Recently, we have been “warned.”
President Obama has told us: “I've got a pen and I've got a
phone.” That is, if Congress, because of its inability to act,
can't address the pressing issues before us, then he will act through
executive orders. The cry from the opposition party is that the
President is acting in dictatorial fashion and his actions will be
illegitimate and unconstitutional. Is this right? Whether it is or
not is a matter of reviewing each of his actions and analyzing it –
not my purpose here. My purpose is to add some context to this whole
question and establish some ground rules as to the notion of an
imperial presidency.
My first introduction to this
term, at least as it was being applied to contemporary conditions,
was its use in describing the presidency of Richard Nixon.
Symbolically, the concern was illustrated when he ordered the
uniforms of the White House guards changed to resemble, to some,
nineteenth century imperial uniforms and, to others, marching band
uniforms. The get-ups were described as “palace guard” uniforms.
Apparently, Nixon was inspired by uniforms he saw in Europe. But
the move fed the general impression, mostly fostered by his
opposition, that this sartorial move simply reflected the President's
desire to institute an imperial presidency. The newer uniforms
didn't last very long. As for my awareness, I probably already had
been introduced to the concept of a strong presidency in my political
science classes.
In the political science
literature, there was – probably still is – a strong bit of
reporting and explaining about the difference between what is called
the “strong presidency” theory and the “weak presidency”
theory. Weak presidency refers to the view that holds that our
Constitution created the presidency to be of very limited
powers. In effect, the powers of the office solely derive from
his/her duty to carry out the wishes of Congress. The president,
under this theory, simply awaits what Congress wishes, in the forms
of the laws it passes, and merely carries out those wishes in a
fashion that is as true to the intentions of lawmakers as possible.
The use of the veto by the executive – the ability of the executive
to say no to a particular bill – should be reserved for only the
most extreme cases in which the Congress has passed an obviously
unconstitutional bill or in which the bill would cause untold damage
to the nation or to the security of the nation, especially in terms
of foreign relations. This view of the presidency was very much in
line with traditional federalist thinking and, as I have pointed out,
in vogue long into the history of the republic. If that be the case,
then one would expect the use of the veto to have been very limited
during the years in which the traditional federalist view was
dominant. From the presidency of Washington through that of Chester
Arthur (1789-1885), there were 206 vetoes – including regular
vetoes and pocket vetoes. Ninety-three of them were issued by only
one president, Ulysses S. Grant. I cut it off after Arthur because
the next president, Grover Cleveland, issued 584 vetoes. One needs
to remember that Cleveland is the only president to have served two
non-consecutive terms – he won one election, lost one, and
then won one. In his first term, he issued 414. What is interesting
about this turn, from Arthur to Cleveland, is that since then we have
had a significantly higher frequency of vetoes by the executive
branch. The all time record holder is Franklin D. Roosevelt with a
total of 635. Then again, FDR served quite a bit longer than any
other president, but ironically was graced with a Congress controlled
by his own party. In any case, I believe the numbers support the
general notion that early in our national history, our bias toward
the presidency was to see the office as subordinate to Congress.
Slowly, but unrelentingly, our acceptance and then our expectations
for an active president grew and with that we had a change of heart.
Consequently, the institution of the presidency has become the
dominant branch. This shift began, ever so modestly, with the
dramatic administration of Andrew Jackson (he issued 12 vetoes;
significantly more than all six previous presidencies which totaled 9
vetoes). In contemporary times, since the Truman administration, the
average number of vetoes per presidency is 66 1/4 vetoes. The
highest numbers were recorded during the Truman (250 in eight years),
Eisenhower (181 in eight years), and Reagan (78 in eight years)
administrations. Of note, the Ford administration issued 66 in
roughly two years and five months. In our current Obama
administration, there have been, in five years, TWO. Perhaps the
current president wants to reintroduce the weak presidency theory?
