CHANGING TIMES

With the last posting of this blog, I began what will be a series of postings which presents a set of functions that every organization needs to satisfy in order to be a federalist organization or an association.  That posting focused on the function of producing; an organization, be it a business, a family, a church, a social group, or an athletic enterprise, has, to some minimum level, produce the goods, service, and/or environment it was formed to produce.  A car company has to produce cars; a nightclub has to produce an entertaining environment and so on.  Of all the functions, this is probably the most straightforward.  But it is not enough to just produce that thing; an organization has to meet other functions.

Samuel P. Huntington,[1] among many social scientists, developed a list of these functions.  His list is adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.  As promised, using Huntington’s list, I want to suggest a list of such functions that might be useful to guide an educator in teaching civics and government.  The guidance is geared to steering students’ attention to relevant issues associated with the creation and maintenance of federalist unions – associations of individuals who allow themselves to be federated.  Federated memberships are characterized by a common commitment toward federalist values or moral code.  As I have written before in a previous posting:

The proposed code [of liberated federalism] not only holds a particular value as a trump value, but also presents a hierarchy of values. There are three levels of values: trump value, key instrumental values, and operational values. Here is a list of these values:

•                     Trump Value: Societal welfare (as experienced through societal survival and/or advancement)

•                     Key Instrumental Values: constitutional integrity (liberty), equality, communal democracy, democratic pluralism and diversity, compacted arrangements, critical and transparent deliberation, collective problem-solving, earned trust, loyalty, patriotism (in the case of a national federated union), expertise

•                     Operational Values (partial listing): political engagement, due process, legitimate authority, privacy, universality of human rights, tolerance, non-violence, teamwork, consideration of others, economic sufficiency, security, localism

As can be noted, lower level values are logically derived from higher level values. These values, other than the trump value, are not presented as a definitive set of values, but the code is fairly tied into the trump and instrumental values as central to its theoretical base – federalist theory.

These values are not unique to liberated federalism, but they, as a set, comprise what federalists aspire to keep in the operation of their union with other members of the group and with the outside world.

This posting will now focus on a second function, that of accommodating change – adaptability.  The world changes and all organizations or groups have to meet those changes with modifications in what they do both in terms of internal operations and how they act with others.  This oftentimes means changes in not just actions, but in how members of the group or organization feel.  This can take time, and often the stress which just about always accompanies these changes can be heightened if the internal or external changes occur in a fast pace.  Changes not only vary in terms of a time factor, but also in terms of how intrusive they are.  Both of these factors, time and seriousness, have to be managed if the entity will satisfy the adaptability function.  Probably the most significant example of an issue associated with this function in the recent news has been our changes regarding race relations as illustrated by the events of Ferguson, Missouri this past year.

Here is a list of questions that an educator can use to analyze a political or social situation that addresses the adaptability function:

What are the major prevailing values and biases of the people in a given group?

What communal, regional, national, and/or global events have taken place that promise to affect the group in question?

Has the membership of the group gone through changes in its attitudes, values, and/or biases either among all of its members or among key members?

Has the membership of the group gone through a turnover due to unmet problems or due to generational aging?

Has the need for the group’s existence been satiated or its priority changed so that the concern over its importance has either been heightened or diminished in such a way that the group’s viability has come into question or its ability to perform efficiently has been compromised?

Have the relations between members grown inappropriately estranged or become too close so as to create stress among those members directly affected and/or by others within the group?

Are authority arrangements clear and appropriate given the current challenges of the group?

Have the members of the group effectively changed their skills and knowledge to meet changing demands?

These questions will also be pertinent in the consideration of other functions I will review in a future posting.  For now, let me just state that some level of change is always on-going.  This is ever truer as the society in which the group exists becomes more complex and developed.  It seems that in the post-Cold War era, one of our biggest challenges on the global stage is to deal with societies that seem to be stuck in a traditional, lesser developed mode of being.  I think our problems in the Middle East have a lot to do with this gap between modernism and traditional value orientations.  For example, many of our assumptions that led to our invasion of Iraq have to do with poor adaptability on our part in dealing with traditional mindsets and where strong authoritarian regimes are either being challenged, as in Syria, or overthrown, as in Iraq.  We seemed to think we could impose a modern political polity on a people who were not able or willing to make the necessary accommodations that our policy was calling for.  We have to be concerned not only with one’s own group’s ability to adapt, but also that of others.

