COMMONWEALTH VS. INDIVIDUALISM (pt. 1)

[Note:  This is the first of two postings that are entered under the same title.  Part 2 will be posted on June 6.]

Confusion arises today with some of the language used in the early years of the republic.  For example, one of the prominent political groups of the time was known as the Anti-Federalists.  This moniker was the product of historical happenstance, an unfortunate development that had more to do with political strategy than an accurate use of the term.  In the traditional meaning of this term, the Anti-federalists were more “federalist” than the Federalists.

One of the areas in which this confusion manifests itself is over the issue of adding a bill of rights to the US Constitution.  This is seen by many as a historical turn toward individualism or individual liberty.  Despite the increasing popularity of Lockean ideas during the years of the founding, a look at this development from another perspective is useful.

In a lecture, Daniel N. Robinson states the following:

We tend to think of the American founding as being the bedrock of what we are pleased to call American individualism, often referring to it as rugged individualism, and the spectacle that I think we’re inclined to picture here …would be maybe John Wayne on the horizon, alone with his horse, and perhaps a shotgun over his shoulder, taking arms against any and all comers.  That just isn’t the America of the founding… 

[S]urely in America at the time of the founding, the proposition that the idea behind a just form of government is that somebody is to be left alone would have been regarded as pathological.[1] (emphasis added)

The history of the Bill of Rights is telling.  During the ratification process, a call for a bill of rights was part and parcel of the Anti-Federalists,' Whigs,’ demands of the proposed constitution.  In the debates that arose in the separate state ratification conventions, opponents to the new constitution, as proposed, argued that the document would be the death of individual and state rights.  Their support was to be contingent on the addition of a bill of rights.

The Anti-Federalists wanted the more traditional view of federalism with provisions to protect local control of governance.  The Federalists, on the other hand, argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because, unlike state governments, the new central government would not have unlimited power. 

In Article I of the new constitution, there was a list of delegated powers and those powers, except for a few other powers listed elsewhere in the document, would limit the central government.  The new Congress could not legislate beyond those powers.  But this did not placate the Anti-Federalists. 

With their more heightened concern over individual rights, – the effect of Locke’s influence among the Jeffersonian types – along with the rights of their local communities, – a Whig concern – they insisted that the new constitution needed a bill of rights.  The bargain was reached; the Federalists promised that as soon as the new government was set up, the first order of business would be to submit to the states proposed amendments to the constitution that would in effect serve as a bill of rights.[2]

And so, it happened with the ratification of the first ten amendments to our national constitution.  But a subtle difference exists between state and national constitutions.  In the states, the bills of rights appear first in the respective documents and serve as a list of guiding principles.  In the national constitution, the Bill of Rights appears after the main body of the document; it's an add-on.  As such, the national Bill of Rights takes on more of a legal mandated set of provisions instead of a list of guiding principles.

But this did not usher in a governance that heightened individualism or individual rights.  For example, the listing of individual rights did not practically affect jurisprudence until the beginning of the twentieth century with protections of property rights, and during the sixties and seventies of that century when, starting with the Warren Court, the courts identified constitutional rights regarding arrests, civil rights, public employment rights, and reproduction rights. 

So, to be clear, the founding generation was almost unified in supporting integral federalism.  Considering the relationship between the central government and liberty, Donald Lutz provides a revealing description:

The preamble to the U. S. Constitution “secured the blessings of liberty to “our-selves and our posterity,” echoing that long-term communitarian commitment.  The Constitution sets forth a decision-making process designed to produce, as Madison says in Federalist 10, “the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”  There must be values, attitudes, and commitments – a mental stance, if you will – that lead people to frame their discourse, approach problems, and justify solutions in terms of the long-term community interests.[3] (emphasis added).

Here, to be honest, within the discussions concerning liberty and community interests, there were genuine disagreements regarding the appropriate level of individual versus community rights.  One should remember, this is a matter of degrees.  Yes, the overall bias was toward community rights, but the shifting toward individualism had begun. 

There was the initial appeal among Jeffersonians of John Locke, and his version of natural rights thinking (this was reviewed in a previous posting).  James Madison, even with his concern over factions (described further in the next posting) and how they are difficult to control in smaller polities, voiced a more communal bias, as indicated in the above quotation.[4]  Each side had its spokespeople.  

