NOT A ONE TO ONE RELATION

One of the most fundamental factual understandings that citizens should know about is the disconnect between social mobilization and political viability, legitimacy, and effective authority. What often leads to a common misconception is that social mobilization is often associated with economic advancement and that in turn is linked to stable governments. We think of rich countries or those who are becoming rich, offering their citizens more social mobility. Fair enough, but that does not necessarily make it likely that such countries will have stable politics. In some cases, the connection is warranted. The US is one such case. But in many nations, it takes very little economic advancement to create significant social mobilization and if the conditions are not just right, turbulence can and is likely to result. We see today, for example, that many nations that are beginning to experience minimal economic gains are experiencing meaningful movements among their citizens from rural to urban areas. Such mobility can have far reaching political consequences. Economic advancement – and its related conditions of higher incomes, higher productivity, and the like – and political viability, legitimacy, and effective authority do not necessarily go hand in hand. Let me call these latter conditions effective governing.

We Americans tend to think that the two – economic advancement and political stability – are almost synonymous. If not synonymous, we see an almost inevitable causal link between the two social areas of governance and economics or economics and governance. And yes, there can be a link between the two, but it need not be there as is the case in many developing nations. You can have healthier conditions in one without having healthier conditions in the other. Of course, a nation can suffer from both weak governance and a weak economy, but we should not make the causal link between a stronger economy and stronger governance.

It is easy for Americans to make this type of mistake. Our history has been, by and large, blessed with both growing strength in one and the other. Our development as a nation has been marked with a growing economic capacity and an ever increasing efficiency in our ability to govern ourselves. But globally, we have been an exception. Samuel P. Huntington¹ gives us insight. He argues that as nations have begun to become modern, the ability of individuals and groups to participate in national affairs has increased at an even faster rate. They are experiencing what sociologists and political scientists call growing social change and increasing social mobilization. That is, even small economic advancements are coupled with rapid social changes. But unfortunately, the rate of development in political institutions has, in too many cases, been woefully slow and insufficient to the demands created by the increased mobilization. In too many nations, rapid social change has not seen corresponding advancements in controlling corruption, having processes to accommodate power shifts, or developing processes to channel popular demands. Huntington quotes Tocqueville:

Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.²

Economic advancement has the tendency to promote social and financial equality. Equality encourages social mobility. Rapid social mobility tends to place demands on political systems and, in turn, call for advancements in political institutions to handle these increases in demands. Failure to keep pace, which often happens, leads to political violence and disruption.

A lot of the history of the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first century has been about cases of political disruptions. Currently, we are seeing a bloody civil war in Syria. There are bloody clashes with security forces in Egypt. In both cases, while economic advancements have been made, the necessary development of political institutions – advancements suitable to the conditions of those nations – has not kept pace. Writing generally, Huntington states, “[t]he rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder.”³ What seems crucial in these cases such as Syria and Egypt is the lag between the conditions that create increased social mobilization and the development of political institutions.

What I think is meaningful to ask civics students is: in addition to looking at developing nations, can conditions in a modern, advanced nation, like the US, deteriorate in such a way that economic advancement continues but the political institutions fall into disarray? And if the answer to that question is yes, can that lead to the same type of disruption that frequents many developing nations? Are we witnessing the beginning of such a development? Given the apparent inability of our government to answer many of the challenges our current economic conditions have presented – the inability to meet the real estate bubble and its aftermath comes to mind – can this lead to political disruption here? To date, this has not happened. Can we say that despite problems in some areas, overall American political institutions are well founded, established, and strong enough to withstand relatively small inefficiencies that might very well be temporary at worst? But a nagging concern lingers: as we see the gap between the rich and the rest continue to grow, are we seeing the beginnings of a rocky future?

All of this is worth discussing in a senior government class. Through such discussion, students can first become aware of the relation between social mobilization and political disruption and violence. They can then delve into how such factors operate in the US and other advanced nations. At least, students can walk away with a new found appreciation for the preceding generations that have done the grunt work in establishing our political institutions; that is, establishing the accepted ways of engaging in politics and governance even if the current conditions can be frustrating and foreboding.

1Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

2Ibid., p. 4.

3Ibid., p. 5.