In the last posting, this
blog introduced the last of four elements constituting the mental construct,
liberated federalism. Along with
covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy, the fourth element is covenant
of reason. This blog is sharing three
aspects of this last element; the last posting addressed the first of these,
critique of preferences. This posting
will turn to the other two: claims of
conscience and treatment of individual interests and, as with the other ideas
concerning liberated federalism, it will rely on the theorizing of Philip
Selznick.[1]
As for claims of conscience, the liberated federalist perspective
holds that an integral attribute of human dignity is the ability and rights to
formulate the substance of one’s conscience.
But this right is not given blanket approval irrespective of its
content. A challenging distinction must
be made. This perspective holds that any
set of beliefs is subject to a review of its justification in terms of existing
moral systems.
This does not mean that a particular set of such beliefs
needs to precisely reflect an existing system; one can vary from such systems,
but its premises should meet reasonable standards. Beyond this test, there is a certain level of
insulation granted to the person or group who has formulated these beliefs. The risk is to abet evil beliefs.
Toleration of diverse beliefs should not preclude vigilance
against such evil. Activities based on
such evil, short of illegal ones, should be allowed, not out of a concern for
dignity of those who harbor such beliefs, but out of a concern for the
“slippery slope.” When actions or beliefs
are prohibited, where do the prohibitions end?
Hard rules need to be set up for this eventuality to protect society
against the temptations to abuse rights in this area.
In terms of the broader arenas of private interests, what elicit
reflective morality? For example, is the
business world beyond any realistic expectation for decision making that is
based on moral concerns or, as various commentators have pointed out, are
American businesses restrained only by the fear of being caught in illegal
activities?
The liberated federalist
perspective first recognizes the essential role that self-interest plays in the
success of capitalism. Self-interest is
seen as a dispassionate view about what beneficial assets are possessed by a
party and the potential opportunities presented to that party. Self-interest is to maintain and advance
those assets and opportunities. As a disciplined
motivator, it is a source of energy that capitalistic systems assume to be needed
for success.
But there is a difference between short-term self-interest
and long-term self-interest. Short term
self-interest accounts for immediate benefits and costs. It is analyzed by marginal analysis (that
this blog described when reviewing the natural rights view). Particular gains are usually the goal, and
the consequences are narrowly defined.
Long-term self-interest considers
benefits and costs from a longer time perspective. As such, the relevant concerns consider a
wider range of benefits and costs. The
practical concerns of moral behavior are more readily taken into the
calculations. Interest in trust and
cooperation, as long-term assets, become more viable. That is, reflective morality, based on
self-interest, has an opportunity to take place in the long term. The challenge is to encourage the discipline needed
to think in the long term.
The Madisonian model stated that numbers of factions are
important. A few factions, say one or
two of them, are likely to be in political environments that allow them to become
highly powerful. But when many compete, these
factions do so for power assets preventing a few of them from taking control, and
this is relevant to advancing the common good.
It, the model, did not
count on Americans being disposed to consider long term self-interest and
relying on such consideration to encourage or be a source of desirable behavior. Instead, Madison argued that the competition
of factions in an extended republic (with many factions competing in their respective
markets) was to yield outcomes with the highest possible good.
The liberated federalist perspective does not dismiss a Madisonian
solution as totally dysfunctional to that stated end. As a back-up structural arrangement, it
performs well. But it cannot substitute
for a generally socialized value that supports people, including businesspeople,
engaging in long term self-interest calculations. Such a socialized message depends on strong
institutions at the local level, such as family, church, and schools. Such a message should be an integral part of
government and civic instruction at the secondary level.
The next, and last aspect of the covenant of reason has to
do with individual interest and the common good. Is the community – common – good simply the
sum total of individual goods? Or is the
common good of the community something beyond that total? Due to the nature of people, “[p]ersonal
well-being requires moral competence, which includes loyalty, trust, and other
group-centered virtues, and it depends on group participation, nurture, and support.”[2]
As such, the community is a real thing, apart from the
individual, and it imposes vivid opportunities and restraints. The individual might calculate to act against
the interests of the community, as in avoiding taxes which pay for services from
which the individual does not directly benefit.
But the long-term interests of that individual are served with an aspirational
context of social integration in which there is connection between the person
and a coherent social order (a long-term concern). Individuals need to be instructed to be aware
of these benefits.
The coherent social order
or common good is in the interest of individuals, but it is an attribute of the
community or commonwealth. As just
indicated, it relates more to long-term concerns rather than immediate payoffs
or costs. In this, one can appreciate
the difference of liberated federalism to more simplified forms of federalism
(e.g., parochial/traditional federalism) or surely the natural rights view
(both constructs extensively described and explained in this blog).
In addition to the
Selznick elements that this last series of postings has reviewed, one general
contribution of Daniel Elazar should be added; that is the cultural commitment
to federalist values that one finds in the US.
This blog has repeatedly observed that this nation has drifted from a
thoroughly federalist cultural position which was prevalent in this nation from
its early history to the years after World War II. But there are still remnants found today.
Of course, and serving as
a very central example, the nation still has a structural proclivity for
federalist arrangements in the nation’s government (central-state arrangement) as
well as other institutions. One of the
major themes of this account of the succession of dialectic struggles is to
regain, at the cultural level, a firmer commitment to the moralistic stance
associated with federal-republican thinking.
In an ideal liberated federalist condition, therefore, a cultural
commitment to federalist values would be a prominent quality.
These then are the
elements of a liberated federalist model.
These elements need to be juxtaposed in order to comprise the resulting
model. The model proposed in the next number
of postings will be presented as a fundamental construct for governmental
studies at the secondary level.
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