To date, this blog has
reviewed three qualities or disciplines which characterize responsible
argumentation. The three are order,
principle, and experience. This posting
will explain the remaining qualities offered by the social scientist, Philip
Selznick.[1] They are prudence and dialogue.
Prudence - A shorten explanation for prudence is: this discipline calls on a person to demand a critical review
of any derived theories or models against ongoing experience. It is what Selznick calls “practical wisdom”
and while reason is end-centered, it favors the continuum of means and ends as
when one looks beyond rules to the reasons for those rules.
If
one is about formulating a legitimate, moral argument, that process, by its
very nature, is one that seeks the truth.
When one starts the process without prejudging the result, has emotions
under check, and is about searching the facts through experience, then one is
looking for what is real.
This
process can also be one in which legitimate efforts at persuasion are
attempted. Therefore, there is a dual-purpose
process in which one can pursue one or both aims: truth ascertainment and/or
persuasion. As earlier indicated, to be
honest and effective, there are disciplines or concerns that the process should
effectuate. These concerns provide
important context when considering prudence.
A
person practices prudence in two domains.
One domain is the disposition to distinguish between rules as abstract
ideals and their practical application in real situations. The other is keeping moral aims targeted when
pursuing policy which is often the product of argumentation.
Imprudent
behavior occurs when one blindly imposes a rule in a way that disregards all
the conditions a situation presents and applies the rule in a mechanical
way. Such imprudence forgets the
reason(s) for the rule in question.
By
looking at the purpose of a rule, and its value premises, judges make good
their commitments to principled decision; by examining particular circumstances
they take account of the inescapable uniqueness of human situations. This is not a retreat from reason but a
distinct mode of deliberation.[2]
For a rule to work,
they must account for the issues involved within the situation(s) in which the
rule is to be applied.
A
problem with ideologues and detached bureaucrats – in many cases – is this lack
of prudence that leads to ineffective policy implementation and judicial
tyranny. A common experience by most is
when a citizen deals with a bureaucrat either in government or some large
corporation. Blind rule-following often
wrecks the purposes of the rules unnecessarily and leads to a loss of citizen
or customer support for governmental or business practices.
The
other domain follows this more practical claim.
It simply points out that in considering means and ends in the content
of an argument, one should coalesce the two.
In a morally based argument, means and ends can be mutually supportive in
that both are true to moral standards.
These, in turn, need to be transparent and defensible by submitting and
explaining, when requested, these standards to moral critique.
This
blog has offered the federalist moral standards. When so informed, one can judge how effective
the advocate of an argument is in exercising the discipline of prudence. For example, if a tax policy is geared to
encourage increased economic activity by lowering costs of business, but loses
sight of maintaining sufficient demand levels by consumers or potential
consumers, the initial means-ends connection has disregarded the function of
the first end to be the means to a more encompassing, desired end – a healthier
economy for all.
And
that leads to the last discipline,
Dialogue – A shorten description
is as follows: This discipline calls for a person to
honor diversity of ends in terms of both goals and understandings held by
others. This honor is acted upon by
engaging with others in mutual efforts by honest agents toward seeking truth and/or
prudent policy. As such, it depends on a
level of social capital or, at least, a proactive commitment to seek or
establish social capital.[3]
Earlier, when
considering prudence, one of its attributes highlights a concern over the ends
of arguments; that is, when considering a contested point of policy or view,
one should be cognizant of the “ends” the argued “means” are meant to
target. Oftentimes, ends, especially
ultimate ends, seem to be assumed; many times, those assumptions differ in that
they reflect differing or opposing ends.
One
can often detect these variances by the language each side uses. For example, in the debate over abortion, one
side will use terminology that speaks of the killing of “unborn babies.” The other side does not counter this
reference directly; instead it will speak of a woman’s right to control her
body. Neither side directly contradicts
the other’s claim because such language gets to the ends of the argument.
The
anti-abortion side has, as its unstated ends, its desire to please a deity in
that they hold the religious belief the fetus (there is no such thing as an
unborn baby) has a soul. The other sees
this battle as one prong in the war for women’s equality. Instead of getting into all that, argument
tends to avoid such “messy” aspects and just assumes, in its arguments that its
ends are above reproach.
But
it is here that participants should argue and they should do so through
dialogue. One engages in such dialogue
not necessarily to secure agreement. Instead,
one engages in this process to seek truth by seeing other perspectives, other
trains of logic, and other instances of devout and honest commitment.
It
humanizes those with whom one disagrees and it does so not by avoiding
strenuous debate and passionate exchanges, but by engaging in them. That is part of it: the passion, the emotions, and the
rhetoric. And yet, one can do all of
this with civility. But civility
presupposes a general environment of basic trust; i.e., that those with whom
one disagrees are honest, generally moral, and are pursuant of the common good.
Therefore,
one can’t have dialogue – not of the type described here – with everyone. As a matter of fact, dialogue, while it can
be attempted in usual argumentation, will probably occur infrequently. Why? Because,
the nation is not currently a society in which federalist values are generally
seen as the ideal, much less an ideal by which people behave. Instead, it has become a society in which
self-interest has become predominant and the arbiter of what is ideal.
But
this does not preclude a people from holding them collectively to some degree –
or even individually – as an ideal that can be strived toward. And so, one so disposed, can seek dialogue,
attempt it, and engage in it whenever possible.
Federation theory is proposed as a way (or better stated, as part of a
way) to seek a more general adoption of views supportive of the common good.
But
even if dialogue were readily experienced, this does not mean such
argumentation will lead to agreement.
Some opposing ends have been with societies since the beginnings of
civilized life, if not before. It would
lead, though, to greater understanding, empathy, and respect among a population.
Although
the risks are real, there is a place for the prophetic spirit, for passion and
rhetoric, in communicative inquiry.
Without confrontation, unspoken assumptions may never be truly exposed
to criticism and debate. People may not
really listen.[4]
And
what of the demands of the classroom?
How does this dialogue work there?
The classroom can prove to be a very demanding place. To begin with, students are a captive
audience. What is presented to them is
mostly not of their choosing. A process
that relies to any degree on argumentation, much less the process suggested
here, needs to be cautiously approached.
Arguments
over ends – what is usually treated as assumed contentions – will come to a
screeching halt if the appropriate build-up is not laid out. Premature attempts at such arguments can
easily devolve into shouting matches. If
that happens, those who will also cease to listen will be the students who are
sitting before the teacher and attempting to engage in such dialogue.
That
completes a review of Selznick’s disciplines.
Beginning with the next posting, this blog will attempt to meld these
disciplines with Stephen Toulmin’s model for logical argumentation. In general, the aim should be to apply each
of the disciplines outlined to date to each of the elements of Toulmin’s model.
[1] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992).
[2] Philip
Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community,
60-61.
[3] Robert Putnam tells us that social capital means having an
active, public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian political relations, and a
social environment of trust and cooperation.
See Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital,” Journal
of Democracy, January, pp. 65-78.
[4] Philip
Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community,
62.
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