While origins of this debate can be traced to the years surrounding the writing of the Constitution, one can safely say that the founding generation and many generations later had a significantly different view of rights from what exists currently.  This belies what many libertarians claim today.  

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[1] Daniel N. Robinson, American Ideals:  Founding a “Republic of Virtue,” (Chantilly, VA:  The Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2004), 15.

[2] Considering the Whigs’ concern, a reader of the Constitution should read Amendments II, IX, and X as protections not of individuals but of states.

[3] Daniel N. Robinson, American Ideals:  Founding a “Republic of Virtue,” 77.

[4] Lester J. Cappon (editor), Adams-Jefferson Letters, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

WHAT WAS THE ORIGINAL INTENT?

This blog has been revisiting the basic ideas that have organized its overall aim:  to introduce the reader to a construct it proposes for selecting content in civics education.  That mental construct is entitled federation theory which served as the dominant view of government and politics from the nation’s beginnings till the end of World War II.

          A functional way to view the concept of federalism, at least in terms of the purposes of this blog, is to consider it a cultural quality not a structural arrangement.  Most references to federalism relates to the governmental arrangement between the central government and state governments.  But that is not the best way to see it from the perspective of this blog.

Daniel Elazar writes that American federalism reflects more of a basic approach to governance: “... as something close to what the French term 'integral federalism, that is to say, as the animating and informing principle of the American political system flowing from a covenantal approach to human relationships.”[1]  This is less a structural perspective than a cultural one.

To add a bit more substance:  traditional federalism reaches the standard of an “integral federalism” in that it is a comprehensive explanation of US’ political origins.  It refers to a conscious agreement of a group or society to unite under the provisions of a covenant or a compact.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant; the US Constitution is a compact.  “Integral federalism” morally binds the parties as exemplified by these founding documents.  Those that agree to this type of promise are morally bound to live by its provisions.

These agreements are not contracts, quid pro quo arrangements – something for something else.  They are covenants or compacts that call for lasting moral commitments.  In every case, that quality is understood by the parties who sign such an agreement.  An individual party is basically committing him/herself or themselves (in case the joining entity is a group) to a course of being and/or action irrespective of what the other parties will subsequently do.

Gordon Wood argues that in the years surrounding the writing of the Declaration of Independence there was an especially strong popular commitment to federalist ideals.  Particularly, the political group of that time, known as the Commonwealthmen or Whigs (not to be confused with the nineteenth century Whig Party), demonstrated an inordinate level of support for republicanism which can be described as a type of political beliefs that include federalist thought.[2] 

The Whigs are credited with leading popular support for independence from Britain.  They emphasized citizen participation – especially at the local level – representative government, liberty, equality, and public virtue.  In other words, citizens bound to this cultural view lived their social lives as Tocqueville described them in an earlier posting. 

According to Wood, these Whigs conflated the ideals and ideas of the Enlightenment and religious traditions into an ideology that encompassed a moral wholeness for society.[3]

With this view in mind, how did early Americans define liberty?  A good summary term for their version of liberty is communal liberty.  It is a belief in people being highly engaged in the political decision-making process.  This is essential to traditional federalism as it both promotes social capital and operationalizes civic humanism; i.e., that communal linkages were to be taken seriously and actively encouraged among the citizenry.

          It is safe to believe that if the Whigs were around today, they would judge American views of liberty as foreign and dangerous.  Primarily, they saw liberty as a protection against governmental tyranny or despotism, not as the right of individuals to do what they wanted to do.

They promoted their view of virtue – civic virtue – in which, unlike under a tyrannical regime, one was to be virtuous because of his/her choice to be so.[4]  Choice and consent becomes central.  Consent, for them, is a precursor to being virtuous and this was essential to identifying what was acceptable political and social behavior.  There was the notion that one was free to do what one should do and this ideal is captured by the term, communal liberty. 

Juxtapose this notion of liberty with the natural rights view – the dominant view today – which holds that the individual has the right to make life decisions irrespective of community needs and ambitions and to have the legal prerogatives to carry out those decisions.[5] 

To the extent to which natural rights advocates hold this a-communal view today, the Whigs would have seen this perspective as undermining the bonds that bind the social community together.  How?  By individuals having mostly unfettered access to individually defined goals, each person is given mostly unrestricted ability to abuse his or her powers and pervert a healthy sense of liberty.  The only restraint is that a person cannot interfere with others doing the same. 

