KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE

Probably at the top of the list of what is currently disturbing has to be the hideous actions of what we call ISIS.  I must say that I never thought I would live to see the day that beheadings and putting people to death by dousing them with gasoline and lighting them up would be out there for me to see.  I have not seen the videos of these acts, but I believe the media when they tell me they are readily available for anyone to see.  How should we approach this topic in the classroom?  Do we bring it up and condemn it or do we avoid mentioning it?  Do we show the videos and run the risk that besides causing some nightmares, they might be alluring to some?  I haven’t heard one way or the other, but I suppose school districts are thinking about whether they should have some sort of policy to police this; if not, they should be.

But beyond these more potentially troubling concerns, how should we discuss ISIS, assuming a teacher is willing to take on the subject?  I think the first thing is to get some perspective.  Because something is outrageous, it does not mean that it threatens our existence or that it is beyond our ability to fix it.  ISIS is an entity that numbers fewer than 100,000 armed insurgents, localized in parts of Iraq.  Apparently, according to some accounts, the departed tyrant Saddam Hussein’s officers are higher ups in this force.  They are a group with big plans, setting up a caliphate and all; they have access to oil reserves and they are in the abduction business, raking in thousands of dollars in ransoms they are able to extract from the victims’ families.  Oh, they access to the Internet and social media that serves to broadcast their propaganda to a worldwide audience.  But all of that does not make them a potent force that can threaten the states around them, much less the US or European nations.  Yes, they apparently can spur some individuals to conduct ghastly attacks such as the one on the office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris.  But this does not rise to a national crisis; it is a crime and developed countries have the wherewithal to address it.  ISIS has no air force, no navy, no allies.  As a matter of fact, if they continue on the same course, they will antagonize enough leaders and regular folks that the victims’ anger will lead to action – as it has already done in terms of Jordan’s response – and cause the eventual demise of ISIS.  I do not see a healthy future for ISIS.

And this leads me to think of the work of a scholar I have written about in this blog:  Francis Fukuyama.  He, back in 1989, proposed that we have witnessed the “end of history.”  The fall of Communism occasioned his pronouncement.  And what he was specifically saying was that with the fall of Communism, liberal-capitalism survived as the default ideology.  Let me quote the April 18, 2014, posting, Grading the End:  “… his claim was based on a Hegelian notion of history marching by the drum of ideological conflicts (thesis vs. antithesis:  old organizing idea vs. new organizing idea).  He saw that, with the fall of communism, our collective experience on the planet was at the point that such an advancement had come to an end.”  The argument is involved and a bit complicated, but for our purposes here it is sufficient to say that because of this development, there is a lack of competing ideas that serve to inspire war between nations.  And sure enough, since the fall of Communism there has been a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts between nations, particularly developed nations.  What we have had are civil disturbances and insurgencies motivated by religious ideologies.  But even here, we are talking about limited numbers, even in the case of ISIS.  Actually, Fukuyama’s argument is holding up quite well.  My only concern today in terms of this argument is our current conflict with Putin over Ukrainian separatists.  But even there, sanctions might do the trick; we will see.  So, if I were teaching about terrorism and ISIS and all those violent images our media is full of – and rightly so – I think I would be well advised to keep all of it in perspective.  ISIS is not a mortal danger to the US and my biggest concern is that any of my students be attracted to the romantic notions of an ideology that glorifies martyrdom.

A FIFTIES SORT OF CHANGE

The years following World War II are important in developing an understanding of our current political outlooks.  It was during that time when the nation shifted in its prevailing view of government and politics.  Most of that shift seemed to be mostly at a subconscious level, the results not manifesting themselves more consciously until the 1960s and ‘70s.  There are many factors responsible, but one of them was truly hidden from Americans of the time.  Not until years later have we been able to get a clear enough picture to be able to make some sense of what transpired.  The narrative describing the shift makes for good drama and some of it has been the subject of histories, novels, and movies.  Unfortunately, in real life, the consequences of some of the changes caused many casualties, including fatalities, in the hundreds of thousands.  In large measure, these developments changed not only how Americans see government and politics, but also how they feel about them.  Ironically, the policy-makers responsible for some of the worst consequences attained what they wanted, not through successful attainment of their aims, but through their failures.  After all, they came from very conservative stock and their goals revolved around a diminished role of government in the lives of Americans.

