The last posting touched on
the cleanliness of political systems thinking – its theorizing – in which
researchers tend to bank on the rational assumption. That is, by focusing on decision-making, the
natural rights perspective can be boiled down at various levels to individuals
calculating marginal cost and marginal benefits and choosing which option
promises to render the highest profit or the least loss.
While this is a powerful
notion and often is sufficient in understanding human behavior, it undermines
what all goes on among people when confronted with opportunities or dilemmas. Philip Selznick picks up on this theme and
argues that modern thinking about this aspect of life has become more systems
oriented. He writes that the ensuing
rationality has an effect on how people measure each other and their expectations:
[In traditional society,] The
rationality of the lifeworld is oriented toward mutual understanding … not
success. Human interaction becomes more
rational as people come to know each other’s premises; as they properly
interpret meanings and motivations; as they use the resources of a shared
language for criticism, dialogue, and agreement. The rationality that looks to success or
goal-seeking [in modern societies] employs other resources and a different
logic. Instead of relying on human
communication and natural language, which are inherently disorderly, fuzzy, and
connotative, rationality is sought in artificial languages. These include the abstraction of money and obedience. In engineered and programmed systems, the
process of Verstandigung, of working toward mutual understanding and
rational consensus, are [sic] swept out as unwelcome distractions.[1]
The problem is that certain benefits and rewards, or the
standards that establish conditions as benefits and rewards, are beyond measure
and money. What parent would sell his or
her child into slavery? What amount of money
would one need to give up a way of life, a religious belief, or worship? For many, there is no amount. And when political behavior is based on these
kinds of considerations, a political systems approach fails to account for or
understand the ensuing behavior.
By way of example, a look at political decision-making by
politicians can be instructive. Game
theory analysts use the analytical tool – the prisoner’s dilemma[2] – to
explain how a representative in Congress would “irrationally” address a problem
such as the national debt.
Given that a representative
might go to Washington with the intent to work toward eliminating expenditures
on wasteful programs, that politician soon faces a dilemma. If the representative votes for eliminating all
waste, he/she manages to antagonize those interests in the home district that
would benefit from the expenditures locally.
To win the campaign to
eliminate the national debt, this congressperson must convince the majority in
Congress to follow his/her example.
Whether the representative is successful in this latter effort, the lawmaker
will not be reelected because it is those interests, the ones that were put off
by fighting the problem, that make the financial contributions that lead to
successful election campaigns. In
addition to not supporting the waste elimination congressperson, the interests
will act aggressively to replace this crusader.
As for the rest of the
population, their benefits are too diffused to overcome the costs of supporting
the good legislator by either making campaign contributions, working for the
campaign, or even, for too many, voting.
So, the championing legislator can look forward to one term, and since
all congresspeople face the same conditions, it will be very likely a majority
of the Congress will respond with no action on this issue.
If, on the other hand, the congressperson votes for locally
favored expenditures of federal dollars that add to the national debt and might
be wasteful, the would-be crusader is likely to win the local affected interest’s
active support. If the majority of the
House votes to eliminate waste, the somewhat hypocritical representative can
feel the satisfaction of seeing the original desired result take place. If the majority does not, a much more likely
result, at least the featured legislator can get reelected and return to fight
another day.
Of course, if one adds to the mix the practice of log
rolling, in which one representative votes for other district spending in
exchange for spending in that representative’s district, the likelihood of ever
eliminating waste in government spending seems systematically impossible. Marginal thinking, in other words, can lead
to conditions generally not desired by the majority of a republic.[3]
Need one hold such a cynical view of republican governance? Only if the system or the polity cannot
engender, on the part of the citizenry, other goals and values than those based
on financial or, as Selznick points out, command motives. If other values and goals, perhaps those that
emanate from communal bonds, are encouraged and promoted, could these be strong
enough to make the support of this or any conscientious legislator rational?
Such goals and values might verge on formulating and
socializing a social morality. This
critique postulates that such goals and values can be developed and
maintained. Without such a possibility, which
is outside the realm of concern of the natural rights perspective, one is left
with the cynical conclusion that a republic cannot have the discipline to
develop policy that entails sacrifice, even when the majority favors such
efforts.
Of course, a review of successful legislative ideas and
ideals might demonstrate to readers that this lack of fortitude describes the
system more accurately than one that entertains the possibility of conscientious
politicians. Yet the history of the
nation does include a series of beneficial legislation. While nirvana has not been reached, how many
readers are willing to move elsewhere or give up on the system? After all, this blogger has heard that he
should not ask what America can do for him, but what he can do for America.
[1] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992), 255.
[2] “The prisoner’s
dilemma presents a situation in which two parties, separated and unable to
communicate, must choose between cooperating with the other or not. The highest
reward for each party occurs when both parties choose to co-operate.” See “What Is the Prisoner’s Dilemma and How
Does It Work?,” Investopedia (August 4, 2022), accessed February 12, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prisoners-dilemma.asp#:~:text=Understanding%20the%20Prisoner's%20Dilemma&text=The%20prisoner's%20dilemma%20presents%20a,parties%20choose%20to%20co%2Doperate.
[3] “Special Interest Politics,” OER Services/OS Microeconomics
2e (n.d.), accessed February 11, 2023, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-microeconomics2/chapter/special-interest-politics/ AND Paul Heyne, The Economic Way of Thinking
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1997/ with Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko – Tenth Edition – 2002).
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