From time to time, this
writer feels it is useful to review and perhaps further develop the basic ideas
and claims of this blog. It holds, as
its major argument, that civics education should shift from a natural rights-based
curriculum to one based on federation theory.
This posting reexamines one of its foundational concepts, that of the natural
rights mental construct.
For those new to the blog, a natural rights view holds that
each individual has rights and that that includes the right to make the life
choices he/she wishes to make and the right to pursue those choices. Some writers use the term social-contract
theory to designate this construct, but this writer finds that term problematic
in that social-contracts can also include various compacts and covenants of a
more communal sort such as federation theory.[1]
The
difference between it and federation theory lies in how natural rights promotes
a sense of individualism that Charles Taylor calls “atomism.”[2] What follows is admittedly an extreme version
of natural rights. It provides a slant
that promotes the idea, individual sovereignty or a description purely based on
the idea that those who believe in this view do so as a trump value. But if one falls short of this seemingly extreme
position, as will be evident from what follows, the whole conceptualization of
the construct seems to collapse; this perception takes on an all or nothing
rationale.
The first point to make is:
the natural rights view, philosophically, relies on a utilitarian moral
position. That is, what is moral is what
meets the valued ends of most. Social
policy, therefore, should reflect what most people want and that want is
defined by self-centered calculations.
This does not predetermine that one cannot hold socially desired ends –
such as less poverty in one’s community or nation – but it also does not promote
such ends. That’s up to each person to
decide.
Common
observations reveal that most seek self-serving ends that relegate concerns, such
as for poverty, to be limited to those who are poor. But one can ask: can this level of individualism be sustained? When one says that each is free to determine
life choices without any principle or sense of obligation to the society in which
one lives, can that work?
Yes,
believers in natural rights do see that each can be called upon to fill roles
necessary for societal survival, but that call is conditional. That is, the call must be within the parameter
of it being advantageous to the person being called or emanating from his/her
consent. The sustainability question can
be addressed from the demands associated with being human and the basic need of
individuals that the social arrangements they inhabit survive.
Using philosophic thought, to say someone, say A,
has the moral (not merely legal) right to do something, say X, commands that
A be respected by others. That is
to say, others are bound not to place obstacles on A doing or otherwise enjoying
doing X. But that also means A
cannot impose any injunction on others.
Why? Because of E,
that is, A’s essential property(ies), his/her capacities. One has the natural right to exercise (do or
enjoy) E, therefore, he/sh has a right, X, to do so. So, for example, individuals have the right
to follow a rational life-form; i.e., a right to life and unobstructed pursuit
of rationality. With that, he/she has a
right to attain and maintain those objects or other assets – property – to exercise
X in seeking E. This would
include beyond a right to life or freedom, a living wage.
This view of people, rights, and capacities are so central
to the natural rights view that society, under such a view, proactively seeks
to secure rights and capacities and not be satisfied with merely not placing
injunctions in their pursuits. For
example:
It is because men and women are the
beings who exhibit certain capacities which are worthy of respect. The fact that we ascribe rights to idiots,
people in a coma, bad men who have irretrievably turned their back on the
proper development of these capacities, and so on, does not show that the
capacities are irrelevant. It shows only
that we have a powerful sense that the status of being a creature defined by
its potential for these capacities cannot be lost.[3]
What warrants this
exalted status for all humans; even in cases when E is not fully available
as is the case with mentally handicapped people? Various people have various reasons.
One claim is the reliance on a belief; that would be the
belief in an immortal soul which, in turn, relies on the belief in a deity. The soul is somehow seen as an extension, on
some basis, of that being. A second
claim or fear is that of a slippery slope concern. That would be if one makes exceptions here
and there, who or what determines the limitation of such exceptions? One can readily see where immoral entities
disposed to trample the rights of others by claiming some exception can arise.
Or,
there is a vision that sees rationality – or its capacity – as being the crown achievement
of existence. That being able to think
rationally culminates the development of this physical realm and deserves a
vaulted ranking among those that have it or potentially can get it; that is,
those who are human.
Lastly, there is a self-described realization that humans –
by and large – can give consent in forming a social contract. This among fellow contractors leads to mutual
respect and, from that respect, the claim of rights resides.
Each
of these is, of course, questioned and critiqued by those who support federated
rationales. For example, rational thought
does not guarantee reasoned conclusions in the formulation and implementation
of public policy. Therefore, there is no
guarantee that that, in turn, does not demand obligations and injunctions
against X – the unfettered rights – since faulty reason can threaten any
social arrangement. History readily
provide evidence to that effect.
This
blog will pick up this argument soon.
Perhaps as soon as the next posting.
This blogger needs to give that some more thought.
[1] Truth be told, he also finds problems with the term
natural rights. If one is to refer to
what is natural, that is limiting what a human sense and behavior are to self-centered
desires as is the case with animals (outside instinctual behavior). He further feels that one can make the claim
it is natural for humans to desire social arrangements even with their entailed
obligations. For example, a sense of caring
or benevolence toward others seem natural enough. See Jonathan Haidt’s book, The Righteous Mind,
or a summary article (a review) of that book:
William Saletan, “Why Won’t They Listen?”, The New York Times,
March 23, 2012, accessed September 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/the-righteous-mind-by-jonathan-haidt.html
.
[2] Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Communitarianism and
Individualism, eds. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29-50. The use of A, X, and E
to designate a person, a right, and a capacity in this posting originates with
Taylor.
[3] Ibid., 33.
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