SOCIAL IMPLICATION OF REGULATED CONDITION

This posting is a continuation of the previous posting.  If the reader missed the last posting, he/she is encouraged to click on to it and get the context of this posting.  Overall, this and the previous entry looks at regulated condition, a form of equality.  The purpose is to see how a liberated federalist model is “activated” and depict how an association, particularly a government, meets a political challenge.

Social Implication – A commonwealth is faced with a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, the inevitable ranking of individuals leads to an uneven distribution of material values.  Such a reality, though, threatens the level of moral equality in the commonwealth – especially if the unevenness is extreme or functions to prohibit others from such advantages. 

Ranking is not only pervasive among societies of all kinds – even among those who set out to abolish such rankings – but it is also readily justified within those societies either directly or through some rationalization.  Calls to end all uneven distributions are unrealistic and attempts will cause unacceptable costs to other values.[1] 

In other words, policies that seek equal results, as is called for by critical theory, would be too costly in terms, not only in funding any resulting programs that seeks to accomplish such equality, but also in other ways as well.  History shows that attempts to even out distributions act to squelch the motivation of those who would otherwise engage in hard, creative work which results in advanced technological and other production oriented activities. 

Selznick points out that the experiences of collectivist societies which have made such attempts to end all uneven distributions have failed miserably due to talent flight or disengagement.  This seems to indicate that such motivation would be squelched.[2]

The key to resolving the tension between equal results and regulated condition is the classic liberal call for equal opportunity.  Selznick describes this value:

No one should be hampered, no door should be closed to anyone, because of a prejudice against that person’s social origins.  Whatever opportunities exist should be open to all without regard to social class or (as later extended) to race, creed, ethnicity, or gender.  Thus equality of opportunity has the limited objective of overcoming prejudice while maintaining the legitimacy of differential rewards.[3]

In short, the focus is on ending any caste elements within the commonwealth.  Affirmative action – proactive government policy that aims at eliminating arbitrary inequality – under a value of moral equality, is limited to certain activities.  They are:

·        identifying and providing appropriate training to those victimized by discrimination;

·        helping members of a discriminated group, or, if efforts are made to assist such victims, demanding evidence that public or private agencies providing such assistance have done so in good faith and have exerted a meaningful effort to rectify past incidents of discrimination by showing actual accomplishments toward those ends that advance federalist equality.

What about those who have not been discriminated against but find themselves unequally treated due to their lack of success in securing financial or material resources?  Selznick calls for helpful efforts be extended to them also because by doing so it would upgrade the group – the collective.  That is, the whole commonwealth is negatively affected by the reality associated with persistent poverty.

Public agencies, such as schools, should provide resources to poorer members of the commonwealth to encourage recipients to be able to compete for the limited material values.  This aim encompasses two ends:  directed assistance to provide the basic requirements of life (food, shelter, etc.) and access to the educational resources that are available to improve the competitive status of the disadvantaged.

The commonwealth would be based on the meritocracy that allows those who produce or have good fortune to benefit from their efforts or luck, but it dismisses as illegitimate the ideal that holds that “winners” are inherently superior.  Inequalities in such a value system – one based on merit – are tolerated because to eliminate them would be costly and impractical and would be disruptive and counterproductive to the general creation of wealth in terms of material and other assets.

Chronic inequality that renders segments of the citizenry to poverty ultimately works to the disinterest of all, including not only the disadvantaged and the discriminated, but the advantaged as well.  Therefore, the moral equality that is sought is based on a reciprocal advantage, not on sympathy, pity, or benevolence.  Under such a system, all should support such “helping” policy because, given an unfortunate turn of events, anyone in the commonwealth could be at the bottom.

This reciprocal relationship among citizens calls on a meaningful reality that, one, allows an opportunity to improve one’s position significantly, and, two, sets up a cooperative mode of social interaction.  It allows for rational decision-making, maximizing one’s benefits and minimizing one’s costs, but is more encompassing than the marginal analysis of the systems approach (which was described earlier in this blog as an element of the natural rights construct).

Selznick writes that this reciprocal relationship considers the potential and often real disruption that the lack of respect and dignity can cause in the social square or arena and the possibility that anyone or anyone’s loved ones can find themselves in desperate and deprived conditions.  The reciprocal relationship of the arrangement has strong support within its logic for a fraternal ethos upon which community can build and a meaningful commonwealth can be maintained.[4]

But there exists under this logic the temptation to see all inequalities as counter to moral equality.  One needs to be clear on the functions of inequality:

Historically there have been four main justifications for inequalities as contributing to the common good.  It has been claimed that inequalities are essential for: (1) effective organization for prosperity, education, public safety, and similar social goals; (2) achievement of excellence and high standards, especially in the realm of “high culture”; (3) protection of freedom, including the freedom to become unequal in possessions and personal attainments; and (4) commitment to ascriptive unities, especially family membership, which depend on recognition of special benefits and privileges.  None of these objectives can justify unlimited or unrestrained inequality.[5]

To summarize: some level of inequality is both practical and moral; i.e., a moral commonwealth should support an elitist element within its midst.  The elites, who are committed to democratic and republican ideals, are those the commonwealth depends upon to lead the pursuit of a moral society under those ideals.

