A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Friday, April 13, 2018

WILLS’ AT ODDS?


This blog has dedicated a bit of space to a historical question:  when did Lockean ideas, in the form of the natural rights construct, become dominant?  That they are dominant today is not questioned.  But, the position of this blog is that while Lockean ideas can be found in American political debates all the way back to the earliest days of the Republic, it was the federalist construct that was dominant all the way up until the years after World War II. 
This is an important issue in that many arguments that natural rights advocates advance, tend to rely on stressing that the nation’s constitution sets forth a political and legal structure based almost exclusively on a standard of liberty.  In turn, that standard relies on a more modern interpretation of Locke’s ideas.  In a nutshell, that view claims that every citizen retains the right to do what he or she wants to do as long as he/she does not interfere with others having the same right.  As such, that view bolsters a highly individualistic view of governance and politics.
A more fuller account of the Lockean view is provided in two previous postings:  “Property As Self” (March 11, 2016) and “Property As Self (continued)” (March 15, 2016).  The reader is invited to look up those postings for this background.  This posting is a quick word on the writings of the historian, Garry Wills, whose work, Inventing America:  Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, is written in the school of thought that attributes to Locke much influence on Thomas Jefferson and the other founding fathers.
After reading about the arguments that led to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence and how those arguments reflect Locke’s ideas, one gets a strong impression that Wills is promoting this much earlier dominance of Lockean ideas.  But then he writes a general description of how the Declaration is somewhat at odds with this disposition.  This posting shares an extended quote from his work which, this writer believes, undermines this whole Lockean, foundational position:
In some ways, it would make better sense to treat the 1774 Bill of Rights as the basic charter of our Revolution.  As we shall see, the Congress did not realize the import of the document [the Declaration of Independence] it cleared for printing on July 4, 1776.
          The first of many accidents that helped promote the Declaration was that it concluded with a charter form deriving from the first Association’s pledge.  Our later cult of the “the signers” as individuals has obscured the fact the “we” who “mutually pledge our lives, our fortunes & our sacred honour” are the “united states” of the document’s title.  Though individuals signed as members of the clustered delegations, only states voted, one vote per state.  This compact-form gives the Declaration a greater solemnity than the Bill of Rights possessed, while taking up a greater responsibility than the first pact, the Association, looked toward.
          … Congress had spoken for the “united states” in terms of the most comprehensive and unifying doctrine available to it.[1] [emphasis added]
          This blog will, in some future posting, make comment on the 1774 Bill of Rights.  Here the point is that by Wills referring to the Declaration as a compact, this is in line with federalist theory.  Those readers who read this blog regularly can probably explain this relationship – it has described the significance of the term, compact, more than once.  But for those readers not so “instructed,” here goes a shortened description.
          Federalist theory is based on a social contract explanation of how a polity is initiated or should be initiated.  That is, the founders of the polity come together and mutually agree to certain provisions: 
·        a statement of purposes and principles,
·        a listing of individual and collective rights,
·        a structural model by which the polity will be governed,
·        a set of powers the agreement bestows on the polity,
·        any special provisions like prohibitions,
·        sanctions on those who defy any parts of the agreements, and
·        the signers (those agreeing to the agreement or representatives of those agreeing to the agreement). 
If the agreement calls on God to witness the agreement, it is a covenant; if it doesn’t, it is a compact.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant, the US Constitution is a compact.  The term federalism is derived from the Latin word for covenant – foedus.
          This accounting of a social contract is at odds with that of the natural rights view.  Here, federalism is not an individualistic view, it is a communal view.  This group forms and together decides to formulate this polity.  Yes, each member does have rights, but the emphasis is on the communal nature of the enterprise.  The gathering is bent on creating the common in the common good or in the commonwealth.  This writer sees their trump value is not liberty, but societal welfare.
          Whether the agreement is a covenant or compact, such an agreement is sacred, and Wills seems to understand this when he writes, “This compact-form gives the Declaration a greater solemnity than the Bill of Rights possessed, while taking up a greater responsibility than the first pact, the Association, looked toward.”  In other words, Wills, probably unintentionally, provides evidence – in the form of expert opinion – that at a more basic level, it wasn’t Lockean ideas that spurred them to issue the Declaration, but instead it was federalist ideals.
          Where they more consciously alert of the Bill of Rights of 1774?  Probably; the 1774 document was responding to the immediate issues they had with the British Crown.  But underlining these moves was a federalist concern to unite the 13 colonies under an agreement to secure their independence.  Given the potential consequences failure could mean to themselves, to their homes and communities, and to their futures, this business occupied highest level of their concerns.


