A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Tuesday, July 4, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, VIII

 

Liberated federalism, the view that this blog promotes to guide curricular strategies in civics education, has as one of its elements the idea of communal democracy.  In turn, communal democracy is distinguishable from what the dominant view of today is.  That is the natural rights view, which promotes a democracy that is based on an electorate of individuals as opposed to a reflection of a community.  In this area of concern, Philip Selznick offers significant insights.[1]

In most day-to-day life, there is not much difference between the two perceptions, but over the long haul, the differences are significant.  For example, individualistic views rely on governance and administration of policy, both from the public and private sectors, to be bureaucratic.  The communal view strives, where possible, to rely on people-to-people services and orientation.  The US has come to accommodate the bureaucratic approach.  A more federated mode of administration would shift people’s expectations to the latter approach.

          That is, a post bureaucratic response to social demands and ills is central to a communal democracy.  It calls for policies by government that are sensitive to community resources and to their needs.  These are judgments that sense and accommodate the fact that communities differ, but that all of them need human interactions, not cold calculations of cost-benefit analyses.

          A classic bureaucratic solution to a social problem area was the decision to put urban police officers in patrol cars and to eliminate the neighborhood police officer.  Another example, the proposal of vouchers for school choice, also infuses the cold calculations of a market to meet the human, community problems associated with education.  These examples are only two in the “sea” of systemic solutions which make sense utilizing marginal analysis but are inefficient when measured by holistic community standards and by real human needs to interact with real people.

          Central to the federalist view is the intervening role of associations between the individual and the state.  These associations include such basic institutions as families and churches.  The aspect of communal democracy on which this reliance is based is on what Selznick calls political pluralism.  Here, the aim is to disperse power by allocating to these associations a certain level of autonomy.  The quality of democracy is enriched by the texture of its elements as expressed within the commonwealth and that these associations provide.

          They add a source of identity, provide a training ground for leadership, act to discourage impulsive actions, and function as a restraint on government.  “Federalism is the keynote, and the federated unities are major groups – religious, educational, economic, cultural, ethnic, political.  In this view, the effective participants in the political community are associations, not individuals.”[2]

          In the model this blog will present in a future posting, this view of effectiveness will play a central role.  But a word of warning is called for – albeit reluctantly:  As an aspect of communal democracy, this view can also be used as a justification for collectivist solutions.  Unfortunately, fascist or communist models can also employ this same rationale to bolster their claims and prescriptions to remedy perceived social maladies.

          In guarding against such applications, personhood must never be sacrificed for the aims and tactics of any association – be it political, social, and/or economic.  This does not preclude socialist policies but limits their vibrancy or encompassing provisions.  Association or organization is seen as a method, not an end, of individual welfare. 

In another area of concern, even under the auspices of a liberated federalist approach, communal democracy as an attribute of an association should not be employed to justify a status quo that entrenches the privileges of the elite class.  The nature of associations tends to protect their own internal, existing power distribution arrangements.  Therefore, the principles of a communal democracy need to be applied to policies that govern these associations, as in labor laws that regulate the internal activities of unions.

And one might ask:  with so much being placed on people being communal, does this leaning leave one unprepared for the actions of factions?  James Madison defines factions as “… a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”[3]

First of note is Madison’s concern for the “aggregate interests of the community.”  That betrays the founder’s ultimate concern and his federated leanings.  But beyond that, he reveals between what Selznick calls democratic pluralism and oppositional pluralism.  Somewhat in counter position to democratic pluralism is oppositional pluralism. 

This Madisonian principle calls for the conflict between associations and factions to be the bulwark against arbitrary and authoritarian government.  This civil antagonism acts as a preventor of any single or oligopolistic – where the few rule – control of the government in which the interests of the general welfare would be sacrificed.

          Madison did not foresee the concentration of economic and political power that has ensued in the American arena.[4]  Selznick labels this Madisonian view as liberal pluralism or oppositional pluralism.  In this arrangement, the government is to find the equilibrium among these factions.

