[Note: This posting is a continuation of a report on
the development of a civics unit of study.
This unit is directing students to formulate informed positions on a
governmental topic: ground rules
overseeing tort law. It is being
developed in real time. Writer wants to
identify his basic source of information, the Great Course’s course, Law School for Everyone.[1]]
This blog has been of
late looking at the tort concern over interpreting negligence, especially as this
standard relates to the common law limitations placed on potential tort claims
and represented by the saying: no duty
to a stranger. While this “indifference”
is applicable to most social interactions where harm befalls someone and others
having no legal obligation to help, there are exceptions arising from
established and legally recognized relationships.
This
topic deserves the review of one more case, Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation. This 1970 case reflects what might happen to
many people who live in large urban areas, especially during the years of the
nineteen-seventies.
Sarah
B. Kline began renting an apartment some years before an unfortunate event
occurred. That is a mugger attacked her,
stole from her, and caused her injury one day.
The attack took place in the common hallways of the apartment building. She sued the owners of the apartment building
and the relevant question was: did the
owners of the building have a duty to Kline and, therefore, liable in this
case?
This
event is not a simple mugging. To begin
with, when Kline moved to this building, the neighborhood in which it was
located had a great deal less crime.
Actually, the apartment building was what one might consider luxurious
with a doorman, marble floors, and fresh flowers in the common areas very day. But in the ensuing years the neighborhood
changed, and crime became common.
Demand
for the apartments fell and, while it is not known if rents decreased – part of
the record seems to indicate they had – the owners of the building ceased providing
a doorman. Incidences of crimes in the
building began to become common and the renters expressed their desire to
reestablish the doorman-service. The
owners refused. Where they now held
negligent in Kline’s case?
Part
of the argument for holding them liable was that if the elevator ceased to
work, lessees would not be responsible to fix it; it would be up to the
landlord to fix it. Was this not
comparable? Wasn’t a safe building – along
with elevator service – part of the assumed conditions a renter can expect when
he/she signs a lease or pays the rent?
And would it not be more efficient if the common landlord took care of
this problem as opposed to each tenant taking on the expenses of providing more
protection?
The
trial court – the federal District Court[2]
– found in favor of the defendant – the owners of the building – but the
plaintiff appealed. One argument the trial
court used to support its decision was to point out that a lessee balances what
he/she spends on rent against any services or protections the building
provides. Kline made these calculations in
her deciding to stay in the building. In
addition, she was a month-to-month lessee, and, therefore, she could of have
moved at any time without penalty.
In
addition, the defendant, the owners of the building, did not mug the
plaintiff. The mugger did. So, the chain of causation, according to this
trial ruling, ends with the mugger. In
effect, the trial decision could not see why the owners were liable for what someone
else did. As indicated above, Kline
appealed this decision.
In
the appeal decision, while noting this causation argument, the court did
believe that a safe common area is basic to this sort of business. Therefore, the federal appeals court reversed
the decision. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals found in favor of Kline and held the apartment building owners liable
for her expenses, mostly due to medical care.
So,
as a precedent, this decision further defines what related parties (related by
contract) have in terms of duty for a given fault and for a given harm.[3] Also, this decision helps to introduce the
next subject to be addressed in this account.
That is causation. It
demonstrates one of various legal concerns related to defining and attributing
causation.
Highly
relevant to the concerns of this overall history, Edward K. Cheng states something
very revealing about the inherent tension between the federated obligations
among citizens and what common law has bequeathed this nation, the
individualist view of legal obligations:
And
in these cases, duty is not only all-important from a technical sense. Duty also becomes fundamental because it
defines the difference between law and morality, and because it implicitly
adopts certain values, which can be quite controversial. The no duty to a stranger rule undoubtedly
celebrates rugged individualism and a desire for personal liberty, but it also
sets aside values about community and regard for others, at least from the
standpoint of legal obligation.
It is this tension, between individual
liberty and collective welfare, that makes the concept of duty
interesting. And it is because of this
tension that the exceptions to the no affirmative duty rule have historically
been a battleground for courts and tort scholars.[4]
This writer would
replace the word, “collective,” in this quotation with the word “associational,”
but beyond that, this quote summarizes what this history’s main point is.
What
Cheng has to say reflects the inherent antagonistic forces a free nation must
face. This nation initially opted, in its political ideals, for the more
communal approach – at least as reflected in its espoused values – but of the
last sixty to seventy years, has shifted toward the individualist perspective
not just in its common behaviors, but in its espoused values as well. And so, with that disparity noted, this
account will next turn to causation and related legal concepts and principles.
[1] Edward K.
Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone
– a transcript book (Chantilly, VA: The
Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2017), 230-445.
[2] Apparently,
the apartment building is in the District of Columbia, a federal jurisdiction.
[3] “Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation,” Case Briefs, 439 F.2d 477, 1970
U.S. App. LEXIS 7831, 141 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 43 A.L.R. 3d 311 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
6, 1970), n. d., accessed October 3, 2018, https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-prosser/owners-and-occupiers-of-land/kline-v-1500-massachusetts-ave-apartment-corp/
.
[4] Edward K. Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone – a transcript book (Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company/The Great Courses,
2017), 230-445, 264-265.
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