Included in this ideal is the goal of establishing a community in which the elites and non-elites can live in a cooperative venture.  In short, that cooperative effort is to seek equality that restrains arbitrary power, encourages democratic participation, and promotes effective economic opportunity.

An Equality Aim, A Further Implication – This account of federation theory is about what should be taught in civics classrooms, not about constitutional dicta suitable for courtroom argument.  The writer knows his place.  In terms of law, in his humble opinion, the natural rights' manner of defining individual rights is about right; that is, while some things should be changed, even in the direction of federalist thought, by and large a system of laws that supports a more individualistic take on our rights should be sustained.

Legally, one should be able to define basic values and those courses of action one feels are best for his/her individually defined goals.  But such a legal system does not preclude the nation from holding “higher” aspirations for its citizens.  And “higher” is in terms of sustaining the health of the commonwealth.  But, just as those among the citizenry who wish everyone to be religiously moral, few would impose the power of government to enforce such an agenda. 

One can say the same for a law-enforced federalist “theocracy.”  The call is not to jam federalism down anyone’s throat, but for everyone to become aware of its noble history in the development of this nation (including its government and economic system) and its enticing promises to encourage and enable a more communal democracy. 

And that ends this account of how federation theory views government and politics.  What remains is a review of how its adherents would see how its adoption would advance the common good through actual classroom application.  That is the topic that will conclude this presentation of the federation theory construct along with a summary of the blog’s argument to this point.  It will do this by outlining a set of lesson plans that can serve as an example of how federation theory can be implemented.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 492.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 499.

REGULATED CONDITION

This blog is currently describing and explaining two forms of equality.  It is doing this to point out how a liberated federalist model is “activated.”  The liberated federalist model is a representation of how federation theory views idealistic governance and politics.  This model has three components:  community, entity, and association and the reader can check out the last eight postings of this blog for a description of these components and how they become activated.

In terms of this posting, the context is that this model focuses on ideal politics as an association, a federalist collective of entities, engages to respond to a political challenge.  As such, it is event specific; that is, it draws classroom study to analyze how idealistically an association should deal with a political challenge and, through that view, see what actually happens.

Since a political challenge, especially if the association is a government, is highly likely to be over an issue relating to equality, the current effort in this blog is to describe what that entails.  To do that, a clear presentation of what equality means is essential, not only in terms of its overall meaning, but how it is defined in its two forms:  baseline equality and equality of treatment. 

          Since no area of concern is more apt to activate the model than an issue concerning equality, this more extended treatment is called for.  Therefore, this blog has defined equality, a la federalist values, shared its importance, and provided a view of its related social implication.  It did the same for one of its forms, baseline equality.  

In this posting, it will build on its description of equality and proceed to explain its other form:  equality of treatment or regulated equality.  Specifically, it will report on the definition of regulated equality and comment on its importance.  The next posting will look at its social implication.

Definition – To get at what equality of treatment means, one cannot just plunge into a definition.  One needs to revisit baseline equality or equal treatment.  Even after defining baseline equality, it is helpful to place some parameters on equality no matter what economic or political arrangement exists.  Even though, on its face, there is the simple notion that equal treatment means everyone is treated the same, one cannot avoid asking:  is this possible?

With further thought, one is faced with the realization that there are some situations in which even just societies tolerate and enforce inequality or unequal treatment.  Upon reflection, one can readily see and understand these situations.  This can be simply demonstrated by looking at two types of such situations.

The first situation is demonstrated by a simple example that makes the point that there are times that demand unequal treatment.  To wit, the law doesn’t allow blind people to drive automobiles.  Perhaps technology in the future will find a cure for blindness or invent cars that can be “driven” automatically without the need of a sighted driver.  According to news accounts, this latter possibility is right around the corner.  But to date, such solutions do not exist and, therefore, this type of inequality remains. 

There is also the case of unequal treatment that is enforced because a sought-after product or service is too expensive for some.  This is a type of inequality, but one can legitimize it in that any good or service is limited – scarce – and needs to be rationed by some method.  The pricing system is a form of rationing.  It is easily supported by a capitalist rationale.  The central point is, as these two types of situation point out, one cannot have total equality.

So, even in a system of laws and customs that adopt solely an equal treatment approach to equality, there cannot be total equality.  With that in mind, this account returns to an earlier claim.  In describing baseline equality, it made the connection between equality and liberty. 

Liberty, under federation theory, is about having those rights to do what one should do, at least in the ideal.  What needs clarification, regarding this form of liberty, is by what standard one judges whether something should be done or should not be done.  Such an inquiry will assist at defining regulated condition.

It was pointed out in the last posting that this determination of what should be done can be complex.  Since one can eliminate the possibility of pure equality, everyone treated the same in all conditions, one already has a sense that distinctions need to be made in how equality is established and maintained.