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[1] Huntington, S. P.  (1968).  Political order in changing societies.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press.

THE NEED TO PRODUCE

On January 14, 2011, I posted “Requisite Functions” on this blog.  It reviewed a model of politics known as the structural-functional model by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.  In a nutshell, the model claims that in order for political systems to deal with stress and lead a healthy existence, it needs to act in such a way that certain functions are met.  They identified five functions:  rule making, rule application, rule adjudication, interest articulation, and interest aggregation.  Since the Almond and Powell model was published, there has been a slew of “function” models, each with its own set of functions and all claiming that it is imperative for systems to meet these requisites and that to the extent that they don’t, they will face stress even to the point that their very existences can come into question.  My take is that these models are useful and the exact list of functions one wants to use is dependent on the aims an analyst or student has in his/her study.  If one is an educator charged with teaching secondary students the nature and workings of our political and governmental realities, is a functional approach helpful?  Does it guide that educator to ask insightful questions that students can use to study their political and governmental world?

Of course, this blog adds another concern:  is there a list of functions that reflects a concern for federalist systems?  Is there a set of questions that has students analyze a group, be it a social group, an organization, an association, or an institution, as to whether that entity encourages and/or expects its membership to federate among themselves and pursue federalist values?  I want to suggest such a list of questions, beginning with this posting and continuing in the postings that follow.  In this effort, I want to use the ideas expressed by Samuel P. Huntington.[1]

Central to Huntington’s concern is how viable political systems are dependent on how well the various systems under their jurisdiction develop into institutions.  Viable political systems and the societies they represent need stable institutions.  Huntington writes: 

Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures in the society. … Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.  The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.[2]

And with this, Huntington offers his own set of functions.  While I will use this list of functions as overall concerns that my list will address, I will change the terminology so that classrooms will find it more adaptable to their needs.

This posting will focus on a function that is not directly identified by Huntington, but is alluded to as he describes the above list of functions, particularly adaptability.  I believe the most basic of all functions is that a social group or organization needs to produce the good, service, or environment it is created to produce.  For example, a government is created for many reasons; among them is to maintain social stability – a society can’t have havoc and chaos breaking out.  Any social/political system has, to some degree, to fulfill those aims and goals that motivated people to form that social entity.  I call this function the producing function.  As with any production, certain activities have to be accomplished.

These activities lead to questions as to whether they are/were done and to what level of viability they are/were done.  These questions can include the following:

Has the entity identified and defined the product it is created to produce?

Has the entity acquired or secured the resources needed to produce the product(s) it was set up to produce?

Is the process of production a viable use of resources?

Does the entity use the resources in a reasonably efficient mode?

Is the process of production effective?

Is the product distributed in a way that meets the aims and goals of the entity?

Are the recipients of the product sufficiently satisfied with the quality, viability, and efficiency of the product?  Do they have a method of evaluating the product and the ability to communicate their judgment of the product to those who are responsible for it and to other interested parties?

Are there in place evaluation protocols over any of the above concerns and ways to communicate the results of these evaluations?

These questions can be used by students to investigate any political organization.  That would include their own schools that, like or not, are political entities.  In the case of public schools, they engage in providing a governmental service and, as such, have to answer the concerns of a constituency:  the community they serve, particularly the parents of the students who attend them.  But here’s another idea:  have students pick one of the formulating presidential campaign organizations that we hear about; for example, Rand Paul’s people.  These organizations’ aim is to elect a particular candidate to the presidency.  That is what they want to produce.  Note:  a teacher need not use all of the above questions and they can be geared to the appropriate level of sophistication that is suitable for the students in question.

In the following postings, I will add additional functions and the questions I associate with each.  The producing function is probably the most basic of these functions and assignments limited to just this function are sufficient to lead students to discover a great deal about a political or governmental entity, be it a political campaign, a part of the government (like their school), or any other politically active entity.

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[1] Huntington, S. P.  (1968).  Political order in changing societies.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press.

[2] Ibid., p. 12.

THE VALUE OF A BAG OF ICE

I had occasion to be reminded the other day that I lived through an event that garnered national attention, at least at the time.  I lived in South Florida when Hurricane Andrew hit. We almost lost our roof and the aftermath, dealing with shortages, no electricity, and contending with homeowners’ insurance and a mortgage company, were memorable (nightmarish?) and I can say that I am glad it all ended a long time ago.  No, I am not seeking any recognition or sympathy; a lot of people experience such events – nothing special in the grand scheme of things – but the memory did bring up an issue of justice.

