This blog is currently describing and
explaining two forms of equality. It is
doing this to point out how a liberated federalist model is “activated.” The liberated federalist model is a
representation of how federation theory views idealistic governance and
politics. This model has three
components: community, entity, and
association and the reader can check out the last eight postings of this blog
for a description of these components and how they become activated.
In
terms of this posting, the context is that this model focuses on ideal politics
as an association, a federalist collective of entities, engages to respond to a
political challenge. As such, it is
event specific; that is, it draws classroom study to analyze how idealistically
an association should deal with a political challenge and, through that view,
see what actually happens.
Since
a political challenge, especially if the association is a government, is highly
likely to be over an issue relating to equality, the current effort in this
blog is to describe what that entails.
To do that, a clear presentation of what equality means is essential,
not only in terms of its overall meaning, but how it is defined in its two
forms: baseline equality and equality of
treatment.
Since
no area of concern is more apt to activate the model than an issue concerning
equality, this more extended treatment is called for. Therefore, this blog has defined equality, a la federalist values, shared its
importance, and provided a view of its related social implication. It did the same for one of its forms,
baseline equality.
In
this posting, it will build on its description of equality and proceed to
explain its other form: equality of
treatment or regulated equality.
Specifically, it will report on the definition of regulated equality and
comment on its importance. The next
posting will look at its social implication.
Definition – To get at what
equality of treatment means, one cannot just plunge into a definition. One needs to revisit baseline equality or
equal treatment. Even after defining
baseline equality, it is helpful to place some parameters on equality no matter
what economic or political arrangement exists.
Even though, on its face, there is the simple notion that equal
treatment means everyone is treated the same, one cannot avoid asking: is this possible?
With further thought, one
is faced with the realization that there are some situations in which even just
societies tolerate and enforce inequality or unequal treatment. Upon reflection, one can readily see and
understand these situations. This can be
simply demonstrated by looking at two types of such situations.
The first situation is demonstrated
by a simple example that makes the point that there are times that demand
unequal treatment. To wit, the law
doesn’t allow blind people to drive automobiles. Perhaps technology in the future will find a
cure for blindness or invent cars that can be “driven” automatically without
the need of a sighted driver. According
to news accounts, this latter possibility is right around the corner. But to date, such solutions do not exist and,
therefore, this type of inequality remains.
There is also the case of
unequal treatment that is enforced because a sought-after product or service is
too expensive for some. This is a type of inequality, but one can
legitimize it in that any good or service is limited – scarce – and needs to be
rationed by some method. The pricing
system is a form of rationing. It is
easily supported by a capitalist rationale.
The central point is, as these two types of situation point out, one
cannot have total equality.
So, even in a system of
laws and customs that adopt solely an equal treatment approach to equality,
there cannot be total equality. With
that in mind, this account returns to an earlier claim. In describing baseline equality, it made the
connection between equality and liberty.
Liberty, under federation
theory, is about having those rights to do what one should do, at least in the
ideal. What needs clarification, regarding
this form of liberty, is by what standard one judges whether something should
be done or should not be done. Such an
inquiry will assist at defining regulated condition.
It was pointed out in the
last posting that this determination of what should be done can be
complex. Since one can eliminate the
possibility of pure equality, everyone treated the same in all conditions, one
already has a sense that distinctions need to be made in how equality is
established and maintained.
With that in mind, it is
useful to inquire as to what restrictions to pure equality exists under a
federalist view. This blog has presented
a federalist moral code. The trump value
of that code is societal welfare. In
other words, what a citizen should do or should not do are those actions that
when done or not done bolster the welfare of a society – at least according to
federalist values.
Putting this idea in less
idealistic language, generally, what people should do is to align their
self-interests in such a way as to not go against – abuse – the common good. Ideally, what is valued most is for an entity
to advance the common good, but at a minimum, the federalist, moral standard is
to not abuse it. In extreme cases, this
can be backed with law, but in most cases, social expectations – norms – can secure
general adherence.
How is equality related to
this common good? In terms of regulated
condition, it adds to what was pointed out in the last posting to be missing
from the baseline form of equality. That
is the concern for dignity and integrity of each member of society. This is a nuanced difference between
regulated condition and equal condition.
To help describe this distinction, conveying a telling story is helpful.