What results, according to Whig logic, is what pretty much exists today:  a social reality in which too many are engaging in licentious behavior and one that is driving toward anarchy, though the nation is not near that eventual state at present.[6] 

Were Whigs supportive of individualism and, if so, how? In accordance with their beliefs, Elazar instructs us that Americans, from the time of the nation's origin, were socialized, at least up to the mid-mark of the last century, to support a federalist individualism, “not the anarchic individualism of Latin countries, but an individualism that recognized the subtle bonds of partnership linking individuals even as they preserve their individual integrities...”[7]

From the days of the ancient Greeks, a concern with democracy has been that they devolve into anarchistic conditions.  Elazar claims that federalism is a way to stem this trend.  In short, one needs, according to federalist thinking, a popular and widespread belief in this more socially oriented and communal view of liberty and individual prerogatives.[8]

In Elazar’s own words, here is how he describes this communal view of individualism:

...[F]ederalism was extended into most areas of human relationship shaping American notions of individualism, human rights and obligations, Divine expectations, business organization, civic association and church structure as well as their notions of politics …  All agreed on the importance of popular or republican government, the necessity to diffuse power, and the importance of individual rights and dignity as the foundation of any genuinely good political system.  At the same time, all agreed that the existence of alienable [or limited] rights was not an excuse for anarchy, just as the existence of ineradicable human passions was not an excuse for tyranny.  For them, the covenant provided a means for free men to form political communities without sacrificing their essential freedom and without making energetic government impossible.[9] (emphasis added)

“Public liberty was thus the combining of each man's individual liberty into a collective governmental authority, the political liberty equivalent to democracy or government by the people themselves …”[10]  Wood writes on, “the people participate in it. Without the pooling of each man's liberty into a common body, no property would be secure.  'For power is entire and indivisible; and property is single and pointed as an atom.'”[11]

Unlike what current libertarians claim, that as defenders of constitutional principles they are offended by an active government, there was no early bias that the government is the problem or that a citizenry can't count on government to meet legitimate common needs.  Instead, the Whigs called for citizen participation in deciding what government was to do and not to represent solely the interests of the advantaged, the wealthy minority. 

In place are structural elements to prevent tyranny, e.g., voting.  Protection is secured by representation not governmental inaction.  This concern against tyranny was heightened with the creation of a strong central government in 1787.  There was no meaningful concern with government protecting the poor or other disadvantaged populations, because there was no historical record of such a thing.

Instead, the Whig’s concern was with those, generally called “Federalists,” who advocated for a strong central government.  The Whigs assumed a powerful central government would advance the ability of the rich to become richer.  For example, they could threaten the interests of the yeoman farmers.  And in this, there was agreement between the Whigs and the followers of John Locke, the early advocates of the natural rights view.

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[1] Daniel J. Elazar, “How Federal Is the Constitution?  Thoroughly,” 8.

[2] Wood does not use the term federalist, but as he describes the beliefs of the Whigs and the way Elazar and others define and describe federalism, those beliefs and federalism basically mean the same thing.  The republicanism refers to a more general form of political thinking and federalism is a more specific form of republicanism.

[3] Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Jeffrey Reiman, “Liberalism and Its Critics,” in The Liberalism-Communitarism Debate, ed. C. F. Delaney (Lanham, MD:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), 19-37. 

[6] Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787.

[7] Daniel J. Elazar, “How Federal Is the Constitution?  Thoroughly,” 10-11.

[8] Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority.”

[9] Daniel J. Elazar, “How Federal Is the Constitution?  Thoroughly,” 26-27.

[10] Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, 24.

[11] Ibid., 25.

EARLY AMERICAN VERSION OF FEDERALISM

To understand what this blog is promoting, it is necessary to review relevant historical information.  This blog is arguing that civics teachers and curricular developers should use a mental construct, federation theory, in their choice of content.  This theory has a rich history in America.

To this point, past postings have pointed out that this construct is related to civic humanism and that it was central to the thinking of the founding generation, and finally, how through the years, it has been challenged mostly by a shift toward natural rights thinking.  But what exactly is it and how is it related to civic humanism?  With this posting, these questions will begin to be answered. 