As we experienced the shortages after the storm, price gouging became a factor.  Actually, my wife and I were extremely lucky.  The contractor who ended up working on our home’s repairs literally just knocked on our front door.  He and his crew were from up state and they had recently hit town looking for work and were trying to take advantage of the devastation.  He offered a deal: he would give us a favorable rate and, in exchange, we would let people know about him.  We said that we would, but that we would be completely honest in our account of our arrangement with him and about the quality of the repairs.[1]  And so it was.  But not everyone was so lucky and, as is usually the case, talk around town soon revolved, to some degree, about outlawing gouging.  Actually, my understanding is that Florida does have some laws against gouging.  While I was concerned about what things might cost with shortages, I had taken enough economics courses in college to know that high prices invite high supplies which leads to lower – even lower than initial – prices.  That is the irony policy makers need to account for when contemplating laws or regulations involving price gouging.  But there is another aspect to this.  Michael Sandel[2] comments that price gouging not only hits our pocketbooks, but it also offends our notion of what is right and moral.  Price gouging is probably seen as lacking virtue.  To feel and believe that presupposes a sense for what is virtuous and moral.  And when we demand or, at least, argue for government to step in and restrict the practice, we are asking government to reflect a particular moral stand.  And that latter stand verges on what I wrote about in the last posting:  should the state, the government, promote a particular moral stand; should it foist on us someone’s view of what is right?

What makes capitalism so conducive to a natural rights perspective of governance and politics is that it is practically value free.  Its only claim to a value is to value individuals’ right to determine their own value positions.  And as such, under conditions of shortages, each person is free to determine what value he/she will put on any product or service and that includes things like ice in August in South Florida when hardly anyone has electricity.  But yet, and this feeling increases exponentially when the person is one of these householders, it just seems unjust for some to charge ten or twenty dollars for that bag of ice.  Then, all of our often proclamations for liberty are sorely tested.  It just doesn’t seem right for a neighbor, a fellow citizen, to take advantage of one who is victimized by the forces of nature.

I would argue that it is here that the tension between a federalist view and a natural rights (liberal) view comes into sharp focus.  Being a federalist myself, I have strongly mixed feelings about these opposing views of justice and virtue.  I readily think government – in the non-foisting fashion I described in the last posting – should promote a view of virtue and justice.  This blog has gone into great detail about what that view should be.  But even I and I suspect those who agree with the general tenor of this blog share to a degree ambivalence over this central and foundational disagreement:  to what extent should government promote a particular view of virtue and justice?  I will return to this question.

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[1] Let me add for the benefit of those who find themselves in such a situation, we did check out the contractor.  My wife made many a call.

[2] Sandel, M. J.  (2009).  Justice:  What’s the right thing to do?  New York, NY:  Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

NO FOISTING GOING ON HERE

Does a republic foist community on a person?  That is, does living in a true republic, as opposed to a liberal polity,[1] a means by which communal arrangements are expected and even insisted upon by government?  Richard C. Sinopoli[2] presents an argument that alludes to a view of republics as just that kind of place.  His approach, I believe, is a bit mischievous.  He begins by claiming that the founding fathers of our republic were not so community minded as recent historical revisionist work makes them out to be.  He quotes Cass R. Sunstein:  “It is no longer possible to see a Lockean consensus in the founding period, or to treat the framers as modern pluralists believing that self-interest is the inevitable motivating force behind political behavior.”[3]  Sinopoli counters this view by citing how much the founders were concerned with the ability of the individual to protect him/herself from the whims of the majority both through the delineation of rights and their much focused concern for the protection of property.  Through this analysis, it seems to become clear that Sinopoli is making his case for liberalism – natural rights perspective[4] – as the preferred general construct by which to view our constitution, governance, and politics.

My argument in this blog has been that the natural rights view enables an anomic populous.  There is a virtual literature of sociological and political research that supports the general description of an American citizenry characterized by self-centered concerns, narcissistic biases, and very low levels of political involvement.  The last national election, for example, was able to attract only about one-third of the electorate to vote.  Sinopoli argues that while the US is a liberal polity, it does engage in a full range of discussions and debates over a host of issues; that liberalism does not by its nature preclude citizens from being so engaged.  But such observations do not pass judgment on how extensive such engagement is or the quality of the discussions.  He admits that liberal polities do not encourage much participation and describes what involvement the citizens partake in is more in the form of interest-group intercourse which is aimed at advancing those interests.