[1] Garry Wills, Inventing America:  Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (New York, NY:  Vintage Books, 1978/2018), 90.

Tuesday, April 10, 2018

BALANCING ACT OVER US/THEMING


In the last posting, this blog addressed what motivates citizens to exhibit two social qualities:  social capital and civic humanism.  In short, these qualities are observed when citizens support a set of values – an active, public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian political relations, and a social environment of trust and cooperation – and to exhibit them to a higher degree than he/she would act out of self-interest.
          That posting, in part, asked:  why would anyone be so motivated?  It provided a three-pronged answer to that question.  Using the thoughts of Michael Sandel, the three are:  reasons of reciprocity, of sentiment, and of self-fulfillment.  The reader is invited to visit that posting to read the descriptions these sources of motivation.  Here, this posting will outline a critique or, if not a critique, a qualifier to Sandel’s sources.
          Richard Dagger[1] begins describing this critique by indicating what to him seems to be suggested by Sandel’s work.  Dagger states that by listing these three sources, Sandel is minimizing the strength of the reciprocity source and of the sentiment source and over relies on the self-actualizing source. 
A constitutive source of motivation seems to be part and parcel of what it means to be human.  As such, it would take on the role of being a more fundamental source, even if it is not felt by all people.  For those who reach a motivational level of self-actualization, they are constituted to pursuing this civic minded motivation.  By not succumbing to this innate motivation, they would be denying their constituted self.
If this is what Sandel is intimating, Dagger believes he is a bit unrealistic.  After all, few reach this level of motivation, so a society would be ill-served if it depended on this sort of motivation.  Dagger further states that one should not see these sources as being mutually exclusive.  That is, the three can co-exist within a person and, by so doing, they should not be viewed as deficient or superior, one to the other.
          In his comments, Dagger cites Michael Taylor who views these concerns as being concerns over community.  While social capital and civic humanism are qualities of a highly developed community, they are relevant to all communities.  Taylor’s analysis starts with the observation that community is not an either/or sort of thing; it either exists or it doesn’t.  Instead, there are levels of community.  The range, not subject to quantitative measures, extends from weak to strong levels. 
Taylor further identifies three “measures” he says determines the strength or weakness of a community.  They are:  the degree the citizenry enjoys shared values and beliefs, the degree the citizenry enjoys many-sided relations, and the degree the citizenry practices reciprocity.  These measures are also relevant to social capital and civic humanism. 
As to these measures’ meaning, they are fairly self-evident, but by “many-sided relations,” Taylor is referring to social arrangements that are not limited to a single purpose – e.g., a monastery – but have numerous purposes.  If a person is a member of a community arrangement that fulfills various purposes, members interact with each other on multiple conceptual and emotional fields.
Generally, the measures are robust in smaller and stable communities and less so in wide-scale communities.  Since modern life is more apt to be experienced in wide-scale arrangements, the qualities of community suffer in any given geographic area where more modern arrangements are prevalent.  Therefore, such developments as globalization – in terms of economic and political factors – pose serious challenges to maintaining the integrity of communities and communal life.  Obviously, this nation’s constitutional framework was designed to meet this challenge by adopting a federalist structure.
Bottom line: whether one is attracted to Sandel’s imagery or Taylor’s, one can see that societies, if they want to sustain their communities and, in turn, the sources by which citizens are motivated to sustain social capital and civic humanism, they cannot turn their backs on all aspects of promoting a sense of peoplehood.  It is within communities in which this peoplehood is expressed.  Peoplehood is a summary term that captures the essence of Sandel’s sources of motivation or Taylor’s measures of community. 
On the other hand, it cannot, to maintain a healthy social harmony within and without a society’s borders, by being antagonistic to those who belong to other arrangements or represent other peoplehood.  It is unhealthy to harbor and express prejudicial postures toward the Them, whether the Themness originates from national, class, racial, and/or religious origins. 
In a pluralistic society, like the US, this is tricky, but essential in furthering its truly federated character among its citizens.  This is a challenging mandate for those charged with socializing the young toward a healthy citizenship.  It is also becoming a challenge befalling other nations.  One can see European nations facing it as more and more migrations are crossing the various European borders.  It is spurring nationalist movements from England to the Eastern European nations. 
History seems to indicate that overzealous nationalist responses are potential precursors to animosities and even war.  Hopefully, the right levels between these opposing forces, peoplehood and pluralism, can be found.  What education teaches the young is important and this is particularly true of civic subject matter.  No civic issue is more important to civic educators than this balancing act.


[1] Richard Dagger, Civic Virtue:  Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York, NY:  Oxford, 1997).