But irrespective of what the national or commonwealth interest might be, such concerns pose a threat to a federated polity and are enhanced by the existing concentration of economic power.  That is where a strong cultural, federated base is essential – a common belief in federated values.  And there lies an important role for civics education.

          Added to this concentration of power and wealth, America has also experienced the pluralization of its cultural base.  The Madison view was written under a significantly more, assumed homogeneous population.[5]  So, what one can say and be aware of is that the nation, demographically, has gone through significant changes and if for no other reason, earlier views of federalism need to be changed accordingly.  Adopting a vigorous view of democracy, one that is in tune with the nation’s population, is prudent if not necessary.

          With that consideration, communal democracy respects the minority’s value to cultural membership – however that might be defined during a given period.  It would find coercive assimilation unhealthy to its principles and would proceed to avoid it, if not prohibit it.  On the other hand, it would similarly look with displeasure at any cultural subgrouping that coerced its members into maintaining any person’s membership in a culturally based association.[6]

          The only insistence this view would hold, according to this blogger, would be that culturally, any messaging and other language orientating communication within the populous, if relevant, be in support of the nation’s constitutional principles (of which there is an array of foreign cultural beliefs that do not fall in line with such principles). 

Any other type of substantive messaging is open to how individuals wish to adopt and accept their personal relationship with any cultural preferences they might hold.  And with this disposition among Americans, it promises – as it has done so to this time – make life in this nation more interesting and enriching.  This posting will end with this note, but the next will continue in the vein.



[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 518, emphasis added.

[3] James Madison, “The Advantages of Union,” in Great American Thinkers Volume I:  Creating America from Settlement to Mass Democracy, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 218-252, 220.

[4] For example, Stacey Vanek Smith and Cardiff Garcia, “Companies Get Political,” NPR/WFSU (January 13, 2021), accessed July 1, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2021/01/13/956553990/companies-get-political#:~:text=Companies%20Get%20Political&text=They%20donate%20billions%20of%20dollars,aloof%20from%20the%20political%20scrum AND Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, Economics Explained:  Everything You Need to Know about How the Economy Works and Where It’s Going (New York, NY:  Simon and Schuster Inc., 1982).

[5] At least as expressed by John Jay.  See John Jay, “Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence [Federalist Paper, 2],” in The Federalist Papers (New York, NY:  Signet, 2003), 31-35.

[6] Most commentary on this topic has been on forces in society that discourage or insist on abandoning cultural traditional beliefs or customs from foreign cultures.  Yet back in the late 1990s, Michael Walzer wrote of this bit of pressure in reverse, i.e., of foreign groups enforcing cultural modes to be insistent upon by immigrants.  See Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1997).

Friday, June 30, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, VII

 

Currently, this blog is describing and explaining its favored view of governance and politics – a view this blog suggests should guide the nation’s efforts in civics education.  It is a mental construct this blogger calls liberated federalism.  To date, the blog has reviewed a couple of its elements, that being covenant or compact[1] and equality.  Readers are invited to visit previous postings to see what has been described. 

The next element is communal democracy.  As with the other related postings, those dedicated to this construct, this account of communal democracy will rely heavily on the ideas of Philip Selznick.[2]  It includes the idea of the “consent of the governed” which is derived from the principle of rule by the governed.  This association was made early by the nation’s republican leaning founders. 

What the liberated federalist perspective stresses is that the rule and consent must be viewed as that emanating from a functioning community, instead of from an aggregate of individuals (as assumed in the natural rights perspective described earlier in this blog).  This other view – this shift – to a communal democracy entails four principles:  “the protection and integration of minorities, the moral primacy of the community over the state, the responsibility of government for communal well-being, and the social basis of political participation.”[3] 

And in that vein, in terms of the protection and integration of minorities, the decision-making process in a communal democracy respects the foundational notion that the process is a reflection of “the people as a whole.”  This notion stands in counter distinction to unrestrained majority rule, in which the majority has the right to do whatever it desires.[4] 

The more communal position identifies that there are individual rights, and that the system must guarantee the integrity of each person’s fundamental needs and interests.  Therefore, the majority is limited in its ability to legally acquire what it wants.  Hence, the idea that rights protecting individuals that is found in the Bill of Rights has its origins with this view of limited democracy or a communal democracy.