This blog has not argued for a foisted community.  What it has encouraged is a civics curriculum in our schools that holds community as a general goal – more as an ideal than a policy of promotion.  It has stated that this can be done by arranging lessons that have students ponder issues and specific social and political problems in which their underlying tensions are caused or affected by the affront the issues or problems have on federalist/republican values.  Those values are summarized by being of two types:  the value for societal survival and the value of progressing toward those societal goals and aims that democratically determined decisions have identified.  Yes, these same objectives can be pursued in a liberal polity, but are they?

Let’s consider one issue:  climate change.  Here we have a developing problem, one that promises to be quite costly if not addressed.  It is caused by the consumption of the commodities, fossil fuels, central to our economy and the source of enormous wealth for very influential people.  The problem, we are told by scientists, is already causing significant costs to many.  The current winter could very well be a product of climate change.  What have been the costs this year are hard to calculate.  But since a definite determination cannot be attributed to us spewing carbons into the environment and therefore changing our climate, we officially choose, to date, to deny the connection.  We elect public officials who simply bypass the issue by claiming they are not scientists.  The discussion so far has been reflective of liberal approaches:  everyone is merely looking out for his/her immediate interests.  These might be in the form of the price of oil stocks they own, cheap gas for their cars, their jobs.  Few really look at the general effect the conditions are having on the common good.  And this seems to include a common good that might be centered on the survival of our society.  Under a worse-case scenario, climate change can threaten our very survival as a viable society.

Our history as a federal republic has had its cases of oppressive mores, customs, and even laws.  As I often have stated, the liberalization of our national, cultural mode of being has been more good than bad.  But we have at times gone too far.  We don’t have to love everyone, but we would benefit from understanding that in more ways than many of us want to admit, our common fate is more pervasive than our public policies often assume.  We would be well served to view all of our fellow citizens as partners in trying to fulfill the promise of federalist values.  This is enhanced by a general sense of kinship among us – a mutual loyalty that is based on a common fate.

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[1] A liberal polity is one in which community is not seen as an a priori goal.  See footnote # 4.

[2] Sinopoli, R. C.  (1992).  The foundations of American citizenship:  Liberalism, the constitution, and civic virtue.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

[3] Ibid., p. 25.

[4] By liberalism, I am referring in this posting to the political philosophy that promotes individual rights that include the right to determine what course of action one takes in life as long as one does not inhibit the same such right of others.  I am not referring to the general political orientation that is leftist and associated with the positions of the Democratic Party.  As a matter of fact, the liberalism I am writing about is more associated with conservative politics or libertarian political positions and is more readily associated, but exclusively, with the positions of the Republican Party.

KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE

Probably at the top of the list of what is currently disturbing has to be the hideous actions of what we call ISIS.  I must say that I never thought I would live to see the day that beheadings and putting people to death by dousing them with gasoline and lighting them up would be out there for me to see.  I have not seen the videos of these acts, but I believe the media when they tell me they are readily available for anyone to see.  How should we approach this topic in the classroom?  Do we bring it up and condemn it or do we avoid mentioning it?  Do we show the videos and run the risk that besides causing some nightmares, they might be alluring to some?  I haven’t heard one way or the other, but I suppose school districts are thinking about whether they should have some sort of policy to police this; if not, they should be.

But beyond these more potentially troubling concerns, how should we discuss ISIS, assuming a teacher is willing to take on the subject?  I think the first thing is to get some perspective.  Because something is outrageous, it does not mean that it threatens our existence or that it is beyond our ability to fix it.  ISIS is an entity that numbers fewer than 100,000 armed insurgents, localized in parts of Iraq.  Apparently, according to some accounts, the departed tyrant Saddam Hussein’s officers are higher ups in this force.  They are a group with big plans, setting up a caliphate and all; they have access to oil reserves and they are in the abduction business, raking in thousands of dollars in ransoms they are able to extract from the victims’ families.  Oh, they access to the Internet and social media that serves to broadcast their propaganda to a worldwide audience.  But all of that does not make them a potent force that can threaten the states around them, much less the US or European nations.  Yes, they apparently can spur some individuals to conduct ghastly attacks such as the one on the office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris.  But this does not rise to a national crisis; it is a crime and developed countries have the wherewithal to address it.  ISIS has no air force, no navy, no allies.  As a matter of fact, if they continue on the same course, they will antagonize enough leaders and regular folks that the victims’ anger will lead to action – as it has already done in terms of Jordan’s response – and cause the eventual demise of ISIS.  I do not see a healthy future for ISIS.