To be clear, this blog is not geared to promote an earlier form of federalism, which will be called traditional federalism, but by reviewing it and its tenets, one can appreciate what basic moral posture federalist thought is.  That construct was essential in forming our republic.  Therefore, a person cannot understand this nation’s constitution without having a working knowledge of this set of beliefs. 

According to Elazar, there are federalist ideas and structures that have had essential influences on not only current political realities, in terms of government, but also in terms of economic institutions.[1]  And traditional federalism is the source of civic ideas and ideals that are functional in promoting social capital. 

But it has its shortcomings which are due mostly to its age.  Traditional federalism, in its totality, is of another time, but it is not irrelevant.  In its time, it was an antithesis to aristocratic and monarchical privilege and some of its attributes might sound like what the advocates of Locke were seeking, but the distinguishing characteristic is its reliance and promotion of communal citizenry.[2]

Essentially, federalism is a construct emphasizing the collective and organic nature of society.  It does this while not sacrificing the integrity of the individual.  It defines society and its government as a social entity that comes about because of a process in which individuals and/or groups consciously form a union based on agreement over fundamental principles and beliefs. 

For those who are familiar with political theory, this view of societal and governmental establishment is one of reflection and choice as opposed to force or accident.  The members of the group formulate this agreement as a mutual promise among the individuals or groups making up the union. 

The agreement has the following qualities:  it is made in perpetuity; it states the purpose(s) of the union; it determines any structural arrangements; it identifies any rights the individuals or groups have under the arrangement; it establishes sanctions that its governing apparatus can administer for infractions against its provisions; and if a covenant, calls on God to witness the promise. 

Our most well-known example of a federated arrangement, not covenant but a compact, is that of the United States.  In that case, the central government was formed by an agreement among both the people of the United States' nation and among the states of the United States.  As such, the US is a complex example.  A much simpler example is a marriage.  In both examples, a member, whether an individual or a group, is equal to all other members, be it a spouse or a nation full of people and/or states. 

By definition, federated arrangements strive to secure equality.  Along with equal treatment, each member has a set of responsibilities and duties so that the union can progress toward accomplishing its purposes.  One way to see this union is to consider it as a partnership among its members whose interests are mutually advanced, at least, in the long run.

Federalism has a long history in the US.  It arrived with the Puritans who landed on the shore along Massachusetts Bay.  They adopted the old Judaic tradition of covenants which had been used to bind people together.  But even before the Puritans, the Mayflower Compact, drawn up by Pilgrims, was a covenant.[3] 

The idea is that, unlike a contract, people from time to time need to rely on others in such a way that that reliance will not waiver through challenging times.  It is not an agreement in which one party provides something in exchange for something else from another party, as in a dollar for a bag of peanuts.  It does, instead, define a relationship in which all members' interests are bound together. 

That would be the case under a government (or a marriage).  A government is formed so that a people can be afforded mutual protection and for other purposes.  A people needs to rely on this institution no matter what might happen.  By using a covenant, the Puritans established a government based on federalist principles – the term federalism has its origins in the meaning of covenant as will be further explained in a subsequent posting (along with what a compact is). 

This historical occurrence began a theoretical tradition that would have enormous influence on the nation's foundational philosophy.[4]  Its most immediate influence was in formulating our foundational documents such as subsequent constitutions and charters which were written during the colonial days and in all the original thirteen colonies and then states.  All the subsequent state constitutions follow the federalist format outlined above.

While the construct served as the dominant view of government and politics, its reign suffered from a continuous diminution.  According to Kramnick, as pointed out in a previous posting, the beginning of its diminution followed the Revolutionary War.[5]  Others place the start of this diminution at other times. Gordon S. Wood writes that federalist ideas held an unchallenged position through the writing of the Constitution by those who led the fight for independence.[6] 

This more traditional, purer rendition of federalism, with an accompanying assumption of homogeneity, had to be surrendered as our politics had to accommodate a pluralistic reality.  The homogeneity of the nation or even of localities within the nation was slipping away within a very short period of time after the establishment of communities became standard practice and the urban areas attracted more people.

As was pointed out in earlier postings as they described the various political subcultures that emerged, America was not of one mind concerning basic biases and beliefs over governance.  Whatever the beginning of its demise, as a study of the American political culture points out, the more moralistic, federalist view of government and politics was seriously challenged by transcendental thought.  This will only be the first of serious challenges to the more moralistic view. 