          In addition, the communal position is one of inclusion in terms of fundamental law, the formulating of constitutional provisions, and in the United States, overriding a presidential veto, for which a consensus must be expressed through representative bodies.  Those incidences of consensus demand the agreement of diverse groups by insisting on 60 percent, two-thirds or three-quarter majorities. 

In addition, there is no permanent majority.  Minorities in one issue can become part of a new majority in another issue.  And upon losing on some issue, minorities can exercise their rights to associate and rights of speech to convince others to join them to form a new majority.  Of course, such an environment invigorates a polity and promotes engagement and activity – hopefully for the better.

The covenantal or compact-al, federalist view is that majority rule is a form of representation, while sovereignty is best held by a people-in-community.  That is, the community, through the institution of majority rule as expressed in representative forms and limited as indicated above, will follow in the direction of the will of the people.  A majority, no matter how large, that is cohesive enough to bar the minority from meaningfully participating, acts to serve as a threat to communal democracy and as such, represents an impoverished form of the democratic ideal.

The second aspect of a communal democracy is the position of the moral primacy of the community over the state.  This tends to be downplayed by civics instruction under the reign of natural rights thinking.  Even though many descriptions of the social contract concept are often misrepresented in current secondary school materials, federalists prefer the term social compact, and a more communal view should be emphasized.  That would portray the continual character of such agreements beyond immediate conditions and render any transactional character as being case-specific, i.e., being attributes of a specific political contest. 

For example, in using a popular textbook – as a teacher is apt to do – it is likely to employ Thomas Hobbes’ description of the state of nature to represent all the views of that concept, including that of John Locke.  The state, according to Lockean theory, originates from preexisting communities, not from autonomous and endangered individuals.  By adopting Hobbesian language, it minimizes the essential role communities play in the formulation of societal origins.

“Whatever may be said of other aspects of his thoughts, this Lockean premise [the protection of fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property] does not entail a radical individualism”[5] as Hobbes’ account tends to do.  Instead, it is based on a view of a person entangled or enmeshed in a social context with relationships of family, friends, and commitments. 

The creation of law in generating a regime helps to perfect (and protect) the community; it does not create it.  The community already has its foundation to be moral through its kinships and resulting traditions that bolster its cohesion.  Morality is allowed to transcend the public and the private spheres of the community.  It also provides the way for the community to be “civilized.”

What results is a give and take between the rights and the moral claims of the community.  There are times when the moral claims preempt private rights, as in the time of war in which involuntary conscription is necessary and permitted.  In more ordinary times, compulsory education falls under this condition. 

On the other hand, there are rights that can be protected only with narrowly constructed laws; for example, laws that regulate the search and seizure of private property in the search for criminal evidence.  This balancing between rights and the prerogatives of government demands interpretation:

 

… the identification of fundamental rights is an aspect of constitution-making; and constitutions, whether tacitly accepted or explicitly adopted, must be interpreted.  Interpretation brings to bear prudential judgment, which requires appreciation for the diverse interests and values at stake in the life of a community.  Constitutional or common-law rights to life, liberty, and justice are authoritative premises for decision; they demand vindication; but their reach is not predetermined.  There is room for enlargement of rights as well as for their limitations.[6]

 

A communal democracy is also concerned with the responsibility of government in maintaining the democracy’s well-being.  All but anarchists believe government has the responsibility for providing services for the betterment of society, even if that expectation is limited to concerns dealing with the maintenance of the society in question.  The argument is not whether the government should provide services, but to what extent.

Historically, there is a tendency for empowered democracy to create a social democracy in which the expectation for governmental services rises significantly.  A social democracy is not synonymous with a communal democracy.  Experience has offered or demonstrated a number of cases where social democracies pursue policies that are extremely individualistic, as even some welfare programs have been, and, in turn, undermine the health of the community. 

