens of the
colony and their respective towns (a modern federalist arrangement). The constitution specifically outlined the
powers of the created government. One
can admire these colonists’ sophisticated understanding of governance.
Fifth, there was a “supremacy clause” included,
giving superior power on points of legal conflict between the towns and the
overarching government in relation to the power under consideration. Sixth, in a more secular development, this
constitution is not a covenant in that it does not call on God as a witness and
is, therefore, a “regular” compact secularizing the agreement.
And seventh, deserving a highlighted status, the
Connecticut document bestows ultimate power to the people by being based on
popular sovereignty. That is, all the
government’s power was derived from the people.
This document served directly or as the foundation of the constitution
of Connecticut for 179 years.
This posting will end here with this report on
the Fundamental Orders and point out that the next posting will begin with
some reflective thoughts of John Adams on the contributions this document had
on the nation’s early development. But
before one considers Adams’ thoughts, one can appreciate from the above
descriptions how extensive and specific parochial federalist elements match up
with the subject of how American political thought and subsequent governmental
structures evolved.
[1] This presentation begins with the posting, “A Parochial Subject Matter” (March 11, 2022). The reader is reminded that the claims made
in this posting do not necessarily reflect the beliefs or knowledge of this
blogger. Instead, the posting is a
representation of what an advocate of parochial federalism might
present. This is done to present a
dialectic position of that construct.
[2]
Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social
Science: A System Paradigm
(Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1968).
[3]
For example, Donald S. Lutz, “The
Mayflower Compact, 1620” (17-23), “The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 1639”
(24-35), “The Declaration of Independence, 1776” (138-145), “The Virginia
Declaration of Rights and Constitution, 1776” (150-165), “The Articles of
Confederation, 1781” (227-248) in Roots of the Republic: American Founding
Documents Interpreted, edited by Stephen L. Schechter (Madison, WI: Madison House, 1990).
[4] Lutz, “The Mayflower Compact, 1620,” Roots
of the Republic, 18.
[5] Ibid., 19.
[6] Ibid., 21.
[7]
Lutz, “The
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 1639,” Roots of the Republic.