Each of these challenges, in turn, undermined the more communal beliefs of federalism and bolstered the individualism of the natural rights construct.  This diminution was not a simple, one-way trend.  The nation’s history indicates that some of the challenges were very complex in their effects (for example, the New Deal while providing extensive bureaucratic programs, did reignite a “we’re in this together” spirit to combat the drastic effects of the Great Depression).

But before the natural rights construct took hold as the dominant construct, a federalist view held sway, at least more so than any other view.  It hung on as a pervading atmosphere which was mostly instrumental in relaying a sense of duty and, when appropriate, shame when its moral precepts were offended.  And this dominance can be detected in place till mid twentieth century.  During its years of dominance, its influence held beyond the concerns of government and included the family, the church, and education.[7]

Stephen L. Schechter[8] provides a good sense of how intimately federalist ideas affected the development of our political tradition starting in the 1600s.  These recurring processes started with small settlements, evolved into colonies, and then into a large nation.

America engaged in a development characterized with “reflection and choice” as opposed to “accidental” development – a natural growth usually characterized by monarchial rule.  The US can point to a definite period, of short duration, in which its basic constitutional ideas were proactively thought of and implemented.

The created political entities were the product of well thought-out considerations, including these five essential attributes: 

·        the almost missionary application of covenants,

·        the reliance on rational-choice (an Enlightenment ideal),

·        the establishment of republican government characterized by popular consent and limited government,

·        the reliance on the rule of law principle which picks up on the Anglo-American common law tradition,

·        and the incorporation of “the principle of organizing polities by distributing and sharing power between general (central government) and constituent governments (the state governments).”[9]

Adding to one’s understanding is the writing of Jack N. Rakove:

The American decision for independence added a further dimension to the concept of informed citizen … Americans began writing new constitutions of government to replace the old colonial regime, and these constitutions took an avowedly republican cast [known for] the virtue of their citizens:  their public-spiritedness, their willingness to subordinate private interest to public good, their capacity to monitor their rulers for signs of tyrannical ambition, their knowledge of the essential rights government existed to protect.  A republican government required a republican society.[10] (emphasis added)

These are federalist values in operation.

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[1] Daniel J. Elazar, “How Federal Is the Constitution?  Thoroughly,” Readings for classes taught by Professor Elazar (Steamboat Springs, CO:  National Endowment for the Humanities Institute, 1994), 1-30.  A booklet of readings prepared for an institute for teachers.  In a booklet of readings.

[2] Communal citizenry will be identified by the term civic humanism, mentioned earlier, which will be more formally defined in subsequent posting.

[3] The Mayflower Compact was not written and agreed to by Puritans, but by Pilgrims who landed on the Massachusetts Bay at Plymouth Rock.

[4] Donald S. Lutz, “The Mayflower Compact, 1620,” in Roots of the Republic:  American Founding Documents Interpreted, ed. Stephen L. Schechter (Madison, WI:  Madison House, 1990), 17-23.

[5] Isaac Kramnick, “John Locke and Liberal Constitutionalism I,” in Major Problems in American Constitutional History, Volume I:  The Colonial Era Through Reconstruction, ed. Kermit L. Hall (Lexington, MA:  D. C. Heath and Company, 1992), 97-114. 

[6] Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1998).  Wood uses other terminology.

[7] Daniel J. Elazar, “How Federal Is the Constitution?  Thoroughly” AND Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).

[8] Stephen L. Schechter, introduction to Roots of the Republic:  American Founding Documents Interpreted, Stephen L. Schechter (Madison, WI:  Madison House, 1990), 1-16.

[9] Stephen L. Schechter, introduction to Roots of the Republic:  American Founding Documents Interpreted., 4.

[10] Jack N. Rokove, “Once More into the Breach:  Reflections on Jefferson, Madison, and the Religion Problem,” in Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society, ed. Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2001), 233-262, 240.  

THREE POLITICAL SUBCULTURES

This next posting compares lists of beliefs that make up the political subcultures that began to develop in America as early as its colonial days.  Specifically, it will compare the moralistic beliefs that were derived from the Calvinist tradition and the individualistic beliefs that are derived from the transcendental tradition.  These two traditions were reviewed in the last posting. 

