I
am in the midst of presenting in this blog a set of postings that
addresses the question: what does it mean to say a person should
have the right to do what one should do? In terms of federalist
thought, this question is important because it reflects how that view
of governance and politics views liberty, at least as an ideal. Such
a view of liberty places, for educators, guided by a federalist
perspective, squarely in what is known as values education. That is,
by emphasizing what one should do, as opposed to what one wants to
do, this view of liberty brings to the fore an analysis of values and
valuing. In that light, I have over the past two postings presented
three assertion statements that model the possible ways a person can
express a value. They are:
- P likes X, because X leads to state Y;
- P likes X, because X is entailed in Z; or
- P likes X, because he/she simply likes X
In the last posting, I reviewed
the second of these assertion types. I want to now focus on the
first assertion type.
The more utilitarian assertion
type points to those value statements in which a person seeks or
favors an object or action that leads to some other desired object or
action. For example, I like writing this blog because by doing so,
among other reasons, it stirs in me my love of teaching; it reminds
me of my days in the classroom. That doesn't make you my students; I
wouldn't impose that role on you, but the very act of explaining
something is enjoyable to me. Therefore, the blog is a vehicle to
some state of mind or emotion. I believe that an instructional model
in values education that is amenable to this type of assertion is the
model offered by Louis E. Raths and his collaborators.1
Raths' model for clarifying values
does not offer questions that teachers might ask of students so that
they might inquire into what it is they should value – it presumes
that students have already formed values or dispositions favorable to
some object or action – nor as a way to solicit the students'
interests in the topic of specific value issues. The emphasis,
instead, is to have students consider certain ways in which they
think and feel about the likes they have. That is, they learn to
form true values that they can accept for themselves and that they,
in turn, are happy with their related choices.
As such, Raths' approach can
theoretically include the first value assertion type outlined above.
By categorizing it under the first type, I am not claiming that it
dismisses value assertions that are derived from philosophic,
ideological, or religious beliefs. A value assertion can seek to
reflect those types of concerns, but the distinction is that the
value in question does not need to be entailed in one of those
conceptual systems. Raths' approach allows for value choices that
lead to satisfying the demands of a conceptual system instead of
being, of necessity, entailed to some aspect of a conceptual system.
Here is an example: if I behave in a loving way toward my neighbor,
my motivation can be entailed in my religious beliefs, let us say
Christian beliefs. But what if my true motivation is that I want the
people I know to think of me as a Christian? This latter motivation
reflects a means to an end; that is, how I am perceived. As such,
the value choice, acting in a loving way, is not entailed in an
overarching value, Christianity, but in a way to seek a valued goal
or objective, a Christian reputation. In this way, Raths' approach
is more open-ended and does not necessarily lead a person to a
predetermined value orientation. In turn, as I hinted above, the
approach can be more utilitarian and relativistic. Again, Raths'
approach does not preclude value assertions based on an overarching
value system, but it does not depend on such a commitment.
Part of the appeal of this
approach to values clarification is that it can in no way be
considered a method by which to indoctrinate students to a set of
beliefs. His written account of his approach voices the concern that
so many institutions in our society are geared toward indoctrinating
others. When one reviews a lot of the communication that occurs
around us, we can detect some form of “selling” something to
customers, clients, patients, or, I'm afraid, students. This is not
necessarily a nefarious practice – the attempt to indoctrinate
might be motivated by altruistic motives. The problem is that by
being influenced in this way by others, we have become more prone to
avoid developing a true sense of self or a sense of commitment to
self-defined principles or goals. By taking a more generic view of
values, a teacher who applies Raths' model is implementing a strategy
aimed at getting students to learn how to form his/her own values.
How does his model do this?
First, Raths defines a value as
the product of a process. In turn, that process consists of the
following steps: (1) choosing freely without any form of coercion;
(2) choosing from alternatives; (3) understanding available
alternatives by identifying and evaluating the consequences of each;
(4) cherishing and prizing the choice one makes; (5) affirming the
choice; (6) acting upon the choice; and (7) repeating the action when
confronted with similar situations. Taken seriously, such a process
places a stringent standard on what can be considered a value. When
a person goes through such a process honestly, then we can say that
person has a value – or stated more descriptively, he/she has
formed a value. This is more meaningful than to merely state that P
likes X.
Raths views a person's ability and
willingness to value in this way as an element of psychological
health. Short of this, a person lacks values about those things in
which he/she is concerned. So while Raths does not have much to say
as to what those values should be – the “Z” factor brought out
in my last posting – he does have a challenging approach about what
it takes to form a value, even if that value is something most of us
see as unworthy of the designation.
In terms of my concerns with
liberty, this model gives us insight into what a person needs to do,
both psychologically and behaviorally, in order to decide what “one
should do.” To speak of some “should” without consideration of
the value(s) involved is meaningless. I believe the value of Raths'
approach is to give us a language by which to judge whether students
are truly valuing the positions they claim on any issue. The
approach can be used in developing value questions. For example,
students can judge how much a politician values, a la Raths,
those things he/she says he/she values. Is the politician willing to
act in accordance with some proclaimed value? How about in terms of
the politician's consistency in times when the choice is favorable to
the politician and in those times when it is not? With this type of
analysis, students can study an array of politicians and perhaps
begin to make generalizations about what motivates them or, at least,
motivates most of them.
So, while Raths' model does not
exclusively relate to the first type of value assertions, it does
accommodate them. As such, for more pragmatic discussions over value
choices, this approach to values clarification can be of great
utility. What remains in my treatment of values discussion in the
classroom is some theoretical attempt at melding together the
treatment of overarching values, as provided by the Oliver-Shaver
model, and the intensity of valuing, as provided by the Raths' model.
My next posting will address this topic.
1Raths,
L. E., Harmin, M., and Simon, S. B. (1966). Values
and teaching. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill
Publishing Co.
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