And this leads me to think of the work of a scholar I have written about in this blog:  Francis Fukuyama.  He, back in 1989, proposed that we have witnessed the “end of history.”  The fall of Communism occasioned his pronouncement.  And what he was specifically saying was that with the fall of Communism, liberal-capitalism survived as the default ideology.  Let me quote the April 18, 2014, posting, Grading the End:  “… his claim was based on a Hegelian notion of history marching by the drum of ideological conflicts (thesis vs. antithesis:  old organizing idea vs. new organizing idea).  He saw that, with the fall of communism, our collective experience on the planet was at the point that such an advancement had come to an end.”  The argument is involved and a bit complicated, but for our purposes here it is sufficient to say that because of this development, there is a lack of competing ideas that serve to inspire war between nations.  And sure enough, since the fall of Communism there has been a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts between nations, particularly developed nations.  What we have had are civil disturbances and insurgencies motivated by religious ideologies.  But even here, we are talking about limited numbers, even in the case of ISIS.  Actually, Fukuyama’s argument is holding up quite well.  My only concern today in terms of this argument is our current conflict with Putin over Ukrainian separatists.  But even there, sanctions might do the trick; we will see.  So, if I were teaching about terrorism and ISIS and all those violent images our media is full of – and rightly so – I think I would be well advised to keep all of it in perspective.  ISIS is not a mortal danger to the US and my biggest concern is that any of my students be attracted to the romantic notions of an ideology that glorifies martyrdom.

A FIFTIES SORT OF CHANGE

The years following World War II are important in developing an understanding of our current political outlooks.  It was during that time when the nation shifted in its prevailing view of government and politics.  Most of that shift seemed to be mostly at a subconscious level, the results not manifesting themselves more consciously until the 1960s and ‘70s.  There are many factors responsible, but one of them was truly hidden from Americans of the time.  Not until years later have we been able to get a clear enough picture to be able to make some sense of what transpired.  The narrative describing the shift makes for good drama and some of it has been the subject of histories, novels, and movies.  Unfortunately, in real life, the consequences of some of the changes caused many casualties, including fatalities, in the hundreds of thousands.  In large measure, these developments changed not only how Americans see government and politics, but also how they feel about them.  Ironically, the policy-makers responsible for some of the worst consequences attained what they wanted, not through successful attainment of their aims, but through their failures.  After all, they came from very conservative stock and their goals revolved around a diminished role of government in the lives of Americans.

Of whom do I write?  Well, they were mostly from the mid-West, a cadre of bureaucrats and politicians who originated from isolationist and religiously inspired folk.  They were the descendants of those who fought against American involvement with European, much less any other part of the globe, political entanglements.  This same reluctance, though, did not extend to trade.  They, mostly representing the growing agricultural interests of their region, were keen on expanding markets for their products.  This included not only harvested crops, but also mechanical equipment that was emanating from their newly minted factories.  And let us not forget the steel their foundries were producing.  So, entanglement was inevitable even if they did not see it.  And surely, such avoidance did not prevent our eventual entrance into two world wars.

After World War II, the folly of this ostrich type of behavior was beyond obvious.  Just about everyone, because of Pearl Harbor, became internationalists.  But being internationalists had to be an approach that mirrored the same prejudices that preceded the turn.  It would have to be one that reflected a Calvinistic orientation in which good and evil is easily defined.

No man represented this outlook more than John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration.  He, in turn, was supported by his brother, Allen Dulles.  Allen was put in charge of a new bureaucratic entity that grew in importance and beyond the initial idea for its creation, the CIA.  These two men played crucial roles in this shift in the perspective of how the US was to act on the international stage. 

Let me share with you an extended quote that I believe captures this shift and I will follow it with my take on its importance as to the overall effect it represents on our collective views of government and politics.