There is another tradition, but that is limited to the southeast states of the old Confederacy.  What has resulted, though, is an intriguing story of tension among these beliefs making it more difficult to form a national political culture.  Despite this tension, a national political culture has emerged.  In part, that has been made possible by one of these traditions becoming a dominant set of values and norms. 

For most of the nation’s history, the moralistic subculture was dominant.  This was true until the years following World War II.  Since then, the individualistic subculture has become dominant.  Dominance does not equate with the elimination of other cultural biases.  One can still find strong expression of each of the three prominent belief systems.  A review of these beliefs is useful as the beliefs help explain why the nation’s politics take the form that they do.

The moralistic subculture, formed in the New England colonies, spread westward across the northern most tier of states stretching to the Pacific Ocean.  If one would want to see a current display of this subculture, pay attention to the weeks leading up to the Iowa caucuses during the next presidential cycle.  By doing so, one can detect the characteristics Daniel Elazar identifies in this subculture:

1.   Belief that politics as a profession is a calling of great moral standing.  One who chooses this line of work can contribute toward the betterment of the commonwealth.

2.   Belief that strong institutions are the foundation of a good society.  Through these institutions, society focuses on securing a healthy commonwealth.  Individuals and their welfare, ambitions, and contributions are measured and given meaning by what they accomplish within these institutions.

3.   The commonwealth recognizes good citizenship through public duty.  It defines this duty in terms of efforts within public politics and should exhibit honesty, selflessness, and a sense of commitment for the common good (akin to what this blog has cited as social capital – a la Robert Putnam).  This subculture holds as anathema the idea that a public career is a means for self-advancement.

4.   The subculture places an emphasis on local political engagement.  It does so because it is through local, community based action that people more readily engage in face-to-face politicking.  By this type of action, engaged citizens become more disposed toward improving conditions and their activity takes on a moral character.[1]

Naturally, this type of interaction comes closest to what Tocqueville [2] in a previous posting depicts as typical politics in the early years of the nation’s history.

Of the three subcultures, the moralistic provides the most supportive line of thinking and feelings aligned with the federation theory construct.  It did and still does have influence among certain sub-groupings of many Americans.  The last President who frequently used the language of the moralistic tradition was the New Englander, John F. Kennedy – e. g., “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.”

The most distinctive element of the moralistic subculture, as compared with the individualistic subculture, is that one places emphasis on the community, the collective, as opposed to the individual.  As this writer states this, it occurs to him that one can readily jump to the conclusion that the moralistic subculture is a collectivist philosophy, perhaps something like socialism. 

It is not.  The federalist construct identifies the significance of the collective in the form of a community, and argues that good and functional social policy must respect its existence and address its demands.  It is what some constitutional historians call civic humanism.

The next account of these subcultures is of the one that has become dominant today.  Mostly stretching westward from first the mid-Atlantic colonies, the individualistic subculture prevailed and still does so today.  Why?  Because it best reflects our capitalist biases as it mirrors and supports the marketplace and that subset of colonies led the way to developing the nation’s first organized market facilities of any size and wealth.

Elazar identifies the following characteristics for the individualistic political subculture:

1.   Politics, its activities and beliefs, is defined as part and parcel of the ubiquitous marketplace. Those engaged in politics are basically involved in trading favors to accomplish social goals. They are active in this exchange and are motivated by a desire to advance their political careers and expect to be adequately compensated for their participation.

2.   Citizens are mostly involved in pursuing their individual interests.  For the most part, they are concerned with private interests, not communal or public ones. Community action should be limited to minimal concerns and should, therefore, be unusual and practiced only in extreme situations.

3.   Political action should be aimed at specific problems. Political programs and ideology should be strongly avoided.

4.   Actual politics is generally a dirty business and should not be the business of most citizens. The necessary politicking should be left to those professionals who have chosen this loathsome profession. Some corruption is probably unavoidable and acceptable if it is kept to reasonable levels. Whether the public exerts the effort to clean out “city hall” depends on calculations measuring the costs and benefits of doing so.  In this atmosphere, only overwhelming public clamor will result in new government initiatives.