For example, Selznick points out that in the United States, a centralized welfare state has diminished the viability of local welfare resources and has debased a sense of moral obligation in meeting the challenges of the impoverished.  Instead of vibrant efforts to deal with these problems, bureaucratic responses have deadened any spirit of liberation among the general populace.

This theme will be continued in the next posting by addressing how communal responses can address these challenges and maintain a vibrant sense for a communal democracy.



[1] Covenants and compacts are sacred agreements.  Compact is the broader classification of which covenant is a subtype.  While compacts are sacred in the minds of those participating, covenants, in addition, call on God to witness the agreement.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant while the US Constitution is a compact.  Of interest, the term, federal, is derived from the Latin word for covenant, that being foedus.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[3] Ibid., 503.

[4] For a cautionary argument lodged against unincumbered majority rule for the founding generation, see John Adams, “The Revolutionary as Conservative,” in Great American Thinkers Volume I:  Creating America from Settlement to Mass Democracy, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 156-207.

[5] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth., 507, emphasis in the original.

[6] Ibid., 510.

Tuesday, June 27, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, VI

 

In sharing the various elements of liberated federalism, the proposed view by which to develop a civics curriculum, this blog is offering equality as a central concern.  In the last posting, using the ideas of Philip Selznick,[1] it described and explained the implications of what Selznick calls baseline equality.  This posting will now review his other form of equality, equal treatment.

          This next aspect, equal treatment, as with the case of baseline equality, is based on the belief in the dignity and integrity of each member of a union.  Such a belief leads to the aspiration for creating a commonwealth in which all its members can enjoy equal treatment or condition.[2] 

As baseline equality was a fundamental right, equal treatment is a derivative right and is based on an equal evaluation of everyone’s welfare.  In pursuing this right, to the extent it exists, dissimilar treatment for people in different categories can be considered and deemed rightful under what is judged to be the appropriate conditions. 

Dissimilar treatment must be justified on some grounds in which circumstances show that a level of disrespect to the dignity and welfare of certain groups exists.  “The objective is fairness based on moral equality, not consistency for its own sake.”[3]  In other words, government should treat people differently if to do so would be to respect and advance the ideal that everyone has intrinsic worth.  This can meaningfully give substance to a moral equality standard, i.e., to afford treatment to individuals as equals but realistic as to their situations.

This dissimilar treatment is not meant to down-level people, but to raise them to create a community in which all are ideally – and to a great extent actually – well-born.  So, therefore, a study of government should include inquiry and debate over the connection between the social equality that exists in fact and the equality which is advocated by this element of the liberated federalist model.  In addition, inquiry should be extended to ask what this element of moral equality would prohibit or set limits on public or private sector policy within a commonwealth.

This blogger in other venues has made a distinction among how advocates of natural rights, critical theory, and liberated federalism define equality.  Natural rights view sees it as being the establishment of equal conditions, as in equality before the law.  This blog identifies that condition as an attribute of baseline equality. 

Critical theory defines it as equal results – that there should be minimal variance in the distribution of assets – such as wealth.  And liberated federalism sees equality as regulated equality in which government and other authorities see to it that where factors, such as historical ones, place disadvantages in the path of certain groups, authoritative regulations should be put in place to alleviate or rectify the resulting disadvantages.[4]  A minimum wage would be such a regulation.

A commonwealth is then faced with a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, the inevitable ranking of individuals leads to an uneven distribution of material values.  Such a reality, though, threatens the level of moral equality in the commonwealth.  But this sort of ranking is not only pervasive among societies of all kinds but is readily justified within those societies.  Calls to end uneven distributions are unrealistic and attempts will (and have) caused unacceptable costs to other values.

For example, would attempts to even out distributions act to squelch the motivation of those who would otherwise work creatively and assiduously to advance technological and other business-oriented activities which result in higher production and productivity?  The experience of collectivist societies, such as in purely socialistic societies where such attempts have been made, seems to indicate that such motivation would be squelched.