Because [in the Cold War] the enemy was cruel and totalitarian, we were justified in responding in kind.  Our survival demanded it.  There were no restraints on the other side; therefore, there should be no restraints on us.

The men who were the driving forces of this new philosophy, the Dulles brothers, Beetle Smith, and their various deputies, as well as the President himself, were from a generation profoundly affected by the vulnerability of an isolationist America to attack by foreign powers – as Pearl Harbor had proved.  They worried endlessly that the very nature of democracy, the need for the consent of the governed, made this nation vulnerable to a totalitarian adversary.  Therefore, in order to combat the enemy, the leaders of the democracies would have to sacrifice some of their nation’s freedoms and emulate their adversary.  The national security apparatus in Washington was, in effect, created so America could compete with the Communist world and do so without the unwanted clumsy scrutiny of the Congress and the press.

Given the nature of the Cold War and domestic political anxieties, the national security apparatus gradually grew richer and more powerful, operating under a separate set of laws (on occasion, it would become clear, under no laws at all).  In any crisis, if there was an element of doubt about legality, it was best to press ahead because that was what the other side would do.  The laws for the secret regime were being set by our own sworn adversaries, who, we were sure, followed no laws at all.

The key men of this world, the real insiders from the CIA and the other semicovert parts of the government, soon developed their own culture and customs … [1]

And to bolster this sense of entitlement were two early successes in which the CIA was responsible for two illegal coups:  one in Iran and one in Guatemala – two nations in which the ousted leadership had supposed ties to Communist leadership in Moscow (ties that have never been verified).  What they might have threatened were commercial interests in the United States.  In short, the stated purposes for our aggressive acts seem, in hindsight, to be highly questionable.

But perhaps more damaging to our more traditional views of governance, the posture, assumptions, and activities of these covert agents were to undermine our sense of republican governance, of citizenry oversight and participation.  The acts led to a view of government, not as an extension of ourselves, but one of agency apart from ourselves:  a consumer mentality that is highly non-federal in its orientation.  This whole development became one important force in undermining our traditional views of politics and governance; a rotting effect to our democratic ethos.

Historically, the above events paved the way to oversimplified estimations of global developments.  It led to overstretching in Vietnam, where we could not distinguish between Communism as a monolithic threat and the nationalistic strain in an enemy willing to sacrifice all for the integrity of its homeland.  In that conflict, our costs were over 58,000 US dead and a total count of over a million, not to mention the wounded.  But we won the Cold War and, compared with the world wars, at a fraction of the number of deaths.  And, as I alluded to above, the conservatives’ goal of diminishing Americans’ trust in government, as revelations of what went on keep becoming public, has diminished the trust beyond their wildest hopes.  From a federalist perspective, one can view those years following the Second World War as crucial to understanding what happened to our old assumptions of what our government stood for and could be counted on to be and to do.

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[1] Halberstam, D.  (1993).  The Fifties.  New York, NY:  Fawcett Columbine, p. 372.

CONSIDERING WHAT IS MORAL

This blog has promoted a mental construct that reintroduces, in a serious and thought-out way, the whole subject of morality to civics instruction.  If the call is at all successful, this would call for teachers to be at least familiar with the psychological standing of moral thinking.  What do we know about moral thinking; what is its function; how innate or enculturated is moral thinking and a person’s concern for it?  Are we all wired to think morally or is it totally learned?  Is it a product of rational thought or is it a reflection of our emotions?  These are questions a teacher who is about to engage in lessons where student beliefs and feelings will be engaged, should know about and accommodate so as to have any chance at success.