Imagine a father with two
sons. The sons have both been stricken
with a serious disease. In the case of
one son, the disease is potentially fatal; in the case of the other, it causes
a high degree of discomfort. The father
has medication, but only enough for one dosage.
This dosage is enough to
cure the disease, but the entire dosage must be administered for the medication
to be effective. The father cannot get
any more of the medication. To which son
does the father give the medicine? How
does he make this difficult decision?
Both sons are equally loved
and equal in the eyes of the father – he wishes he had the disease instead of
either of his sons. But even if he did
care for one more, does that make a difference?
Does he flip a coin? Does he have
the sons race for the medicine and whoever gets to it first gets the
dosage? Or does he raid each of his
son’s piggy banks and whoever has more money wins? Or finally, does he tally how well behaved
each son has been and determines which son has merited the medication?
Of course, he doesn’t do
any of these things; he gives the medicine to the one whose life is in jeopardy
and thanks whatever power that both sons are not fatally threatened. This solution reflects the thinking and
feeling of regulated condition or equality of treatment. Yes, both sons are not treated equally in the
strictest form, but both are treated equally in terms of some normative
standard.
If the conditions were
reversed, the other son would get the medication. As it is, as a price for this form of
equality, the discomforted son will just have to continue being discomforted. But both sons, in this short anecdote are
given equal consideration regarding resources, assets, and other entitlements along
with being treated with integrity, dignity, and respect.
This then is the definition
of equality of treatment or regulated equality:
It is a treatment of each entity in which the person or group possesses
a baseline equality (integrity, respect, and dignity) and the right to equal
consideration, considering the entity’s needs, in the distribution of resources
or other entitlements. This mirrors the
previous definition for equality given earlier in this blog and based on
federalist values and, in turn, federation theory.
Importance - A desire for equality in general, especially
if it is emotionally felt, leads to the aspiration
for creating a commonwealth in which all its members can enjoy equally a
“regulated condition” form of equality.
When held by a society, regulated condition is categorized as a
fundamental right; equal condition (equal treatment), on the other hand, is a
derivative right.
Regulated condition is
based on an equal evaluation of everyone’s welfare. In pursuing this essential right, to the
extent it exists, dissimilar treatment for people in different categories can
be condoned and even seen a reasonable and necessary. One doesn’t allow blind people to drive
because in holding everyone’s welfare equally, the practical realities call for
dissimilar treatment. Dissimilar
treatment, though, must be justified.
The need for justification
is particularly demanded when, due to some historical developments, arbitrary
categories were – and might still be – established and maintained for
determining a difference in treatment.
Here the inequality was not based on equal consideration of human
dignity, but on its opposite. That is,
the inequality was to promote the interests of some groups above others or to
advance some misguided belief in genetic elitism.
In those cases, historical
events or conditions established some grounds in which circumstances show that
a level of disrespect to the dignity and welfare of certain groups existed (and
they might continue to exist today). In
our history, the most obvious example is that of slavery and the treatment of
African-Americans. Also, a group treated
in similar fashion is the indigenous people.
Hence, we have immoral inequality in terms of these two groups and
others.
“The objective is fairness
based on moral equality, not consistency for its own sake” – and meeting this
objective as an instance of regulated condition or equality of treatment is a
federalist aim. In other words,
government should treat people differently if to do so would be to respect and
advance the ideal that everyone has intrinsic worth. And this is where the above referred
distinction between simple baseline equality and equality of treatment is felt
and observed.
Such a case would, in the name of equality, call for providing
assistance to someone who has been subjected to unequal opportunity as is the
goal with affirmative action.
This can meaningfully give
substance to a moral equality standard; i.e., give treatment to people as
equals, but within the parameters of a federalist moral code. And this can mean dissimilar treatment. Selznick argues that this dissimilar
treatment is not meant to downgrade people, but to raise them to create a
community in which all are ideally well-born to some reasonable, minimal level.
A study of government in the
nation’s schools should include inquiry and debate about the connection between
the social equality that either exists or doesn't exist in fact and the moral
equality which is advocated by this element of the liberated federalist
model. In addition, inquiry should be
extended to ask what this element of moral equality would promote or prohibit
as policy in either the public or private sectors of the commonwealth.
What remains in describing
regulated condition is the social implication of this form. That will be the topic of the next posting.