The key to resolving the dichotomy of values is the classical liberal call for equal opportunity.  Selznick describes these values as follows:

 

No one should be hampered, no door should be closed to anyone, because of a prejudice against that person’s social origin.  Whatever opportunities exist should be open to all without regard to social class or (as later extended) to race, creed, ethnicity, or gender.  Thus equality of opportunity has the limited objective of overcoming prejudice while maintaining the legitimacy of differential rewards.[5]

 

In short, the focus is on ending any caste elements within the commonwealth.[6]  Affirmative action, under such a value, is limited to the following activities: 

 

·       identifying and providing appropriate training to those victimized by discrimination,

·       helping members of a discriminated group, or to demand evidence that public or private agencies have dealt with discriminated groups in good faith, and

·       exert meaningful effort to rectify past incidences of discrimination by actual accomplishments.

 

Helping efforts might be extended to those who have not even been discriminated against, in order to upgrade the group as a whole.  In addition, public agencies, such as schools, should provide resources to poorer members of the commonwealth to encourage recipients to compete economically for limited material values.  At its base, the commonwealth would rely on a meritocratic standard that allows those who produce or have good fortune to benefit from their effort or luck, but it dismisses as illegitimate the ideal that holds that “winners” are inherently superior.

          Inequalities in such a value system are tolerated on the grounds that to eliminate them would be costly, impractical, and too disruptive and counterproductive to the general creation of wealth of material and other assets.  This would ultimately work to the disinterests of all, including the disadvantaged and the discriminated.  Therefore, the moral equality that is sought is based on a reciprocal advantage, not on sympathy, pity, or benevolence.

          Under such a system, all should support an arrangement as if anyone making up the commonwealth could be at the bottom – “there but for the grace of God go I.”  This reciprocal nature calls on a meaningful reality that (1) allows an opportunity to improve one’s position significantly, and (2) sets up a cooperative mode of social interaction.

          It allows for rational decision-making, maximizing one’s benefits and minimizing one’s costs, but is more encompassing than the marginal analysis of the systems approach (reviewed earlier in this blog).  It considers the potential and often real distribution of assets.  Where significant imbalances exist – when basic humanity is threatened for an individual or group – leading to a lack of respect and dignity where anyone or anyone’s loved ones can find themselves in desperate and deprived conditions, appropriate welfare should be allotted.

          The reciprocal nature of this proposed arrangement has strong support within its logic for a fraternal ethos upon which community can be built and a meaningful commonwealth can be maintained.  But there exists under this logic the temptation to see all inequalities as counter to moral equality.  One needs to be clear about the functions of inequality.  Selznick comments:

 

Historically there have been four main justifications for inequalities as contributing to the common good.  It has been claimed that inequalities are essential for:  (1) effective organization for prosperity, education, public safety, and similar social goals; (2) achievement of excellence and high standards, especially in the realm of “high culture”; (3) protection of freedom, including the freedom to become unequal in possessions and personal attainment; and (4) commitment to ascriptive unities, especially family membership, which depend on recognition of special benefits and privileges.  None of these objectives can justify unlimited or unrestrained inequality.[7]

 

 

            The argument can be made that some level of inequality is both practical and moral, i.e., that a moral commonwealth should support an elitist element within its midst.  The elites, who are committed to democratic and republican ideals, are those the commonwealth depends upon to lead in the pursuit of a moral society under those ideals. 

Included in this ideal is the goal of establishing a community in which the elites and non-elites can live in an overall cooperative venture.  In summary, that cooperative effort is to seek equality that restrains arbitrary power, encourages democratic participation, and promotes effective economic opportunity.  These qualities serve as the bedrock of a liberated federalist guided polity and should be at the core of a civics curriculum.



[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] The term, “equal treatment,” as it is often used by those who ascribe to the ideas of natural rights, is limited to the notion that all should be treated in similar fashion by those in governmental authority.  Here, Selznick expands on this ideation of what “equal” or “equality” means.

[3] Ibid., 491.

[4] See for example, Robert Gutierrez, Toward a Federated Nation:  Implementing National Civics Standards (Tallahassee, FL:  Gravitas/Civics Books, 2020).

[5] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 492.