Jonathan Haidt[1] has reported, both his and others’ research and theorizing, on these very questions.  He points out that the lineage of this research has gone through an evolution.  Tracing this history reveals what probably constitutes our intuitive notions about moral thinking.  To begin, is morality and our concern over it something we are born with, a nature thing, or is it something we learn, a nurture thing?  The first is known as a nativist notion and the latter is an empiricist notion.  He dismisses either one of these choices as being a “false choice” between them.  Since the 1980s, the field of psychology that studies this has favored a third option:  rationalism.  Rationalism grows from the developmental work of Jean Piaget.  This line of research and theorizing was later picked up by Lawrence Kohlberg and later still by Elliot Turiel.  Simplified, the explanation is that moral thinking is the product of individuals figuring out moral situations as they grow through childhood and then into their post puberty years.  Apparently, according to this view, a person’s ability and need to develop a moral understanding are highly dependent on the person’s level of abstract thinking.  Kohlberg offered, and I was taught in my teacher preparation training, a model of moral development.  The three scholars are known as developmental psychologists, and the Kohlberg model traces a person’s march through stages of moral thinking.  There are six individual steps, through three stages, of moral commitments.  Not everyone goes through all six; actually most people get “stuck” at stage three or four.  In general, the stages have a person committing moral allegiance to ever larger levels of moral fidelity to larger and even abstract populations:  from self to immediate groups (family) to large abstract groups (nation) to abstract ideals (equality of human kind).  Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King were given as examples of individuals who went all the way to the sixth stage.  Whether you agree with this designation or not, they were two individuals who gave up their lives for “the cause.”  The fact that all of us are prone to this development, at all, suggests a level of nature having a role in our moral development.  But given that this process is not at all automatic in terms of how far a given individual develops, indicates that nurture also has a role.

Haidt reports that he was not satisfied with this model; that it did not, for him, answer all aspects of moral thinking.  He cites the work of psychological anthropologists.  In order to understand Haidt’s concern, we have to keep in mind that the developmentalists put large stock in individuals “figuring out” what is moral based on the universal disdain for hurting others.  The reasoned basis for such disdain is the simple fact that a person doesn’t want to be hurt and so the likelihood of being hurt is greatly diminished by not hurting others, in that there is universal agreement based on simple human relations.  But that simple notion does not explain the variations that exist among societies over what is moral and what is not.  And here the study becomes more complicated:  there are developed and lesser-developed societies; there are traditional and modern societies; there are literate and non-literate societies.  And sure enough, there are patterns one can detect among societies that fall on either side of each of these divides.  Not only that, but within each society, there are divides among classifications such as class and age.  So there seems to be more going on than stages of development or the ability to think abstractly.

Haidt, using the research of Richard Shweder, began testing the opposing models of moral thinking against that of the developmentalists.  Borrowing Turiel’s and Shweder’s research techniques, giving subjects short moral “stories” and asking subjects from different societal, class, and age designations what they thought was moral or immoral, Haidt was able to make distinctions between what was considered immoral or just offensive behavior that transgressed social conventions.  For example:

While walking, a man saw a dog sleeping on the road.  He walked up to it and kicked it. …

A young married woman went alone to see a movie without informing her husband.  When she returned home her husband said, “If you do it again, I will beat you black and blue.”  She did it again; he beat her black and blue.  (Judge the husband.) …

In a family, a twenty-five-year-old son addressed his father by his first name.[2]

Haidt found that in the first story, both Americans and members of traditional, non-Western, society saw kicking the dog as immoral.  The Americans found beating the wife as immoral, but not so among the traditional subjects.  And the traditional subjects saw as immoral the familiarity expressed by the son toward his father, but Americans did not.  Here were cases (the first and the third case) that harm was not inflicted to another human, but immorality was deemed to characterize all three situations by at least some of the subjects and a distinction arose over conventional views regarding respect and conventional roles.  Along with questions of respect, there are also, the research shows, concerns over what is considered disgusting.  What the research seems to indicate is that there are cultural factors at work, most notably differences between societies that are individualistic – such as Western countries in the more extreme levels – where the interests of the individual most likely will trump the interests of the group/society and sociocentric societies – such as traditional societies – where the interests of the group trump the interests of the individual.  In general, groups lacking in Western educational backgrounds tend to make clear distinctions between conventional concerns and moral ones; that among the social factors that contribute to this first distinction is class; and, very important, these distinctions held up when researchers controlled for perceptions of what caused harm – that is, when compared, members of lower classes seemed more readily to conflate conventional taboos with moral dictums even when the situations clearly did not cause anyone harm.

So, in summary, culture does have a role in determining morality.  At times, people have gut feelings about what is disgusting or disrespectful and this, in turn, will affect what is seen as immoral, and while self-construction of what is moral has a role, it doesn’t explain all of what is seen as moral or immoral.  And with that complex cauldron, I still want teachers to delve into what is moral and immoral when teaching civics and government!

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[1] Haidt, J.  (2012).  The righteous mind:  Why good people are divided by politics and religion.  New York, NY:  Pantheon Books.

[2] Ibid., p. 16.