As
the nation approaches the election, it is a good time to review the makeup of
the electorate. In the time leading up
to the last presidential election, The Pew Research Center published
information that indicated how the electorate was changing from the 1990s.[1] The assumption here is that those changes between
1992 and 2016 have indicated certain patterns and the patterns are still in
place. If so, the 2016 information
provides contextual background for the polarization this blog is currently
addressing and will affect the upcoming national elections.
For example, one telling figure informs
one of how the non-Hispanic whites’ share of registered voters dropped from 84%
in 1992 to 70% in 2016. The Hispanic
share just about doubled, but was still a single percentage figure, 9% (up from
5% in ’92). During that time, the black
percent increased from 10% to 12% and the mixed-race percent went up from 1% to
5%. Altogether, non-white percent has
shot up from 16% to 26% during those twenty-four years. Today, an estimate has it
that the white population share is at 60.7% and there is a projection that that
percent will fall below 50% by 2045.
These kinds of shifts and projected
changes have and will have political repercussions. This blog, in its review of the growing
polarization issue, has pointed out some of these. In short, political analysis needs to
recognize the makeup of both major parties and how it is changing. Overall, the changes are more heavily
pronounced on the Democratic biased side.[2]
That side in 1992 was 76% white, 17%
black, and only 6% Hispanic. In 2016,
the percentages were 57% white, 21% black, 12% Hispanic, 3% Asian, and 5%
“other.” These numbers further support
the descriptive generalization this blog has made – the Democratic Party is,
relative to the Republicans, the diverse party.
Compare these numbers with the Republican/Republican leaning
makeup: in 1992, 93% white, 3% Hispanic,
2% black; and in 2016, 86% white, 6% Hispanic, and 2% black.
Another shift of note in the
electorate has to do with age. Due to an
aging Baby Boomer generation and the increased longevity among them, the median
age of registered voters increased from 46 to 50 between ’92 and ’16.[3] Adding to this shift is the added effect of
the decreased birth rates in the subsequent generations since the Baby Boomer generation’s
procreating years.
Of special note is that the
Republican/Republican leaning voters were relatively younger than the
Democratic side back in ’92 but in ’16 they were a good deal older. According to the Pew Center report, the GOP
side was, in ’92, 61% under 50 (38% were 50 and older), but in ’16, 41% under
50 (58% were 50 and over). For the Democratic/Democratic
leaning side: in 1992, 57% were under
50; and in 2016, only 42% were 50 and over.
How about in education? In a time when Americans have generally
become better educated (in 1992, 50% of voters did not have any college
exposure, in 2016 that figure dropped to 33%), the percentage of four-year
college degreed Americans increased from 23% in ’92 to 33% in ’16. Added to that shift has been the relative
proportion of how educated each side of the political divide has become.
Republicans were the better educated
electorate in 1992, but that changed significantly by 2016. The numbers are: 28% of Republican voters had college degrees
in ’92 compared to 31% in ’16 (with some college exposure, the percentage
increase was 28% to 35%); 21% of Democratic voters had degrees in ’92 compared
to 37% in ’16. Or stated another way,
the portion of Democratic voters that had no college experience dropped
significantly from 55% in 1992 to 32% in 2016.
What has been the change among non-whites
in terms of college education? The
change between ’92 and ’16 for this demographic can be viewed from different
perspectives. As indicated above,
non-whites account for a larger portion of the voting population. There are two categories of note: non-whites with college degrees and non-whites
without degrees. Non-whites with college
degrees went up (3% to 8%) and the category non-whites without degrees also
went up (13% to 21%).
Further
context: in 1992, 63% of registered
voters were non college degree holding whites.
That percentage fell to 45% in 2016.
But in terms of the share of all voters who were white and had gotten degrees
that only edged up four percentage points (21% to 25%) between those two years.
Another demographic category experiencing
a shift is religious membership. Here,
those who do not identify with any religion have increased in their percent from
8% in 1992 to 21% in 2016. And that
increase is found more often on the Democratic side. That, in effect, widens the gap in terms of
religion. That side, the Democratic
side, was noted for having 29% classifying themselves as atheist, agnostic, or
non-affiliated in 2016. It was only 10%
in 1992.
As for Democrats or Democratic leaning
respondents, in 2016, 11% were white mainline Protestants, 10% white Catholics,
and 8% white evangelicals. Together,
these three groups had fewer percentages in 2016 than in 1992. In terms of black Protestants, they
constitute 15% of all Democratic voters.
Hispanic Catholic make up 6%.
These last two groups have not changed in terms of percentages since
1992.
On the Republican side, change has been
very small. To no surprise, they are
more likely to be affiliated with a religion, and that likelihood is
increasing. There, 2016, the numbers were: 35% of Republican voters were white
evangelical Protestants, 18% were white Catholics, 17% were white mainline
Protestants, and 12% were religiously unaffiliated. This last rate rose six points in the years
between 1992 and 2016.
The Pew report states, “There has been
little change in the share of all GOP voters who are white evangelical
Protestants or white Catholics over the past two decades, but the share who are
white mainline Protestants has declined 12 points.”[4] This last bit of information further
heightens what this blog is reporting, i.e., demographic factors seem to be
feeding the polarization forces one finds among the electorate.
Surely, after the upcoming election has
taken place and groups such as the Pew Center do their analyses of the results
or any surveying they do, one can see if the assumption cited earlier bear out,
i.e., that the trends the 2016 analysis discovered have continued if not
increased in the subsequent years.
If a civics teacher chooses to address
these or similar numbers, students can probably add to any ensuing discussion
by relating anecdotal information as to whether their home or neighborhood life
resembles or stands in counter distinction to the trends the above statistics point
out.
[1] “1.
The Changing Composition of the Political Parties,” The Pew Research Center (September 13, 2016),
accessed August 31, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/09/13/1-the-changing-composition-of-the-political-parties/ .
[2] By Democratic biased side, the reference is to those
voters who either vote Democratic or tend to vote Democratic.
[3] Readers should note these percentages refer to
registered voters and not the population, as a whole. According to one site, the current median age
is 38.3. See “United States Population,”
Worldometer (n.d.) accessed August 31, 2020, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/#:~:text=The%20median%20age%20in%20the%20United%20States%20is%2038.3%20years.
[4] Ibid.
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