[6] Is “caste” too strong a term when considering the US?  To address that question readers are directed to Isabel Wilkerson, Caste:  The Origin of Our Discontents (New York, NY:  Random House, 2020/2023).  She makes a convincing argument that this nation has sufficient conditions to classify it as harboring a caste system.

[7] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 499, emphasis in the original.

Friday, June 23, 2023

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, V

 

This blog, over a great number of past postings, has been presenting a dialectic argument that traces the history of political biases in this nation.  More specifically, it has traced the common view of governance and politics among the population from an original parochial/traditional view to a natural rights view.  Added to that narrative, the blog has described a current challenge to the natural rights view, that being critical theory.  In each case, the blog has presented these views from the perspective of an advocate for each view respectively.

And now, this blogger presents a proposed synthesis, the liberated federalism view, which he promotes.  In this endeavor, it’s time to present this last construct – to describe and explain it.  But before the actual model is described, some of its elements need to be identified.  In doing so, this blog will dedicate several postings to this task, starting with this entry and the ones to follow.

The first element is the covenant or compact.  This element, for the purposes of this model, retains its meaning found in the parochial/traditional perspective,[1]  but because of the current social and political environment, which is encouraged by the natural rights perspective, certain attributes need to be emphasized.

          Unfortunately, the term, covenant, as it is currently used, has become synonymous with the word contract.  But within this model there is a significant difference between the idea of contract, and that of covenant or compact.  Contracts are agreements between or among individuals or groups over limited issues or binding clauses.  Covenant or compacts refer to obligations that:

 

… ought to be seen as more comprehensive and more binding … [It] suggests an indefeasible commitment and a continuing relationship.  The bond is relatively unconditional, relatively indissoluble …

            Covenant is more ambiguous [than contract] … The ensuing obligations are not fully specified in advance; instead, they derive from the nature and history of the relationship.  Respect for parents, nurture of children, civic virtue:  these duties and ideals are neither founded in consent nor created through negotiation [as in the case of contracts].[2]

 

And with this quote, this account will begin to describe what Philip Selznick shares with his readers concerning the various elements that this blogger relates to liberated federalism, the construct under review.[3]

The function of a covenant or compact includes making clear what the fundamental moral attributes and standards are in the union formed by those involved in agreeing to the provisions of such a document.  That is, there is an explicit or implied deference to moral determination beyond individual will, a positive view of the self that can make and keep such commitments, a genuine interest in the welfare of fellow members in the union, and a clear listing of principles for a distinguished and identifiable way of life. 

These notions of a covenant or compact run parallel to those espoused by Daniel Elazar in his writings concerning federalism.[4]  And in this, readers should take note that this rendition of what federalism is does recognize its structural elements – especially in terms of government structure – but the emphasis is more on what Elazar calls its processes – those ways of conducting business which honor the notion of being federated or of being partners with others.

Along with covenant or compact is the next element of this model, which is equality.  Equality, as identified in this nation’s basic national covenant – the Declaration of Independence – which is a foundational document.  It has a strong moral component utilizing both religious and secular thinking.  If nothing else, experience has shown the evil that follows when the moral principles of this hallowed document are disregarded, particularly in relation to ensuing travesties to human dignity and to the conceptions of personhood.

More ambitiously, equality acts to encourage, from a collective or communal state of mind, the formulation of a reflected and felt constitution – a true expression of a people since this principle assures that all need to be on equal standing within the arrangement.  And beyond equality’s role in the formulation of a constitution, the same sense and value motivate the creation and maintenance of a healthy commonwealth that is derived from that constitution.  “Moral equality is the postulate that all persons have the same intrinsic worth.”[5]

Selznick describes this element from two levels:  baseline equality and equal treatment – more on this below.  At either level, equality refers to the belief that despite inequality in talent, wealth, health or other assets, the entailed value calls for equal consideration of all persons’ well-being, that all have an equal right to maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons.  This ascribed status is given, by this researcher, the title of constitutional integrity.