5.   Obviously, political activity by citizens is not encouraged. The subculture does not seek out core causes of social, economic, or political problems, and only reluctantly addresses the symptoms of such problems.[3] James McGregor Burns has described this type of political leadership as “you scratch my back, I'll scratch your back” or transactional leadership.[4]

The mid-Atlantic political culture has been exemplified, through the history of those states that stretch from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast until today; that is, these populations, in the main, live out these cultural traits.  There are areas of the country that fall outside this broad region that also exhibit these cultural traits; for example, areas of south Florida.  This is due to significant migrations within the country.

The third political subculture identified by Elazar is the traditional subculture of the southern colonies and then the southeastern states.  It is characterized by a general cultural orientation that supports an elite class (southern plantation owners and their families).  This power position should be secured by establishing a caste system in which political, economic, and social status is mostly determined by conditions of birth.  It was also heavily embroiled in racist politics. 

Of course, this subculture and its beliefs was significantly responsible for the Civil War.  The subculture, a pre-industrial view, supports and maintains a strict social and political hierarchy.  Under their paternalistic control, elites can accomplish good things, but goodness is basically defined by elitist interests.

Political parties, for example, are of little value and basically are used to recruit those who perform the legalistic requirements of governance necessary to maintain essential governmental services – such as policing services.  Politics is more a function of personal relationships.[5]

Due to mostly historical events, prominently among them the South losing the Civil War, this subculture is judged to be the least viable of the three.  Limited to the southeastern states (the old Confederacy), the subculture has been, to a great degree, regarded with less legitimacy in the rest of the country. 

Elazar, if alive today, would be perhaps a bit surprised, however, by how some southern thinking seems to be making a comeback.  For example, because of Texas prominence in the choice of textbooks used in our classrooms, – due to the size of its population and therefore its position in the textbook market – recent demands by Texas education officials regarding these books’ content might have significant influence on what texts around the country may contain.[6]

For the purposes of this blog, though, the main issues of excessive individualism are an expression of the tension between the moralistic subculture and the individualist subculture.  It is the result of the bifurcation between these two belief systems that a newer set of beliefs might evolve; a synthesis might emerge.

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[1] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966).

[2] Alexi de Tocqueville, “Political Structure of Democracy,” in Alexis de Tocqueville:  On Democracy, Revolution, and Society, ed. John Stone and Stephen Mennell (Chicago, IL:  Chicago University Press, 1980/1835), 78-101.

[3] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States.

[4] James McGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978).

[5] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States.

[6]Tim Walker, “Don’t Know Much about History:  Controversial Changes May Be in Store for Your Textbooks, Courtesy of the Texas State School Board,” National Education Association, accessed September 14, 2016. 

BRIMSTONE VS. GENTILITY

This blog has made the argument that a federalist view, more than any other, was the dominant view of governance and politics.  What does that mean?  With this posting, the blog will sort out this claim.  What it does not mean, as the use of the term, dominant, indicates, is that it was not the only view among early Americans.

Hopefully, after reading this and subsequent postings, the reader can attain a rounded understanding of the early thinking of colonists and of the citizenry of the new American republic.  This writer relies on a number of scholars to stitch together a description of these foundational thoughts, developments, and policy decisions; among them is philosopher George Santayana, political scientist Daniel J. Elazar, and political theorist/philosopher Michael J. Sandel.

In 1911, George Santayana, famous for the quote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” published an address, “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy.”[1] To begin, Santayana points out that since the earliest days of the nation, there has been a two-sided Christian view which has molded a lot of our social and political thought:  a fire-and-brimstone Calvinist view and a gentler message known as social transcendentalism.

The Calvinist view bolstered a concern for the ravages of sin and expressed itself as an “agonized conscience.” The gentler side promoted an imported, social philosophy.  Social transcendentalism, which developed more formally in Europe during the eighteenth century, augmented a more self-enhancing message.  A review of both allows one an insight into an early American tension that played out within most Americans and among them in local community settings.

Calvinism pushed Americans to be disciplined and promoted a moral standing to hard work which resulted in a discipline necessary to tame a frontier environment. The harsh conditions and its dangers were met by a people armed with a view of life and morality suited to meet the challenges. So successful was this mental and emotional framework that it became victimized by the success it allowed these settlers to achieve.

And while many of the Calvinist mentality has mellowed or diminished, Americans are still seen as a hard-working people.  As the demands of the frontier environment subsided, Americans, with a prosperous economy and material security, began to have available the finer things of life.