Of course, opposing the weak
presidency theory is the strong presidency theory. Here, the idea is
for the president to challenge Congress in order to implement the
president's agenda and where Congress does not act, to take the
initiative and act. The first annunciation of this theory was given
to us by Andrew Jackson. He not only challenged Congress; he also
challenged the Supreme Court by refusing to refrain from a policy the
Court had ruled unconstitutional1
– a challenging strategy against the Court not followed by any
succeeding president with the exception of FDR with his “court
packing” scheme. In terms of relations with Congress, the question
is: what are the initiating powers of the president to develop and
carry out policy not authorized by Congress? For example, Theodore
Roosevelt wanted to spend monies already allocated to send a fleet of
our navy ships, the White Fleet, around the world – a showing-off
gesture to promote our military prowess. Some said Congress had not
authorized the expenditure. TR simply responded to the critique:
“try and get it back,” referring to the money. Instead of a
subservient role, the strong presidency theory calls for a
cooperative relation between Congress and the president in
determining what national policy will be. Sometimes, that
cooperation reflects a coordination, and sometimes it is better
characterized as a competition for power and influence. It is this
sense of competition, many argue, that is more closely in line with
the intention of the Constitution. It reflects the Madisonian
ideal of having the branches of government compete so that excessive
power would not fall on any one of them – “absolute power
corrupts absolutely.”
As for the charge of whether the
Obama administration is trying to reintroduce a weak presidency, not
so, say his critics. I was watching a C-SPAN broadcast the other day
of a Congressional hearing in which constitutional scholars were
invited to testify as to whether the Obama administration was
usurping too much power. With only two vetoes, the focus was not on
stopping legislation, but on the President and his administration's
execution of the laws. The charge is that through the actions of the
President and his interpretations of the law, he is not executing the
law as written. By behaving in this way, the President does not have
the legitimate power to do what he is doing. An often cited example
is his administering the Affordable Care Act in which he has delayed
the implementation of certain mandates written into the law. I will
not pretend to know enough about the law to determine whether he is
guilty of using unsupportable power to delay those mandates, but
there are certain guidelines by which to determine if that is the
case.
Fortunately or unfortunately, laws
at any level – national, state, or local – usually cannot be
written with such specificity so as to spell out exactly how the law
will be administered in its execution. Also, laws don't always come
to the executive fully funded. That is, for every law that
authorizes something to be done, such as the ACA, there needs to be
an accompanying, but separate, law that appropriates the funds from
the Treasury to pay for it. Often, that amount is not equal to the
task. Hence, this usually gives the administration power in
determining what parts of the laws to implement. This is the case
unless the law specifically identifies a priority in spending
choices. When the President states that he has a phone and a pen to
carry out executive orders, in order to be legal, the authority to do
so comes from the lack of specificity in the law or from a lack of
funding provisions. Oh yes; there are times when the law
specifically calls on the executive to determine the actual method by
which the law goes into effect.
Take the issue of whether the
administration will enforce anti-marijuana laws in Colorado where the
recreational use of it has become legal under state law, but not
federal law. The Obama administration has announced that it will not
enforce those federal laws; that is, it will not spend its limited
funds on policing statewide law breaking. Now, unlike a law, such
executive decisions are easily reversed by subsequent administrations
by the equally simple use of a pen and phone by a new president. Any
executive action, which is a product of a law's lack of specificity
or lack of funding, is in force only during the life of that
administration, assuming the President doesn't change his/her mind
and get rid of the order him/herself. The moment a newer
administration decides to rescind it, it is no longer in effect.
Therefore, as a tool in
implementing an “imperial” presidency or a “dictatorship,”
executive action is a relatively weak one. The veto is much more
effective and this president has been quite weak in its use.
Note: My use of the term, el
presidente, is not meant as a slur of the Latino/a culture – heck;
I'm a Latino. I just think it sounds more imperial, doesn't it?
1This
had to do with the removal of the Cherokee – native American tribe
– from the East to territories out West.