The architecture of the nation’s constitutional structure is
a wondrous social and political invention.
A great deal of thought, debate, reflection, and compromising went into
its writing and approval. A glimpse into
this foundation is a reading of the Federalist
Papers, jointly written by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton with a few
entries by John Jay. Collectively, these
writers are known as Publius, the pen name they originally used as they
submitted the individual papers back when the proposed constitution was being
considered.[1]
As every
civics student is taught, the present-day constitution was written in the
summer of 1787 and then submitted to state constitutional conventions for
ratification. It is these representatives
in each of the states who are ultimately responsible for the nation’s basic
law. In their deliberations, the
constitutional issues were debated and arguments in favor and in opposition
were entertained. It is in this backdrop
that the Federalist Papers were
published.
The Federalist Papers have been described in
this blog, especially Federalist Paper
Number 10, by James Madison. It was
described as an argument to convince the ratification delegates to vote for the
new constitution on the basis that the proposal established an extensive
republic. By the states and the people
coming together and establishing a viable central government, the resulting
republic would be one of a large nation instead of a collection of thirteen
smaller republics. In Madison’s opinion,
this structural attribute was essential to establish any republic able to
survive the vicissitudes of normal political realities.
Those
realities begin with the very nature of human beings in that they, individually,
ultimately seek their self-interest. In
doing so, each person is naturally disposed to seek those other citizens whose
interests sufficiently are in line with his/her interests to form a faction or
a collective of people with similar interests.
A resulting faction poses more political viability than would be the
case of an individual seeking his/her desired policies individually.
In this blog,
this writer described this argument as a position that saw smaller republics be
susceptible to the control of one or two factions – described as dominant
economic entities. This faction(s) would
be able to control the political and governmental policy-making processes to
further and/or protect its (their) interests.
The blog summarily described this as “company town” politics.
In a larger
republic, as what was being formed by the new constitution, there would be many
other factions and, consequently, there would be competition among them within
the political arena. In such
competition, no one faction or combination of factions could run roughshod over
policy-makers; any attempt would be seriously challenged. In other words, factions would have to enlist
the support of non-affected factions and citizens who would be more interested
in the common good than in furthering the interests of those initiating the
proposal.
While this
description can be logically derived from the argument in Number 10, a more accurate rendition of the argument is a bit
different. And here, in line with human
nature, one is served by remembering that all governments can be divided into three
types: the rule of the one (usually a
dictatorship or monarchy), the rule of the few (usually an oligarchy or
aristocracy), or the rule of the many (usually a pure democracy or a
representative democracy which the Federalist
Papers called a republic).
Whichever form of government a
society adopts, the natural disposition is for those in power is to selfishly
seek their self-interests even to the point of abusing the common good. In doing so, those in power sow the seeds for
the demise of their system since those who are ill-served will seek relief and
eventually work toward disposing of that power that is abusing their interests. This is even the case with democracies.
Historically, one is also well-served
to remember that one important reason the Constitutional Convention was called
was the belief that the existing constitutional setup was allocating too much
power to the many – the common folk.
Shay’s Rebellion, perceived as demonstrating this condition, was but one
source of evidence.
So, among the founding fathers, there
was a general determination to contain the democratic quality that existed then
and, while not taking away all remnants of popular sovereignty, to find a
way(s) to more responsibly avoid an oppression by the majority – an oppression
that can attack the rights of the minority.
The problem with the rule of the one is that the one has the power to
oppress the rest; the problem with the rule of the few is that the few can
oppress the rest, and the problem with the rule of the many, as was seen to be
the case, is that the many can oppress the rest – the minority or the
individual.
In their study of the famous
republics of the past, they could detect the many or the few – depending on the
specific case – exercising oppressive power, and this instructed the founders about
the folly of allowing any form of oppression.
Publius’ solution to the problem was to have the rule of the many, but
with some provisos.
Hence, the Constitution provides for
checks and balances, separation of powers, and a federal structure (with the states
retaining certain sovereign powers). These
structural elements were meant to avoid oppression by any political actor. But underlying those elements, there is the
functional aspect of bigness or extension.
How does a larger republic help to
minimize the probability of oppression?
For these mechanizations (separation of powers, check and balances, and a
federal arrangement) to work, an important assumption needs to be true. That is, that the many must be doing sufficiently
well economically and otherwise, so that it does not see itself as a single
faction.
If the economic conditions are not sufficiently
prosperous and there are not sufficient levels of income and wealth
distribution, then those on the short end of the stick begin to define
themselves as belonging to a beleaguered faction. If this is nation-wide, then there is a significant
faction seeing its interests as a singular political and unifying force.
Then the many has the language and
means to favor those policies that can oppress others who are part of that
faction. For example, property rights
can come under threatening laws, or production might adopt inefficient
practices that would result in higher prices.
Such a condition of unbalanced income
and wealth, unfortunately, is affecting too many today. Due to the financial crisis of 2008 and the
steady stream of diminished numbers of industrial jobs, less and less of the
nation’s income is going to the middle class and more of it is ending up in the
pockets of the upper classes.
To quote the popular, former
presidential candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders, "’The top one-tenth of 1 percent’
of Americans ‘own almost as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent’."[2] This reality is being defined as oppression
by politicians who are ready and willing to so define it. This last presidential election shows how
this language was used to determine the result of the election.
Whether the results of the election address the
imbalance in income and wealth, time will tell.
As for now, though, these realities show that the insight Publius
expressed over 200 years ago was prescient.
The problem is that so far, the extended republic is failing. It is up to the nation’s policy-makers to
realize what is at stake and to issue the policies that address the
imbalance. It is the opinion here that
there is a time element. The nation –
the republic – is facing a serious challenge.
[1] Martin Diamond, “The Federalist,” in History of Political Philosophy, Third
Edition, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987),
659-679. The argument outlined in this
posting is based on the analysis of Mr. Diamond. This article is highly recommended.
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