WHY PLAY FAIR?

Two recurring themes in this blog are to, one, claim that the nation has generally opted a natural rights perspective by which it views governance and politics and, two, by so doing has encouraged a self-centered view of civic responsibilities.  Consequently, the nation, since the years following World War II – when the natural rights view became dominant – has, to ever increasing levels, become a nation in which selfish, egotistic social behavior has become more common.  The blog reports polling evidence to support these claims.

          In short, the blog has been critical of this historical shift and trend.  In a series of four postings, posted between March 25 to April 5, 2016,[1] this writer addressed the pro-natural rights arguments of Richard C. Sinopoli.[2]  He, in short, provides, ironically, a pro-communal defense of natural rights view (he uses the terms “liberal” or “classical liberalism” to designate this construct).  The reader is invited to visit those prior postings – they provide the backdrop for this offering.

          This posting looks at the basic explanation of why the natural rights view is susceptible to the above charge.  Sinopoli, harkening back to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, highlights the proverbial problem of the “free rider.”  He also seems to rely on what this writer considers to be a crude take on John Locke’s original version of liberalism.

          That version takes the following form:  all humans are equal in a state of nature.  That is, a condition in which everyone exists, unconnected with others, and fighting for survival.  That is a precarious condition, full of dangerous hazards.  It occurs to these humans, at an individual level, to contract with each other an agreement for the common defense against those hazards.  They form a social contract which includes the creation of a governing body or structure.

          This contract has the following provision:  the individual sacrifices a number of his/her unlimited rights in order to form the collective, but only those rights that are necessary for the sake of this mutual defense.  The individual retains all other rights to do what he/she wishes to do.  Stated another way, the individual maintains his/her rights to do what he/she wants to do as long as he/she does not interfere with others being able to exercise their rights in like manner. [3]

          Sinopoli addresses three criticisms that critics of this view have leveled against this natural rights view.  That is the topic of the above cited series of postings.  Here the concern is:  why would anyone who is a part of such a contract offend its provisions?  That is, why would anyone offend others’ rights?

          To begin, Sinopoli points out that it is rational, once the individual joins the collective, to behave to advance the common good if, and only if, by doing so his/her interests are advanced more so than by not doing so.  A general disregard for the common good renders the reasons for the contract as superfluous.  This writer would add, this is the case if those interests are defined in the long term – a perspective, by the way, the natural rights view avoids.

          Here is how Sinopoli expresses this:

Under liberal contractarian assumptions, all are better off by cooperating since only through a publicly enforced legal framework are their security and independence assured.  These two aspects – consent and benefit – form the liberal theory of political obligation:  one ought to contribute to the maintenance of the public order if one has agreed to receive the benefits provided by it.[4]

One should note how the common good is perceived; it is very limited to issues of common liberty and public order.  Very little room is given for “activist” governance.  Hence, such a view would have little tolerance for such programs as Social Security.[5]  It seems to have a blind eye for the realities of differentiation that can be attributable to such factors as class and racial prejudices.

          This account goes on; it points out that this ideal rendition has a practical problem in soliciting this minimal level of cooperation or fulfilling these minimal obligations of obeying the law – laws designed to insure the collective’s benefits and its provision for public order.  Summarily, the dysfunctional condition is labelled the “free rider” problem.

          It is a condition common to any collective effort.  Why help the collective – and absorb a cost – when others are fulfilling the necessary roles in providing the benefits and public order the collective makes possible?  It is rational for the individual to take that “free ride” and enjoy the benefits without incurring any costs.  This situation spurs one to consider justice.  Is it just to be a free rider?

          The intuitive answer is no as Locke indicates.  But is a concern for justice enough of a motivator to lead people to abide by the laws of the collective?  Plainly, since any society must deal with crime, that answer is no, at least, it is not enough for all or for a significant number of the contracted agents.  As a matter of fact, Sinopoli admits that while intuitive, this sense of justice does not erupt spontaneously.  The commitment to act according to the contract must be “taught.” 

And here a distinction is made.  Yes, justice is rational and subject to intuitive revelation, but that does not constitute the motivation to abide by it.  And, adding to this, the reality of scarcity provides enough of a motivating force to encourage many to engage in unjust activities – to become free riders.  After all, these realities render the promise to be able to do what one wants to be highly restricted by the fact there is not enough to go around and fulfill every desire.

In complex societies, how are these uncooperative forces handled?  With a bit of imagination, one can sense a competitive structure evolving.  Pit the interests of one against the interests of others.  For example, a free market provides a framework for such competition.  But a market also has rules and laws undergirding its competitive environment and why should those rules and laws be treated differently?  They are apt to be equally broken by free riders.  This is the problem in a natural rights world.

The next posting will pick up on this problem and comment on this immanent condition.  Spoiler alert:  federation theory is further promoted by this review of the free rider problem.  Can the reader predict the elements of that argument?

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[1] The postings are:  “They’re Not Lockean,”  March 25, 2016, “Not Always a Case of Morals,” March 29, 2016, “I Can’t Do What?,” April 1, 2016, “Step Right Up,” April 5, 2916.

[2] Richard C. Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship:  Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992).

[3] A qualifier:  this writer is not a Lockean scholar.  He has taught the basic ideas of Locke and, in his research of federalism, has read a bit of commentary on Locke by various scholars – some cited in this blog.  My understanding is that Sinopoli is a Lockean scholar.  Part of my defense is to point out that the ideas Sinopoli presents is not in accordance with what other scholars have expressed.

[4] Richard C. Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship:  Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue, 34.

[5] Social Security relies on positive laws that insist on workers paying a tax to fund the program so that current workers can enjoy its benefits.  They in turn will depend on future workers to pay the tax so they can enjoy the program’s benefits.  It is an intergenerational compact far removed from a natural rights rationale.