Of whom do I write?  Well, they were mostly from the mid-West, a cadre of bureaucrats and politicians who originated from isolationist and religiously inspired folk.  They were the descendants of those who fought against American involvement with European, much less any other part of the globe, political entanglements.  This same reluctance, though, did not extend to trade.  They, mostly representing the growing agricultural interests of their region, were keen on expanding markets for their products.  This included not only harvested crops, but also mechanical equipment that was emanating from their newly minted factories.  And let us not forget the steel their foundries were producing.  So, entanglement was inevitable even if they did not see it.  And surely, such avoidance did not prevent our eventual entrance into two world wars.

After World War II, the folly of this ostrich type of behavior was beyond obvious.  Just about everyone, because of Pearl Harbor, became internationalists.  But being internationalists had to be an approach that mirrored the same prejudices that preceded the turn.  It would have to be one that reflected a Calvinistic orientation in which good and evil is easily defined.

No man represented this outlook more than John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration.  He, in turn, was supported by his brother, Allen Dulles.  Allen was put in charge of a new bureaucratic entity that grew in importance and beyond the initial idea for its creation, the CIA.  These two men played crucial roles in this shift in the perspective of how the US was to act on the international stage. 

Let me share with you an extended quote that I believe captures this shift and I will follow it with my take on its importance as to the overall effect it represents on our collective views of government and politics.

Because [in the Cold War] the enemy was cruel and totalitarian, we were justified in responding in kind.  Our survival demanded it.  There were no restraints on the other side; therefore, there should be no restraints on us.

The men who were the driving forces of this new philosophy, the Dulles brothers, Beetle Smith, and their various deputies, as well as the President himself, were from a generation profoundly affected by the vulnerability of an isolationist America to attack by foreign powers – as Pearl Harbor had proved.  They worried endlessly that the very nature of democracy, the need for the consent of the governed, made this nation vulnerable to a totalitarian adversary.  Therefore, in order to combat the enemy, the leaders of the democracies would have to sacrifice some of their nation’s freedoms and emulate their adversary.  The national security apparatus in Washington was, in effect, created so America could compete with the Communist world and do so without the unwanted clumsy scrutiny of the Congress and the press.

Given the nature of the Cold War and domestic political anxieties, the national security apparatus gradually grew richer and more powerful, operating under a separate set of laws (on occasion, it would become clear, under no laws at all).  In any crisis, if there was an element of doubt about legality, it was best to press ahead because that was what the other side would do.  The laws for the secret regime were being set by our own sworn adversaries, who, we were sure, followed no laws at all.

The key men of this world, the real insiders from the CIA and the other semicovert parts of the government, soon developed their own culture and customs … [1]

And to bolster this sense of entitlement were two early successes in which the CIA was responsible for two illegal coups:  one in Iran and one in Guatemala – two nations in which the ousted leadership had supposed ties to Communist leadership in Moscow (ties that have never been verified).  What they might have threatened were commercial interests in the United States.  In short, the stated purposes for our aggressive acts seem, in hindsight, to be highly questionable.

But perhaps more damaging to our more traditional views of governance, the posture, assumptions, and activities of these covert agents were to undermine our sense of republican governance, of citizenry oversight and participation.  The acts led to a view of government, not as an extension of ourselves, but one of agency apart from ourselves:  a consumer mentality that is highly non-federal in its orientation.  This whole development became one important force in undermining our traditional views of politics and governance; a rotting effect to our democratic ethos.

Historically, the above events paved the way to oversimplified estimations of global developments.  It led to overstretching in Vietnam, where we could not distinguish between Communism as a monolithic threat and the nationalistic strain in an enemy willing to sacrifice all for the integrity of its homeland.  In that conflict, our costs were over 58,000 US dead and a total count of over a million, not to mention the wounded.  But we won the Cold War and, compared with the world wars, at a fraction of the number of deaths.  And, as I alluded to above, the conservatives’ goal of diminishing Americans’ trust in government, as revelations of what went on keep becoming public, has diminished the trust beyond their wildest hopes.  From a federalist perspective, one can view those years following the Second World War as crucial to understanding what happened to our old assumptions of what our government stood for and could be counted on to be and to do.

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[1] Halberstam, D.  (1993).  The Fifties.  New York, NY:  Fawcett Columbine, p. 372.