Constitutional integrity has a normative quality since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects of that condition.  Selznick quotes Bernard Williams on this point:

 

That all men are human is, if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc. are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be forgotten.  These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations represented in perception and thought; and the capacity to feel affection for others and the consequences of this, connected with frustration of this affection, loss of its objects.[6]

 

Factually, the judgment is made from the behavior of humans, that homo sapiens are equal in their ability to make moral choices.  There exist no elite standing in this regard; each is humbled by the leveling attribute; each is subject to moral discretions; each can realize fully his or her own capacities as a person.  These attributes are what lead to meaningful self-respect and a sense of empathy that allows one to reach out to others according to Selznick and, upon reflection, one’s own common sense.

Equality has certain aspects that Selznick uses to further analyze this element.  The first, as indicated above, is what he calls baseline equality.  This aspect refers to the minimal level of equality to which each person is entitled.  It is constitutionally or formally defined.  In the history of the United States, this in turn, has to do with jurisprudential development of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to its provision of equal protection[7] and, to some degree, the due process provisions.[8]

Of particular concern are the legal entanglements of the fundamental interests of the states, the rights of individuals as they are identified in the Bill of Rights, and the corollary issue of suspect classification (when a group or class is judged to have been subject to discrimination).  That concern suggests two questions:

 

·       Do the actions of the state represent fundamental interests of that government as defined by its police powers, such as public safety, and justify any adverse treatment of individuals?

·       And how do those interests compare to the rights of individuals affected by those actions? 

 

These questions suggest that when situations are targeted against some group or person, what are the countervailing values:  usually the value of equality vs. the value of some legitimate state interest.  In addition, Selznick asks whether individuals who are adversely affected by the actions of the state are members of a group with a history of constitutional abuse being directed against them.

          That writer highlights the effects of history and the relation of individuals to their commonwealth:

 

The constitutional doctrine of equal protection does not ignore or erase differences of talent, achievement, contribution, or good fortune.  It is not a device for leveling gradations or for making society more homogeneous.  It is, however, a path to community.  Equal protection speaks above all to membership, and membership presumes that all who belong share a core identity.  This identity is wholly compatible with rich diversity so long as that diversity does not undermine equality of membership.  The most serious threat to such equality is division based on moral stigma.  Whatever its source, whether it be a certain racial or ethnic origin or level of native intelligence, the effect of moral stigma is to rank some people as intrinsically less worthy than others.  Vindication of moral equality, in the face of strong impulses toward moral hierarchy, is the primary mission of equal protection of the law.[9]

           

Within a community there is the expectation that all members can fully participate or else there can be no meaningful commonwealth.  There is not just an expectation of being protected against abuses of power, but a whole range of duties and rights attached to membership and to the protection of being members. 

While these rights and duties might be bound by limited resources and options, they are what make membership meaningful.  And this line of thought will be further pursued in the following posting as it addresses equal treatment, the other form of equality identified by Selznick.  But before leaving this notion of baseline equality, the term should be held with serious consideration and commitment among the populace of a federated union.



[1] In a few words, covenants or compacts are sacred agreements that usually set up arrangements among people.  Actually, the overall classification is compacts, of which covenants is one type.  Covenants call on God to witness the agreement and compacts, unless they are covenants, do not.  In everyday life, marriage vows are either covenants or regular compacts.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant; the US Constitution is a compact.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992), 479-480.

[3] Ibid.

[4] For example, Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,” Journal of Church and State, 33, 2 (March 1, 1991), 231-254 AND Elazar, D. J. (1994). How federal is the Constitution? Thoroughly. In a booklet of readings, Readings for Classes Taught by Professor Elazar (1994), prepared for a National Endowment for the Humanities Institute. Conducted in Steamboat Springs, Colorado, 1-30.

[5] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 483.

[6] Ibid., 483-484.

[7] Mark V. Tushnet, “Equal Protection,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 257-259.

[8] Thomas O. Sargentich, “Due Process, Procedural,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 236-237 AND Peter C. Hoffer, “Due Process, Substantive,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, edited by Kermit L. Hall (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 237-239.

[9] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 489, emphasis in the original.