With that in mind, it is useful to inquire as to what restrictions to pure equality exists under a federalist view.  This blog has presented a federalist moral code.  The trump value of that code is societal welfare.  In other words, what a citizen should do or should not do are those actions that when done or not done bolster the welfare of a society – at least according to federalist values. 

Putting this idea in less idealistic language, generally, what people should do is to align their self-interests in such a way as to not go against – abuse – the common good.  Ideally, what is valued most is for an entity to advance the common good, but at a minimum, the federalist, moral standard is to not abuse it.  In extreme cases, this can be backed with law, but in most cases, social expectations – norms – can secure general adherence. 

How is equality related to this common good?  In terms of regulated condition, it adds to what was pointed out in the last posting to be missing from the baseline form of equality.  That is the concern for dignity and integrity of each member of society.  This is a nuanced difference between regulated condition and equal condition.  To help describe this distinction, conveying a telling story is helpful.

Imagine a father with two sons.  The sons have both been stricken with a serious disease.  In the case of one son, the disease is potentially fatal; in the case of the other, it causes a high degree of discomfort.  The father has medication, but only enough for one dosage.

This dosage is enough to cure the disease, but the entire dosage must be administered for the medication to be effective.  The father cannot get any more of the medication.  To which son does the father give the medicine?  How does he make this difficult decision?

Both sons are equally loved and equal in the eyes of the father – he wishes he had the disease instead of either of his sons.  But even if he did care for one more, does that make a difference?  Does he flip a coin?  Does he have the sons race for the medicine and whoever gets to it first gets the dosage?  Or does he raid each of his son’s piggy banks and whoever has more money wins?  Or finally, does he tally how well behaved each son has been and determines which son has merited the medication?

Of course, he doesn’t do any of these things; he gives the medicine to the one whose life is in jeopardy and thanks whatever power that both sons are not fatally threatened.  This solution reflects the thinking and feeling of regulated condition or equality of treatment.  Yes, both sons are not treated equally in the strictest form, but both are treated equally in terms of some normative standard.

If the conditions were reversed, the other son would get the medication.  As it is, as a price for this form of equality, the discomforted son will just have to continue being discomforted.  But both sons, in this short anecdote are given equal consideration regarding resources, assets, and other entitlements along with being treated with integrity, dignity, and respect. 

This then is the definition of equality of treatment or regulated equality:  It is a treatment of each entity in which the person or group possesses a baseline equality (integrity, respect, and dignity) and the right to equal consideration, considering the entity’s needs, in the distribution of resources or other entitlements.  This mirrors the previous definition for equality given earlier in this blog and based on federalist values and, in turn, federation theory.

Importance -  A desire for equality in general, especially if it is emotionally felt, leads to the aspiration for creating a commonwealth in which all its members can enjoy equally a “regulated condition” form of equality.  When held by a society, regulated condition is categorized as a fundamental right; equal condition (equal treatment), on the other hand, is a derivative right.

Regulated condition is based on an equal evaluation of everyone’s welfare.  In pursuing this essential right, to the extent it exists, dissimilar treatment for people in different categories can be condoned and even seen a reasonable and necessary.  One doesn’t allow blind people to drive because in holding everyone’s welfare equally, the practical realities call for dissimilar treatment.  Dissimilar treatment, though, must be justified.

The need for justification is particularly demanded when, due to some historical developments, arbitrary categories were – and might still be – established and maintained for determining a difference in treatment.  Here the inequality was not based on equal consideration of human dignity, but on its opposite.  That is, the inequality was to promote the interests of some groups above others or to advance some misguided belief in genetic elitism.

In those cases, historical events or conditions established some grounds in which circumstances show that a level of disrespect to the dignity and welfare of certain groups existed (and they might continue to exist today).  In our history, the most obvious example is that of slavery and the treatment of African-Americans.  Also, a group treated in similar fashion is the indigenous people.  Hence, we have immoral inequality in terms of these two groups and others.

“The objective is fairness based on moral equality, not consistency for its own sake”[1] – and meeting this objective as an instance of regulated condition or equality of treatment is a federalist aim.  In other words, government should treat people differently if to do so would be to respect and advance the ideal that everyone has intrinsic worth.  And this is where the above referred distinction between simple baseline equality and equality of treatment is felt and observed.

Such a case would, in the name of equality, call for providing assistance to someone who has been subjected to unequal opportunity as is the goal with affirmative action.

This can meaningfully give substance to a moral equality standard; i.e., give treatment to people as equals, but within the parameters of a federalist moral code.  And this can mean dissimilar treatment.  Selznick argues that this dissimilar treatment is not meant to downgrade people, but to raise them to create a community in which all are ideally well-born to some reasonable, minimal level.[2]

A study of government in the nation’s schools should include inquiry and debate about the connection between the social equality that either exists or doesn't exist in fact and the moral equality which is advocated by this element of the liberated federalist model.  In addition, inquiry should be extended to ask what this element of moral equality would promote or prohibit as policy in either the public or private sectors of the commonwealth.

What remains in describing regulated condition is the social implication of this form.  That will be the topic of the next posting.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 491.

[2] Ibid.