A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

HAVE REASON, HAVE RIGHTS


From time to time, this writer feels it is useful to review and perhaps further develop the basic ideas and claims of this blog.  It holds, as its major argument, that civics education should shift from a natural rights-based curriculum to one based on federation theory.  This posting reexamines one of its foundational concepts, that of the natural rights mental construct.
          For those new to the blog, a natural rights view holds that each individual has rights and that that includes the right to make the life choices he/she wishes to make and the right to pursue those choices.  Some writers use the term social-contract theory to designate this construct, but this writer finds that term problematic in that social-contracts can also include various compacts and covenants of a more communal sort such as federation theory.[1] 
The difference between it and federation theory lies in how natural rights promotes a sense of individualism that Charles Taylor calls “atomism.”[2]  What follows is admittedly an extreme version of natural rights.  It provides a slant that promotes the idea, individual sovereignty or a description purely based on the idea that those who believe in this view do so as a trump value.  But if one falls short of this seemingly extreme position, as will be evident from what follows, the whole conceptualization of the construct seems to collapse; this perception takes on an all or nothing rationale.
          The first point to make is:  the natural rights view, philosophically, relies on a utilitarian moral position.  That is, what is moral is what meets the valued ends of most.  Social policy, therefore, should reflect what most people want and that want is defined by self-centered calculations.  This does not predetermine that one cannot hold socially desired ends – such as less poverty in one’s community or nation – but it also does not promote such ends.  That’s up to each person to decide.
Common observations reveal that most seek self-serving ends that relegate concerns, such as for poverty, to be limited to those who are poor.  But one can ask:  can this level of individualism be sustained?  When one says that each is free to determine life choices without any principle or sense of obligation to the society in which one lives, can that work? 
Yes, believers in natural rights do see that each can be called upon to fill roles necessary for societal survival, but that call is conditional.  That is, the call must be within the parameter of it being advantageous to the person being called or emanating from his/her consent.  The sustainability question can be addressed from the demands associated with being human and the basic need of individuals that the social arrangements they inhabit survive.
          Using philosophic thought, to say someone, say A, has the moral (not merely legal) right to do something, say X, commands that A be respected by others.  That is to say, others are bound not to place obstacles on A doing or otherwise enjoying doing X.  But that also means A cannot impose any injunction on others.
          Why?  Because of E, that is, A’s essential property(ies), his/her capacities.  One has the natural right to exercise (do or enjoy) E, therefore, he/sh has a right, X, to do so.  So, for example, individuals have the right to follow a rational life-form; i.e., a right to life and unobstructed pursuit of rationality.  With that, he/she has a right to attain and maintain those objects or other assets – property – to exercise X in seeking E.  This would include beyond a right to life or freedom, a living wage.
          This view of people, rights, and capacities are so central to the natural rights view that society, under such a view, proactively seeks to secure rights and capacities and not be satisfied with merely not placing injunctions in their pursuits.  For example:
It is because men and women are the beings who exhibit certain capacities which are worthy of respect.  The fact that we ascribe rights to idiots, people in a coma, bad men who have irretrievably turned their back on the proper development of these capacities, and so on, does not show that the capacities are irrelevant.  It shows only that we have a powerful sense that the status of being a creature defined by its potential for these capacities cannot be lost.[3]
What warrants this exalted status for all humans; even in cases when E is not fully available as is the case with mentally handicapped people?  Various people have various reasons.
          One claim is the reliance on a belief; that would be the belief in an immortal soul which, in turn, relies on the belief in a deity.  The soul is somehow seen as an extension, on some basis, of that being.  A second claim or fear is that of a slippery slope concern.  That would be if one makes exceptions here and there, who or what determines the limitation of such exceptions?  One can readily see where immoral entities disposed to trample the rights of others by claiming some exception can arise.
Or, there is a vision that sees rationality – or its capacity – as being the crown achievement of existence.  That being able to think rationally culminates the development of this physical realm and deserves a vaulted ranking among those that have it or potentially can get it; that is, those who are human.
          Lastly, there is a self-described realization that humans – by and large – can give consent in forming a social contract.  This among fellow contractors leads to mutual respect and, from that respect, the claim of rights resides. 
Each of these is, of course, questioned and critiqued by those who support federated rationales.  For example, rational thought does not guarantee reasoned conclusions in the formulation and implementation of public policy.  Therefore, there is no guarantee that that, in turn, does not demand obligations and injunctions against X – the unfettered rights – since faulty reason can threaten any social arrangement.  History readily provide evidence to that effect. 
This blog will pick up this argument soon.  Perhaps as soon as the next posting.  This blogger needs to give that some more thought.


[1] Truth be told, he also finds problems with the term natural rights.  If one is to refer to what is natural, that is limiting what a human sense and behavior are to self-centered desires as is the case with animals (outside instinctual behavior).  He further feels that one can make the claim it is natural for humans to desire social arrangements even with their entailed obligations.  For example, a sense of caring or benevolence toward others seem natural enough.  See Jonathan Haidt’s book, The Righteous Mind, or a summary article (a review) of that book:  William Saletan, “Why Won’t They Listen?”, The New York Times, March 23, 2012, accessed September 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/the-righteous-mind-by-jonathan-haidt.html .

[2] Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 29-50.  The use of A, X, and E to designate a person, a right, and a capacity in this posting originates with Taylor.

[3] Ibid., 33.

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