This posting is a short follow up to the last
posting, “Spending and Saving.” In that
prior posting, a simple economic factor was pointed out and related to what
government’s role should be in the economy.
Here is not a restatement of that relationship, but a further analysis
of a point that posting made. That is,
that the construct, parochial/traditional federalism, a dominant view that Americans
shared in the years before World War II, was inadequate for the more modern
times of American governance and politics.
In
this clarification, the term parochial is central. To cite Wikipedia, one finds the
following:
Parochialism
is the state of mind whereby one focuses on small sections of an issue rather
than considering its wider context. More generally, it consists of being narrow
in scope. In that respect, it is a synonym of "provincialism". It
may, particularly when used pejoratively, be contrasted to cosmopolitanism.[1]
It is a term this blogger originally was
introduced to in his growing up years within the Catholic tradition.
He went to parochial schools for 13 years. What little questioning he expressed at the
time solicited a sense that parochialism referred to the local church and local
concerns – much in line with what Wikipedia states. What he was to learn and appreciate was how
central this idea was to American culture until, as the last posting pointed
out, the realities of a national and now global economy made this provincialism
untenable.
It
particularly applies to views of governance and politics in the US, since for
various reasons, localism was held to be central to the American
experience. The federalism that grew in
the US was originally based on the local settlements that sprung up on the eastern
seacoast of the North American landmass.
Each was the product of settlers joining together and formulating a
polity based on what was considered a sacred agreement. The word, compacts, applies to these
agreements.
More
specifically, as Daniel Elazar explains, these agreements were a type of
compact, that being covenants.[2] In that they resembled Judeo tradition,
covenants established a union in which whatever members did, they were part of
that union. The signees of the agreement
called on God to witness the agreement which solemnized it.
As the American people became a bit more
secular – to a degree the product of the Enlightenment – this element was put
aside, making the newer agreements straightforward compacts. A comparison that illustrates
this turn is that the Declaration of Independence (1776) is a covenant, and the
US Constitution (1787) is simply a compact.
In both cases, the purpose was to hold those agreements in solemnity.
The distinctions one can make between or among
the founding documents (including, for example, state constitutions) and the
terms one uses to classify them have consequences. And to illustrate, a legal matter comes to
mind. To further distinguish what is
being described in this posting, it introduces yet another term, that being
contract. Here, a historical turn – an
unfortunate one – muddles the waters.
And sure enough, the French have a role.
No, French influence is not at odds with fortune, but in terms of
constitutional principles, it does have another tradition.
The origins of this difference can be traced to
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and how he envisioned the ways and reasons people organized
to form polities. In doing so, they give
up some natural rights – the ability to behave as they wish – to practically
allow them to live under a set of laws or restrictions. This language casts a different sense from
what the Judeo tradition called for.
With a social contract, one deals with a quid
pro quo – something for something (personal rights for societal arrangement). This stands in distinction to a more communal
sense of the Judeo model. But if applied
to the Constitution, it casts that agreement with a more contractual sense and
diminishes its compact-al or communal orientation.
On a practical level, for example, with a
social contract – the more contractual approach – the courts, usually at the
hands of conservative jurists, have elected to interpret the Constitution and
laws in a literal fashion, like one interprets a contract. This is called textualism. It holds other ways to interpret – such as
historically, traditionally, structurally, prudentially, morally or based on
precedent – as being illegitimate to some degree.
In this singular way, one can see how this
other view – the natural rights view – has drained, from the American
experience, the bonding force of a communal constitutional framework. The consequences have been numerous and have
most recently included the palpable sense of a politically polarized citizenry. As the last posting concluded, a form of
federalism – a compact approach – would benefit the American people by
reintroducing a more communal sense – with hopefully less parochialism – to its
constitutional view.
[1] See “Parochialism,” Wikipedia (n.d.), accessed
January 9, 2024, URL: Parochialism - Wikipedia.
[2] This blog has repeatedly cited Elazar. For a more recent citing, see “Compact Theory
of the U.S. Constitution,” Center for the Study of Federalism (n.d.), accessed
January 9, 2024, URL: https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Compact_Theory_of_the_U.S._Constitution.
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