They found it difficult to maintain the stricter way of living, at least to the levels they endured earlier. Oh, there were attempts to refuel it with movements such as the Great Awakening in the 1730s – Calvinism did not disappear – but it lost its more stringent character by the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.[2]

An influential aspect of the Calvinist past was the development of congregations. From America’s earliest settlements, this form of social arrangement, the congregational model, characterized how Americans organized themselves.  And with this bias, the nation’s view of federalism was initially formed.

Key to this was organizing agreements among settlers through the utilization of covenants, sets of communal commitments by the settlers which established the basic social and political arrangements of the group. These instruments were formalized as written agreement(s) in the form of a charter or a constitution. To solidify this important promise to each other, the settlers called on God to witness the agreement.[3]  This aspect is developed further in future postings.

Due to diminishing harshness, transcendentalism became prominent. Leading this movement in the nineteenth century, Ralph Waldo Emerson helped define transcendentalism for Americans by activating a Kantian tradition called “systemic subjectivism.”  This was a more individualist turn, especially as compared with Calvinist thought.

Emerson strongly promoted a self-initiative bias which was highly valued in a mostly frontier nation. The quality was easily integrated into a romanticized version of Yankee lore and was instrumental in adopting Lockean ideas (which has been explained in previous postings).  But it should be remembered that Emerson’s influence does not make itself known until the mid-1800s and significantly after the Calvinist influence had been well-established.

Two characteristics were emphasized in this transcendental vision: emphasis on present needs and the importance of the will over the intellect – action over thinking.  And so, the major challenging view to a communal bias was introduced in a social and somewhat economic sense.

As opposed to the earlier Calvinist focus on evil, transcendental thought seemed to have a blind eye for it and rhapsodized an up-beat disposition and optimism. To Emerson, these dispositions translated themselves into confidence or trust in oneself, in one's ability.

Along with confidence came a positive self-definition and a faith in intuition: “the perspective of knowledge as they radiate from the self.”[4]  But this view of Emerson is getting a bit ahead of the story, but serves as backdrop for what will transpire around the years of the early republic.  After the foundational generation gave the nation its constitution (along with the Declaration of Independence), there began an increasing, over time, acceptance of individualism.

Summarily, an imbalance seemed to emerge and the challenging perspective became noteworthy; this less humble view stood in counter distinction to Calvinism.  Among the turmoil associated with an emerging nation, two competing social perspectives took root:  one, a lure for the marketplace, and two, a commonweal view, a much more communal orientation.  Each of these views would compete among the people and even within a person’s perceptions.

The marketplace view defines citizens according to their role in the bargaining processes of the market. In this view, each person seeks his or her own self-interest. On the other hand, in the commonweal view, citizens are having, among themselves, undivided interests. This tension took on different styles among the various regions of the nation and, according to Elazar, led to the evolution of three distinct political subcultures in America.[5]

Here, it is necessary to explain that this overall cultural diversity is presented in relative terms.  Each of the regions did and does exhibit the various listed cultural traits and beliefs to stronger or lesser degrees than what had been found in the other regions.  For example, the anti-communal traits exhibited in the mid-Atlantic colonies and then states are by degree stronger in that region.  But one can still detect an overall political culture characterizing the whole American nation.

In sharing a short description of each, to be provided in the next posting, of the three sub-cultures, the effort will begin with a review of the first of these which was introduced with the Pilgrims and Puritans in the New England colonies.  They were influential beyond their numbers in that their biased view of government and politics became the dominant view.  That view remained dominant till World War II.

In the next posting, this blog will compare the lists of beliefs that the subsequent subcultures developed in the different regions of the nation.  Specifically, it will compare the moralistic beliefs that are derived from the Calvinist tradition and the individualistic beliefs that are derived from the transcendental tradition.  There is another tradition, but that is limited to the southeast states of the old Confederacy.  What has resulted is an intriguing story – stay tuned.

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[1] George Santayana, “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy,” in The Annals of America, vol. 13, (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1968/1911) eds. Charles Van Doren and Mortimer J. Adler, 277-288.

[2] Daniel N. Robinson, American Ideals:  Founding a “Republic of Virtue,” [a transcript book], (Chantilly, VA:  The Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2004).

[3] Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,” Journal of Church and State, 33, (Spring, 1991):  231-254.

[4] George Santayana, “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy,” 281.

[5] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966).